

Romanian Journal of European Affairs

**Vol. 10 No. 1
March 2010**

EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF ROMANIA

Romanian Journal of European Affairs

Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2010

EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF ROMANIA

Founding Director

Niculae Idu

Director

Gabriela Drăgan

Editor-in-Chief

Oana Mocanu

Associate Editors

Mădălina Barbu

Mihai Sebe

Iulia Serafimescu

Gilda Truică

Editorial Board

Farhad Analoui – Professor in International Development and Human Resource Management, the Center for International Development, University of Bradford, UK

Daniel Dăianu – Professor, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, former MEP, former Minister of Finance

Eugen Dijmărescu – Deposit Guarantee Fund Romania

Gabriela Drăgan - Director General of the European Institute of Romania, Professor, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest

Andras Inotai - Professor, Director of the Institute for World Economics, Budapest

Mugur Isărescu - Governor of the National Bank of Romania

Alan Mayhew – Jean Monnet Professor, Sussex European Institute

Costea Munteanu - Professor, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest

Jacques Pelkmans - Jan Tinbergen Chair, Director of the Department of European Economic Studies, College of Europe - Bruges

Andrei Pleșu - Rector of New Europe College, Bucharest, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Minister of Culture

Cristian Popa - Vice Governor of the National Bank of Romania

Tudorel Postolache - Member of the Romanian Academy

Helen Wallace - Professor, European University Institute, Florence

Romanian Journal of European Affairs is published by the European Institute of Romania

7-9, Regina Elisabeta Blvd., Bucharest, Code 030016, Romania

Tel: (+4021) 314 26 96, 314 26 97, Fax: (+4021) 314 26 66

E-mail: rjea@ier.ro, [http: www.ier.ro/rjea](http://www.ier.ro/rjea)

ISSN 1582-8271

DTP: Monica Dumitrescu

Cover design: Gabriela Comoli

Print: Alpha Media Print, www.amprint.ro

Contents

EQUITY AS THE MISSING LINK: THE VALUES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Annette Freyberg-Inan	5
DISQUIETUDE ON THE EASTERN FLANK: AWAITING ALLIANCE RESPONSE Octavian Manea, Iulia Serafimescu	22
EU AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF NGOs IN PEACE MISSIONS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION Daniela Irrera	32
ARE CONTEMPORARY WARS “NEW”? Clara Darabont	52
CHANGES IN ROMANIA’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP Agnes Nicolescu	64
BETWEEN HAMMERS AND ANVILS THE SOCIALIZATION OF EUROPEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES: ROMANIA AND BULGARIA - A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY Neculai-Cristian Şurubaru	77

EQUITY AS THE MISSING LINK: THE VALUES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Annette Freyberg-Inan*

Abstract:** *The European Union (EU) is a singularly successful example of economic integration. To what extent it has also been a force for democracy- and how it can more clearly become one- are the key questions addressed in this article. Below, I first lay out how the values of prosperity, democracy, and equity are theoretically linked. Second, I show that the values of democracy and equity have been subordinate to aggregate prosperity in the process of both European integration and European Union enlargement. Not only do the EU's institutional structure and policy priorities reveal an imbalance in favor of the common market and in disfavor of a common fiscal and social policy as well as democratic accountability, EU strategy vis-à-vis candidate and accession countries reveals a disregard for the socio-economic implications of transition and for EU-fostered technocratic threats to democratic consolidation. While formal democracy of course remains a criterion for membership, EU conditionality on the whole conflicts with the development of democracy beyond minimal formal criteria. The institutional design and key policies of the enlarging EU thus clearly aim more at creating aggregate wealth than at ensuring social justice or popular empowerment. Greater awareness of the relevant choices among values should precede any further attempts at regional integration.*

Keywords: *social democracy, EU enlargement, regional integration, political norms, equity, social policy*

1. Equity as the Missing Link

Most of us are familiar with the age-old claim that democracy requires the presence of a strong middle class.¹ Why? The argument is simple: A critical mass of the population must be content enough with the system to support it, rather than struggling to overthrow it or decadently

exploiting it. Too many poor people means too much social discontent, which brings political instability. Even too many rich people can cause a problem, if, as is generally the case, democracy is accompanied by a capitalist economic order which requires individuals to hustle for constant improvement of their life circumstances in order to fulfill societal expectations of growth and progress.

*Annette Freyberg-Inan is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam and the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research. Her main fields of interest are International Relations, International Political Economy, and European Politics, with a special interest in the EU's new and prospective member states. E-mail: A.FreybergInan@uva.nl

**An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, March 4th 2005, under the title "Prosperity – Equity – Democracy: The Missing Link(s) in Europe." This paper represents an update for the Romanian Journal of European Affairs and it was submitted to the editors in October 2009.

¹ This claim was popularized by, among others, Seymour Martin Lipset in "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, 1959, pp. 69-105.

Since it needs a strong middle class, democracy requires a certain amount of prosperity. There must be enough wealth to go around to support a good standard of living for a large part of the population. Up to this point (let us call it Point A), the argument is widely accepted. From this point onward, though, we cannot proceed consensually because we are confronted with the again age-old disagreement between liberal economic thought and its critics. Put in a nutshell, economic liberalism argues more or less radically that if there is enough wealth to go around it will go where it should (to keep the system stable) without the need for public redistributive measures. Its critics argue that this is not so and suggest a variety of redistributive interventions.

This disagreement has two dimensions which should be distinguished. One is empirical, the other normative. The empirical part of the disagreement centers on the question whether prosperity in a capitalist economy really does end up broadly distributed without public measures to ensure this outcome. It is difficult to claim that liberalism has won this part of the argument. The US and Britain are widely cited cases where Reaganomics and Thatcherism have led to

increasing socio-economic polarization and a shrinking middle class. Elsewhere in western Europe (Germany is an example) similarly drastic measures are more recent, but trends can be observed that point towards similar outcomes. The normative part of the disagreement helps us to understand why the debate still rages nonetheless.

Frequently, the liberal answer to the empirical record of growing inequality under liberalism is essentially: so what? Equity as a norm (just as social justice more generally) is simply not a central concern of economic liberalism.² Sure, it would be nice if there weren't any poor people, but what matters more is that markets are free to create competitive growth and (arguably) greater aggregate prosperity. Socio-economic shocks are not to be wished for but they can be necessary sacrifices on the way to greater liberalization, which in the end will benefit everybody. The logic of argumentation in the end returns to the utilitarian empirical claim that liberalism creates the best of all possible worlds, but by now it is clear that this empirical claim is a prophesy. Consequently, in contemporary European political discourse, the liberal promise is usually not presented as a positive

² Some explanation is needed of why and how I use the term "equity" in this paper. I drawn on Karen S. Cook and Karen A. Hegtvedt, "Distributive Justice, Equity, and Equality," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9, 1983, pp. 217-41: The literature in the social sciences suggests different types of justice principles. A basic distinction between equity and distributive justice is common. "The former involves notions of exchange and the latter concerns general fairness in allocation situations" (p. 218). Exchange involves a mutually beneficial transfer of valued resources between actors, while equity is defined as "the equivalence of the outcome/input ratios of all parties involved in the exchange" (p. 218). When these ratios are not equal, that is if the exchange increases the level of inequality of pre-exchange positions, there is inequity. Important is that I view the relation between ordinary European citizens and political and economic elites as a relation of exchange, that is a mutually beneficial, two-way transfer of valued resources (reciprocation), rather than as a case of a one-way distribution of resources across a category or "circle" of recipients (allocation). That is why I employ the term "equity" rather than "distributive justice". The more encompassing term "social justice" includes two additional elements: "procedural justice," which refers to procedures by which distribution is achieved, and "retributive justice," which concerns the fairness of the allocation of punishments. These last two elements are not central to my argument here.

course of action with reference to empirical evidence of the past and present, but it is instead presented as a protective measure to defend against the threat of the alternatives: the supposed anachronism, populism, unaffordability, and inability to compete internationally of more strongly redistributive forms of political economic organization.³

I argue that this strategy of argumentation depends on the normative choice in economic liberalism to ascribe less value to equity and to democracy than do some of its key rivals (notably old-fashioned social democracy). The persuasiveness of the liberal argument depends on the “so what?” with which it answers accusations that it instrumentalizes empirical socio-economic reality for the sake of an organizational model. It does not come as a surprise, of course, that equity is not

the central norm of liberalism. What is more interesting here is that by denying the importance of this norm liberals also endanger the norm of democracy.⁴ Few liberals would accept such an accusation, even as most liberals would accept my argumentation up to Point A above. This of course creates a logical dilemma for liberalism. One way out is to extend the time-frame for the liberal prophesy to take effect. The argument then is that democracy can persist through short-term shocks to equity, which are necessary to ensure prosperity, which is necessary to restore equity in the longer run, and thus supports democracy.

Critics of liberalism have primarily two responses. One draws attention to historical cases of democracy succumbing to tensions created by socio-economic shocks and thus argues that democracy is more fragile and more

³ Redistributive measures can of course be seen to conflict with the norm of equity. However, as long as inequality is not declining at the aggregate level it appears that trends of wealth concentration are counteracting public redistribution measures, as is typical for advanced capitalist societies. I hold that redistributive measures are required to prevent worsening inequality, which is itself a sign of inequity, at least at the aggregate level of societal exchange.

⁴ Again, an explanation of my definition of this key term is in order. I argue with David Held that democratic autonomy requires that “people should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others” (*Models of Democracy*, Stanford University Press, 2nd ed. 1997, p. 301). This view is fairly mainstream within Europe and does not conflict with a liberal understanding. According to a 2001 White Paper on European Governance, a democratic political system must fulfill the criteria of popular sovereignty, human rights protection, and congruence and accountability. Popular sovereignty ensures citizens’ ability to participate in the legislative process; human rights are primarily understood as liberal rights to private freedom; congruence assures that those affected by decisions are also responsible for them; accountability means decision makers can be held responsible for their actions and can be dismissed by the citizens. It is emphasized that “citizenship entails not only to be ruled but also to rule in turn.” (Erik Oddavar Eriksen, “Governance or Democracy? The White Paper on European Governance”, Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 12, October 3rd 2001; available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/jeanmo/p0023.html>, last accessed September 30th 2009). These criteria for democracy are closely linked with the popular understanding of democratic legitimacy as laid out by Christopher Lord and David Beetham: A legitimate political system is seen to fulfill three criteria: “performance in meeting the needs and values of citizens; public control with political equality; and a sense of identity [...]” shared by the citizens (“Legitimising the EU: Is There a ‘Post-Parliamentary Basis’ for Its Legitimation?” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39/3, 2001, pp. 443-62). This article focuses on the first two criteria for the political legitimacy of the European Union.

immediately dependent on equity than liberalism assumes.⁵ The other response emphasizes the normative dimension of the conflict and argues that equity should not be merely an instrumental link but rather one of the primary goals of political economic organization.⁶

The following pages are informed by both responses. I view equity as an important norm in its own right. I also view it as a prerequisite of democracy, and one on which democracy is more immediately dependent than liberalism assumes. My geographical area of interest is the expanding European Union. It is of course composed of more and less consolidated democracies. The issue of democratic fragility is especially salient in the new and future member states which have emerged from communism. I will concentrate in my remarks on the effects of EU integration strategy on those countries. However, as recent successes of anti-democratic (and illiberal) parties in several old member states have shown, they are by no means immune from the risks discussed here. Democracy in the European Union is of course a complicated subject, given that it is composed of an intricate interplay between domestic and supranational elements. I will remark in this paper on the evolution of both democracy within states as well as democracy at the supra-state level in Europe.

2. The EU's Focus on Prosperity: How Equity and Democracy Suffer

In this section I will argue that equity as well as democracy are generally subordinate goals in European Union policy. First, I will take a look at the process of European integration in general (with a focus on the deepening of integration). Second, I will examine the EU's enlargement strategy in particular (the widening of integration). In both areas a strong focus on the goal of aggregate prosperity can be observed.

2.1. Deepening

From its beginnings in the 1950s European integration has of course had the goal of increasing prosperity in the member states. The main key for achieving this goal has been economic liberalization, roughly speaking first of trade in coal and steel, then manufactured goods, then agricultural goods, then services and capital, then (to date still imperfectly) labor.⁷ The result of this progressive liberalization and the accompanying creation of a common customs regime has been a large common market. Since 2002 the euro also unites a large and growing number of the member states under a common monetary regime. In the meantime, fiscal policy remains the prerogative of member states. The Lisbon Treaty, now ratified by

⁵ Such arguments are indebted to Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation: Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 [1944]).

⁶ The term equity is not normally used in this literature. The goal is more commonly referred to as social justice and/or social security.

⁷ The EU has only been called EU since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. Before that date it was referred to as the European Communities. However, for the sake of simplicity I will in this paper use the term European Union (EU) to refer to the institutional apparatus of European supranational integration from the creation of the ECSC until the present day.

all member states, leaves unanimity in place as the voting rule in the Council in tax matters (Art. 223, §2). Fiscal policy being the main instrument by which to implement redistributive measures, redistribution within the EU has primarily been the business of individual member states with their rather large variety of domestic political economic regimes. Within-state redistribution obviously does little to ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth across the EU. Pan-European convergence of national wealth was mainly expected to result from negative economic integration (i.e. liberalization),⁸ and judged by macroeconomic (national) indicators convergence has indeed occurred (the most spectacular case to date being the rise of Ireland).

The main and important exceptions to the rule that measures to combat economic inequality within states are member state business, and that the accomplishment of trans-national convergence is left to market forces, are the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds (SCF) and its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Structural and Cohesion Funds use a large part of the EU budget to channel resources to the economically weakest regions within the EU to take advantage of their growth potential and increase regional cohesion. The CAP uses an even larger portion of the EU budget to support certain (i.e. business) elements of the agricultural sector throughout Europe without regard for location.

These important transnational policies with a redistributive dimension

are currently under threat. Significant reforms to the CAP have been widely considered necessary for a long time and have only been prevented by threat of national vetoes of main current recipients. The enlargement process also demands a reorientation of the structural and cohesion funds from which, again, old members stand to lose. Further reform of both policies is both inevitable and, unsurprisingly, a major cause of contention in contemporary EU politics. However, more significant are increasing calls for a reduction of the overall volume of both CAP money and the SCFs, motivated by the increasing tightfistedness of the main contributors, most of which face domestic budget crisis (as judged by the criteria of the stability pact and only partly as a result of the current global crisis). Such calls undermine both the solidarity dimension of European integration and the movement towards an "ever closer union" in general. Aiming to devolve responsibility for regional development to member state governments might make sense in the Netherlands or Austria but hardly makes sense in the new member states, where currently all but three regions count among the least developed in the Union.⁹ The institutionalization of the principle of solidarity in the Union's polity and practices had precisely the aim of safeguarding redistributive measures from the dynamics of charitable giving, which depend on high levels of inequality combined with fair weather conditions for the potentially charitable. It is precisely for the times when sharing would no longer

⁸ Negative integration results from the removal of obstacles to exchange. Positive integration is the creation of common institutions and practices. The EU as we know it today is a unique result of both.

⁹ Prague, Bratislava, and Közép-Magyarország (which includes Budapest) are currently (2009-2013) the only three regions in the post-communist new member states which do not qualify for structural funds.

be easy that redistributive institutions and practices were invented. The ease with which some in Europe now call for their dismantling is truly frightening in light of this commonsensical observation. It is more easily understood when one realizes that all too often the call for limits to and a devolution of the SCF and CAP are motivated by a general desire to limit and even turn back supranationalism in the EU.

The EU budget is tiny as a percentage of GDP, and the EU's redistributive measures hardly create comfortable welfare state conditions for farmers and impoverished regions. For Euroskeptic liberals¹⁰ they are still a double affront. First, they are supranational policies and therefore by definition offensive. Second, they represent a form of state intervention in market dynamics. On the other side of the debate are those for whom these policies do not go far enough towards cushioning the inequality-generating (or at least inequality-preserving) effects of the economic integration of disparate regions and population groups. They observe that inequality within Europe is not accurately measured by comparing national-level data. Instead, groups of "winners" and "losers" are as much spread across European borders as are business interests. They are the advocates of the development of a common social policy to complement the common economic framework already in place and to further

increase cohesion within the Union by acknowledging sub- and trans-national socio-economic dynamics in proportion to their actual relevance in a highly integrated pan-European economy. I argue that the embrace of a common social policy would not, as Euroskeptics claim, lead to a further disempowering of members states. Instead, it would acknowledge the already existing and very serious limits on member states' ability to tax and spend (which are due to agreements among them as well as within the larger, globalizing international political economy). Moreover, it would help create a balance between the forces of state and market where there is now an imbalance in favor of markets that erodes state power more thoroughly than any amount of majority voting in the Council ever could.

Olivier Blanchard, economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, observes that EU member state "governments have willingly delegated [...] powers [over the single market] to Brussels in order to achieve reforms while being able to shift the blame to Brussels." Now, the resulting "product and market deregulation put strong pressures on labour market institutions."¹¹ A Bloomberg report of December 2004 provides an impressive overview over the resulting liberalization measures adopted all over Europe.¹² In the year 2005 alone, corporate and income taxes were lowered

¹⁰ Liberals in Europe can be Euroskeptic but frequently are not. Their stance typically depends on the economic community with which they identify and on their judgment of how this community is affected by being part of the larger EU economy. At one extreme we find the dogmatic British liberal Euroskeptics, at the other the liberal MPs in the European Parliament, which are generally rather strongly supranationalist.

¹¹ Olivier Blanchard, "The Economic Future of Europe," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18/4, 2004, pp. 3-26.

¹² "European Governments Cut Taxes to Spur Growth, Investment," Bloomberg, Dec. 31st 2004; available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000100&sid=aWRewFbVAjSs&refer=germany>, last accessed February 15th 2005.

and tax systems made less progressive in Italy, Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Turkey, Denmark, Poland, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Romania, and Estonia. The cuts add up to more than 18 billion euro in income losses for governments, which hope to thereby boost consumer spending, investment, and aggregate GDP growth. In conjunction, labor market reforms, such as notably in Germany, are forcing through greater flexibilization and reducing the decisionmaking power of organized labor and employees. While the above measures are primarily meant to create conditions for investment attractive to potentially footloose capital, the next set of measures is primarily meant to increase employment rates and aggregate labor productivity from below, a goal which seems to optimistically presuppose the (re-)creation of jobs which do not presently exist. Changes to welfare regulations (again Germany is a well-known example) threaten the unemployed with poverty. The pension age is being increased all around. Working hours are being expanded and holidays cut back. Continuing economic integration, especially with the new member states, is frequently cited as the motivation for such measures, as if they were the only possible response – a rhetorical strategy which further serves to test pan-European solidarity, notably among organized labor.

Concurrently with the above developments and in line with the Lisbon Agenda,¹³ the EU has undertaken

a strong push to further liberalize the services sector. The two blueprints in this area are, first, the financial services action plan (FSAP), which seeks to create a single market for financial services. It comprises 42 measures designed to harmonise the member states' rules on securities, banking, insurance, mortgages, pensions and all other forms of financial transaction. The second blueprint is the services directive (the so-called Bolkestein directive, named after the former Dutch EU Commissioner for Internal Market, Taxation and Customs Union, Frits Bolkestein). Passed in late 2006, it focuses on non-financial services and supports the right of free establishment for service providers and the free movement of services between member states. It also includes a version of the controversial "country-of-origin principle," according to which a service provider is subject to only the law of the country in which it is established and not the one where it operates. As its many critics have pointed out, the services directive not only further upsets the balance between common market and un-common governance but can also facilitate a regulatory race to the bottom with negative consequences for consumer protection, environmental safety, and other important regulatory achievements of the past.

This, then, is the Europe of today. A common social policy is not in sight for the time being. The dominance of neoliberal ideology combines with a sufficient amount of anti-supranationalism to prevent it. As shown above, Europe-

¹³ In March 2000, the Lisbon European Council presented a ten-year strategy to transform the EU into the world's "most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010". The liberalization of the services sector and a push for higher employment rates are both elements of this strategy, which overall takes a broadly neoliberal direction (the main exception being its strong focus on investment in education and R&D).

wide redistribution measures and with them the solidarity dimension of European integration are under threat. The importance of equity as a general EU policy goal is diminishing further today, in the general context of further liberalization, even as we have entered a time of obvious global crisis.

What does this mean for democracy in the Union? Generally speaking, the European Union has become a more democratic polity over time. The introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, the ever expanding law-making power of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Council, the increasing influence of national parliaments and the Committee of Regions, and a variety of other changes have combined to achieve this effect. However, the EU is still by all accounts far from being a thoroughly democratically organized system of governance, and complaints about a “democratic deficit” abound.¹⁴ The European Union is not thoroughly democratized with good reason: Its citizens don’t support it in a large enough majority, nor with enough reliability. European integration began after WW II as an elite project. Very likely it could not have begun any other way. But the negative side-effects of this legacy are now obvious: Attempts to bring in the people at this late stage in the process are extremely problematic. As it said to the accession countries of the

past, the EU now has to say to its citizens: This is the European project - take it or leave it! But unlike in the case of the accession countries, if the EU’s citizens decide to “leave it,” the project will not survive. As has become abundantly clear in the attempt to develop a Constitutional Treaty for the EU, democratizing now is risky, because the citizens just might wish to rearrange things much more fundamentally than is acceptable to the elites (both political and economic) that have been able to shape the process thus far.

The problem of a lack of Euro-enthusiasm among ordinary citizens is complex. Its main causes probably include a lack of insight into the importance of European governance for their lives and the relentless efforts of Euroskeptics and beleaguered domestic politicians alike to blame hairy problems on “Brussels”. However, another part of the explanation is exceedingly simple. In the eyes of most citizens, to European governance there is an alternative, to domestic governance there is not. When asked whether they would like to do away with the existence of a national government, most citizens would say no for the simple reason that they couldn’t imagine life without it (and indeed, such life might be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”). Life without European governance, on the other hand, would be simply like the good (or bad) old days. Or wouldn’t it? It probably

¹⁴ See, for example, David Beetham and Christopher Lord, *Legitimacy and the European Union* (London: Ashley, Wesley, Longman, 1998); Dimitris N. Chrysochoou, *Democracy in the European Union* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998); Christopher Lord, *Democracy in the European Union* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998); Christopher Lord and David Beetham, “Legitimizing the EU: Is there a ‘Post-Parliamentary Basis’ for Its Legitimation?” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39/3, 2001, pp. 443-62; Philippe C. Schmitter, *How to Democratize the European Union... and Why Bother?* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

would not, but this insight is not self-evident. Imagining how, say, Belgium would have fared in a globalizing world economy since 1950 if it had not been a part of the EU is a demanding exercise in counterfactualizing. As a result of the difficulty of such exercises, many EU citizens simply do not know why the EU has to exist (except for the convenience of not having to change money or stop at border check points when traveling to the northern Mediterranean beaches).

It is the nation state which provides the most evident forms of security by having a police force and army and a court system. It is the nation state that levies taxes and pays social benefits. It is the nation state that pursues an employment policy and runs an educational and a medical system. In the worst case scenario the citizen of a member state can see that EU stability pact criteria demand tight budgetary policy, that economic integration means a loss of jobs to other regions of the Union and further stress for the domestic economy through an influx of cheaper products and labor, and can see very few of the benefits that integration can bring to more competitively situated groups and individuals. What such a citizen would likely demand as a condition of continuing European integration would be more equity, a social security system that can buffer the shocks caused by integration for those temporarily less competitively placed. Nation states within Europe are no longer in the position to provide such social security. Social unrest and non-mainstream parties are growing as a consequence. The EU

both constitutes the appropriate level of governance to step into the emerging vacuum of security provision and stands to gain significant relevance and potential legitimacy in the eyes of citizens if it did.

Until European elites are in their majority prepared to shift the strategy of continuing integration away from a focus on special interests and aggregate prosperity, further integration is incompatible with further democratization.¹⁵ There are too many losers from the process of European liberalization, who can create political instability if they are given the power. Thus, equity must be the link which can make sustainable the pursuit of prosperity in a democratic context in Europe. Equity in Europe can in contemporary circumstances only be achieved through a common social policy and consistent support for the solidarity dimension of integration.

2.2. Widening

EU enlargement of course does not take place independently of and disconnected from the larger integration project. As a consequence, it bears many of its general features. Given the precarious state of democracy in several new and soon-to-be member states, it seems important to take a look at the consequences the EU's management of enlargement has had in those countries. I will first draw attention to the strong focus on the economic liberalization dimension of integration exhibited by the Commission's enlargement strategy.

¹⁵ Similar arguments are made by Philippe C. Schmitter, *How to Democratize the European Union... and Why Bother?* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) and Fritz Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Second, I will talk about the negative consequences this emphasis has had for socio-economic security and democratic consolidation in the new member states. Third, I will take a closer look at the economic criteria for EU accession, which themselves work to deemphasize the importance of equity and solidarity in the Union.

2.2.1. Focus on economic liberalization

In line with the dynamics of European integration in the west, integration with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) also began with the economic dimension. Soon after the end of the Cold War, the EU removed old import quotas on a number of CEE products, extended the Generalised System of Preferences, and concluded Trade and Co-operation Agreements with Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Soon afterwards, Association Agreements, also called "Europe Agreements," were concluded with the same countries.¹⁶ They provided the regulatory framework for the progressive liberalization of economic relations, which received a further strong push through the process of accession negotiations.

While accession with countries that could not boast formally democratic systems and rule of law or that committed crimes against groups or individuals that

could cause international outrage was of course always out of the question, the EU's emphasis on democratizing the formerly communist future member states has from the get-go been much weaker than many optimistic Europeans believe. While the Copenhagen criteria included a set of political prerequisites for negotiating membership that demanded "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities," during the course of accession negotiations more emphasis was consistently placed by the Commission on the Copenhagen economic criteria: "the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union."¹⁷ This occurred in primarily two ways: First, political problems related to the functioning of democracy unless truly major (such as Slovakia's Meciar interlude) tended to be glossed over (except in cases where journalists or EP members created enough scandal to make their acknowledgement unavoidable), while deficits with respect to liberalization and deregulation were much more likely to be noted. Second, where political problems were identified, they were presented as less serious obstacles for the conclusion of negotiations than those related to the functioning of the economy (including the administrative prerequisites of such functioning). In sum, integrating the new and prospective member states fully into

¹⁶ The EU had already established Association Agreements with Turkey (1963), Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972). A Customs Union with candidate country Turkey has been operational since December 1995.

¹⁷ The third set of criteria, "the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union," is a vital element of both other sets of criteria but was again applied mainly with reference to the requirements of economic integration. The same is true for the condition stressed by the Madrid European Council in December 1995 that candidate countries must create the proper conditions for their integration through the adjustment of their administrative structures.

the common market (and zone of liberal economic policymaking) was apparently more important to the Commission than helping those countries along the road to democracy and making sure they would not import serious democratic deficiencies into the EU.¹⁸

2.2.2. Effects on equity and democracy in acceding countries

The second aspect of the EU's enlargement strategy to which I want to draw attention is the tendency to overlook or disregard the negative effects this strategy has had for, first, democracy and, second, socio-economic security in the accession countries. The first of these effects links with the elite-driven nature of the European integration process in general and may be seen to consist in the transposition of the European elite bias into the domestic context of accession preparations. In post-communist societies state-society relations are predictably distant and non-governmental associational activity is minimal. Societal interests thus have trouble finding political expression and taking an active part in shaping policy. There is widespread agreement that the consolidation of democracy in those countries requires the development of an active civil society and closer state-society relations. However, the EU has not only

done relatively little to support those goals, it has arguably instrumentalized and thereby strengthened the relatively large leeway of domestic elites vis-à-vis their citizens to ease the achievement of its own goals in the negotiation process.¹⁹ The paucity of public information about the stakes in and the pros and cons of accession and the lack of its critical discussion in the public sphere were not problematized by the EU. It seemed more important that the referenda in accession countries on the accession treaty would all come out positive than how such yes-votes were obtained or what they meant.

Domestic elites stood to profit from the EU's lack of attention for their capturing of the accession process for their own domestic benefit. On the one hand, the EU could be blamed for unpopular measures that ostensibly or actually had to be taken to make accession possible. On the other hand, the large if uninformed popular support for accession (especially in the early states of the process) and the often illusionary hopes associated with this goal could be exploited to keep the population in line and suffering patiently through administrative periods marked by ineptness and/or corruption. Even though circumstances of course differ between the various new and prospective member states, it is rather astonishing how twenty years after the end of communism in CEE the one lesson domestic elites in

¹⁸ As the EU institution which holds the negotiations with prospective member states, the Commission is most influential in determining their terms. The European Parliament has been more inclined to worry about political criteria, but it has little influence. The Council's stance shifts over time in response to shifts in national governments as well as trade-offs struck among its members. Generally, however, it has always gone along with the recommendations of the Commission (which in turn try to anticipate the stance of the Council).

¹⁹ I have gone into greater detail on this issue with a particular focus on Romania in "Which Way to Progress? The Impact of International Organizations in Romania," in Ronald Linden (ed.), *Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See also Tom Gallagher, *Theft of a Nation: Romania since Communism* (London: Hurst & Company, 2005).

the newly democratic countries seem to have learned most thoroughly from their western European counterparts is how to keep their populations under control and themselves in power.²⁰

Why has the EU not paid more attention to truly emancipating the citizens of these formerly unfree societies? Again we can link the choices made with respect to enlargement strategy to a general pattern of European integration: Bringing citizens into the process in a meaningful way would undoubtedly have complicated it, delayed the achievement of the goals of those interests well-organized at the EU level, and even risked the failure of enlargement. Domestic power structures have thus been instrumentalized to achieve the goals of the accession process. This has surely benefited the accession countries and their citizens as well in a number of respects, but it has not helped to truly democratize their societies.

The second area of neglect in the EU's enlargement strategy concerns the negative effect of efforts made towards accession on domestic socio-economic security and equity.²¹ Liberalization has led to increasing inequality in all accession countries. The rush to restructure economies in line with the demands posed by the EU and other actors, notably the IMF, has transferred former state-property at dubious prices

into the hands of few, while for large parts of the population increasing GDP figures are not reflected in improved standards of living. This is true even for those new member states deemed most successful. If we look at the widespread poverty in countries like Romania or Bulgaria, the EU's lack of attention to socio-economic security becomes even more difficult to comprehend. Not only are poverty and inequality issues that play almost no role in accession negotiations. The EU even ties the hands of domestic governments as they might wish to use state resources to redress them. Deficit spending and subsidies are to be duly minimized to make these countries fit for the common currency and competition policy. Tax systems are shedding the last vestiges of progressiveness in the struggle to attract capital and employment - this being the one obvious benefit of accession for the newcomers under current circumstances. What is to become of the losers of the process, of, for example, former miners, steel workers, and small farmers all across CEE, is a question for which the EU shows a cynically low level of concern.

Had citizens been given a meaningful say-so in the negotiation process, CEE societies would likely have polarized further than they anyway have between those who potentially stand to win and those who probably stand to lose from the policies associated with the goal

²⁰ The risks for democratic stability caused by elite entrenchment in CEE are discussed by Jack Snyder as early as 1990 in "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14/4, 1990, pp. 5-41. Snyder cites Huntington to draw attention to the risk of "praetorianism" in Eastern Europe, caused by a failure to create channels for effective political participation in formally democratizing societies. He, however, fails to address the risk for democratic consolidation resulting from rapid liberalization without a compensation of the disadvantaged. Generally, Snyder's (as well as Huntington's) perspective is limited by a geopolitical way of thinking that neglects local experiences and normative considerations.

²¹ This issue is addressed in more detail with a particular focus on Romania and with extensive empirical evidence in Annette Freyberg-Inan and Otto Holman "Failing Integration or Not So Splendid Isolation? Transnational Capitalism and the Double Transformation in Romania", *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* 5/1, 2005, pp. 93-145.

of EU membership. This polarization and the risks it might have posed for both domestic order and the goal of enlargement was kept under tabs by keeping European integration an elite-driven project, even in those societies which it was ostensibly meant to help democratize. Again we can see the link between the norms of democracy and equity in action: Neglecting the first allowed neglecting the second. Engaging with the first would have demanded engaging with the second.

2.2.3. Competition before solidarity

In this section I will take a brief look at the EU's economic criteria for accession. At the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 those were formulated to demand "the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union." The ability of accession countries to adhere to the aims of economic and monetary union is also relevant. To understand how these rather abstract criteria have been interpreted and applied by the EU throughout the negotiation process it is necessary to study the Commission's annual regular reports, which evaluate the progress made by each candidate country with respect to the established criteria. The following explanations are based on the information contained in these reports.²²

"Functioning market economy" status has mostly been tied to minimizing state intervention in the economy. Here, the demands made of accession countries

have sometimes been harsher than those which EU-15 governments were willing to impose upon themselves. Concretely, EU negotiators demand that broad consensus exist in the country about the essentials of economic policy (i.e. as viewed by the Commission). Equilibria between demand and supply in the economy should be established by the free interplay of market forces, which requires the liberalization of prices as well as trade. There should be no significant barriers to market entry and exit. Macro-economic stability should be in evidence, defined mainly as price stability and sustainable (both considering domestic resources and the EU regulatory environment) public finances and external accounts. The financial sector should have developed to channel savings towards what is deemed (again, by the EC) productive investment. Finally, a functioning legal system should be in place to safeguard property rights and the enforcement of laws and contracts.

A country's "capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union" is yet more difficult to determine than the existence of a functioning market economy. Clearly, this second criterion is connected to the presence of a functioning market economy with sufficient macro-economic stability to allow economic agents to make decisions in a general climate of predictability. Additional criteria applied by the Commission include the following: There should be a sufficient amount of human and physical capital,

²² See also PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Enlarging the European Union: Are the Economies of Accession Candidates Ready?" 2002, available at www.pwcglobal.com/gx/eng/ins-sol/spec-int/neweurope/home/insights/eu_enlargement_barometer-2002.doc, last accessed February 13th 2005.

including infrastructure, at an appropriate cost. Small firms should contribute to the economy in a significant proportion (because small firms tend to benefit more from improved market access and because a dominance of large firms has been seen to indicate a greater reluctance to restructure). Relevant are also the degree and pace of trade integration with the European Union before accession. Both the volume and the nature of goods already traded with member states are assessed to determine how economic relations will evolve after accession takes place. Finally, once again the need to minimize government intervention in the economy is stressed by the demand to avoid policy and legislation which can influence competitiveness. Tabs are kept on trade policy, competition policy, state aids, support for SMEs, and other measures which can have this effect.

From the get-go the focus with respect to economic criteria for accession has been on ensuring the competitiveness of the acceding national economies in conjunction with minimizing state intervention which could distort the free interplay of market forces. It is well worth asking what such a focus implies. Interestingly, EU-sponsored transition in its accession countries emerges as something of a mirror image of integration at the EU level. In both cases, we can observe a focus on aggregate prosperity and external competitiveness (which is enshrined at the EU level in the Lisbon Agenda). In both cases, the result of this emphasis is that the state's hands are tied when it comes to compensating

the losers of the process. And in both cases this fact prohibits a genuine democratization of the process. At the level of accession countries, domestic inequality is increasing for the sake of the idea that there is a national economy which must compete within the larger framework of regional integration. At the level of the European Union, the solidarity dimension of integration is downplayed and compensation left to increasingly disempowered states for the sake of the idea that there is an EU economy which must compete with the rest of an increasingly globalized world. Rather than uncritically accepting such appeals to competitiveness, it is necessary to dissect the concept to observe that it potentially includes very different actors competing in various constellations for very different benefits.²³ Workers compete for jobs, companies for markets, and states for investment. Workers compete with management for state support. States compete with each other for capital and scarce categories of labor. One could go on and on. What makes matters yet more complicated is the increasing divergence of the spheres of operation and regulatory environments of the different groups of actors, ranging from transnational corporations via states in variously inclusive international regulatory constellations to both migrating and localized workers.

What seems clear is that any serious concern with the competitiveness and prosperity of entire societies requires a delicate balancing of the concerns of all three types of actors at various levels

²³ For an introductory discussion of competitiveness from the perspective of critical political economy see Annette Freyberg-Inan, "Transition Economies," in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2005), pp. 419-30.

of governance. The EU can of course be accused of having cared primarily for the competitiveness of national and EU-wide markets as interpreted primarily through the interests of capital. What is important is to see that this view of the requirements of adaptation to transnationalization dynamics is a political choice and not a matter of necessity.

I will conclude this section by returning to the lessons of political theory and drawing attention to just one crucial but frequently neglected point: Competition and solidarity are opposing values. This means that within the context of one and the same social group, there is a trade-off among them. Deciding on an appropriate strategy for continuing integration requires us to think about whom we wish to compete with whom, and where in Europe we would wish a sense of solidarity to reign supreme instead. This is a particularly important subject for the European Union today, as it struggles to establish a sense of unity, perhaps even a common identity among its citizens. It is patently absurd to on the one hand establish fierce competition for jobs among domestic labor forces within the EU and on the other to try to foster a sense of common identity among them. It is equally absurd to pit management versus employees in a series of disputes over changing labor conditions while at the same time appealing to both sides' enlightened recognition of the common need for reform. Regulatory frameworks and state intervention are necessary to define and defend limits to competition which make social cohesion and thus the political stability of integration possible and sustainable.

Creating true competitiveness (in the sense of an ability to prosper among the other actors) for the economically

weaker members (countries, groups, and individuals) of the Union requires solidarity in action. This means identifying those who sacrifice more than they gain for the sake of those who gain more than they sacrifice from measures taken ostensibly for the good of all. It means improving the equity of the process of integration by recognizing the existence of these different groups and giving them a voice. It demands a different approach to enlargement as well as changes in the overall strategy of European integration which would activate the missing links between the quest for prosperity and the ideal of democracy.

3. Conclusion: The Quest for a Coherent Normative Framework for the European Project

This article has argued that even affluent societies cannot be democratized without the risk of instability without working to maintain a minimally equitable distribution of their wealth. This insight is particularly vital for the European Union. The EU cannot at this moment be called a fully democratic polity, even if its at least formally democratic member states truly represent their citizens in Brussels (which in many cases they arguably do not). It is an official goal of the Union to democratize further. To this end the Treaty of Maastricht has first evoked a new creature called an "EU citizen" and a number of steps have been undertaken to better inform and involve citizens in European affairs. One important original purpose of the Lisbon (formerly Constitutional) Treaty, for example, is the clarification of the structure and rules of the European project for the benefit of its citizens. Civil society groups were even involved in the drafting of the

original text. On the other hand, it often appears as if the motivation behind these tentative steps towards supranational democracy is the creation of greater legitimacy for the EU's institutions, rather than the empowerment of its citizens. To achieve the latter, a rather more radical overhaul would likely be necessary. Such an overhaul cannot safely be attempted in the current and worsening climate of citizen frustration and insecurity. And elites will not attempt it, as they well know that citizens just might use their acquired powers to throw the Europeanist baby out with the neoliberal bathwater (or vice versa).

A greater focus on equity is thus arguably desirable from the points of view of both liberal democratic and social democratic supporters of the European project. As long as democracy and equity remain clearly subordinate goals in the integration process, the entire endeavor, whether focused on liberal policy goals or alternative ideas, stands on very shaky feet.

This article has attempted to show how European integration has suffered from a normative imbalance in favor of aggregate prosperity and external competitiveness and in disfavor of internal solidarity and democracy. This is true for both the deepening and the

widening dimension of integration. It might be called a tragic observation in light of the particular promise of the European project: Not only is the EU indeed a singularly successful example of economic integration, with all the benefits this implies for the creation of greater wealth and security for its people(s). It has also brought into its fold a number of countries for which now is the first chance in history to achieve the promises of either social market economy or democratic empowerment. As this article has argued, the EU's current integration strategy risks denying them these chances by means of its strong focus on negative integration along neoliberal lines, by its neglect of the negative repercussions of integration under current conditions for socio-economic security, equity, and democracy in its member countries, and by its emphasis on competition at the expense of solidarity as basic organizing principles. To avoid a growing tension between its own ideals - prosperity, security, freedom, and democracy - to balance the political needs of cohesion, accountability, and representation, and to construct a coherent normative framework within which sustainable policy strategies can be situated, the missing link of equity should be urgently be (re-)discovered.

REFERENCES

- Beetham, David and Christopher Lord, *Legitimacy and the European Union* (London: Ashley, Wesley, Longman, 1998).
- Blanchard, Olivier, "The Economic Future of Europe," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18/4, 2004, pp. 3-26.
- Chrysoschoou, Dimitris N., *Democracy in the European Union* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998).
- Cook, Karen S. and Karen A. Hegvedt, "Distributive Justice, Equity, and Equality," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9, 1983, pp. 217-41.

- Eriksen, Erik Oddavar, "Governance or Democracy? The White Paper on European Governance", Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 12, October 3rd 2001; available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/jeanmo/p0023.html> (last accessed September 30th 2009).
- "European Governments Cut Taxes to Spur Growth, Investment," Bloomberg, Dec. 31st 2004; available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000100&sid=aWRewFbVAjSs&refer=germany> (last accessed February 15th 2005).
- Freyberg-Inan, Annette, "Which Way to Progress? The Impact of International Organizations in Romania," in Ronald Linden (ed.), *Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 129-64.
- Freyberg-Inan, Annette, "Prosperity – Equity – Democracy: The Missing Link(s) in Europe," paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, March 4th 2005.
- Freyberg-Inan, Annette, "Transition Economies," in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2005), pp. 419-30.
- Freyberg-Inan, Annette and Otto Holman, "Failing Integration or Not So Splendid Isolation? Transnational Capitalism and the Double Transformation in Romania", *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* 5/1, 2005, pp. 93-145.
- Gallagher, Tom, *Theft of a Nation: Romania since Communism* (London: Hurst & Company, 2005).
- Held, David, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford University Press, 2nd ed. 1997).
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, 1959, pp. 69-105.
- Lord, Christopher, *Democracy in the European Union* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).
- Lord, Christopher and David Beetham, "Legitimising the EU: Is There a 'Post-Parliamentary Basis' for Its Legitimation?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39/3, 2001, pp. 443-62.
- Polanyi, Karl, *The Great Transformation: Political and Economic Origins of our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 [1944]).
- PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Enlarging the European Union: Are the Economies of Accession Candidates Ready?" 2002, available at www.pwcglobal.com/gx/eng/ins-sol/spec-int/neweurope/home/insights/eu_enlargement_barometer-2002.doc (last accessed February 13th 2005).
- Scharpf, Fritz, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
- Schmitter, Philippe C., *How to Democratize the European Union... and Why Bother?* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
- Snyder, Jack, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14/4, 1990, pp. 5-41.

DISQUIETUDE ON THE EASTERN FLANK: AWAITING ALLIANCE RESPONSE

Octavian Manea, Iulia Serafimescu*

Abstract. **: *The absence of significant and tangible military defensive infrastructure on the Eastern flank generated over time a breach of credibility in the security guarantee provided by NATO under its Article 5 commitment. The main argument of the countries in the New Europe now is that, in order to be credible enough, and not just a paper guarantee, a collective defence commitment must be backed by “boots on the ground” and by military tangible logistics. While assuming this perspective, the present article looks at some of the alarm signals coming from the countries on NATO’s Eastern flank, trying to explain the feeling of insecurity perceived by the states in the region as well as the options available to the Euro-Atlantic community in order to engage in a much-needed process of strategic reassurance.*

Keywords: *NATO, Central and Eastern Europe, strategic reassurance, European Security and Defence Policy, Sikorski doctrine, Article 5 commitment, collective defence.*

Introduction

Is the NATO Eastern flank in danger? This question currently haunts, in quite a timely fashion, the countries of the “New Europe”. The interrogation became evident on several occasions which outline, on the one hand, the framework of the debate and the conceptual challenges ahead, and, on the other hand, the collective worries of the states in the region. In this local concert of voices arguing insecurity, Poland seems to have taken the lead.

On July 7th, in Brussels, internal debate was launched within NATO with

the purpose of crafting a New Strategic Concept for the most successful alliance in history. At that time, the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, was pointing out that in his opinion, one of the most pressing issues to be dealt with would be that of reassuring “the new Allies that NATO takes its Article 5 collective defence commitment seriously; not just on paper”¹.

While strategists realized that the document that will codify the strategic vision and rationale of NATO in the post 9/11 world will have to bear elements of reassurance, an impressive collection of former presidents and ministers from

* **Octavian Manea** is Editor at “Revista 22” Weekly, Romania. He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of Bucharest, and an MA in International Relations, from the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest. E-mail: octmanea@yahoo.com.

Iulia Serafimescu is Project Coordinator with the European Institute of Romania. She holds a BA in Political Science from the University of Bucharest, and an MA in International Relations, from the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest. E-mail: iulia.serafimescu@ier.ro.

**This article was submitted to RJEa in early November 2009.

¹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, Speech in Bratislava, 17 July 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56487.htm

the states of the New Europe voiced out their concern in an open letter addressed to the Obama administration on July 17th. The Euro-Atlantic decision-makers generation that supported the opening-up of NATO's security umbrella over Central and Eastern Europe back in the 1990s called for the understanding that "NATO needs to make the Alliance's commitments credible and provide strategic reassurance to all members"².

The underlying basic premise of the ones that fear seems to be that the Article 5 musketeer commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty is not credible enough. In response, the strategists always voice the need for keeping the engagement. In September 2008, in the context of the Russian invasion in Georgia, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, translated this into NATO language: "in the case of NATO, Article 5 must mean what it says"³. Nevertheless, this is perceived as soft rhetoric in capitals across the Eastern flank of the Alliance, and especially in Warsaw, where Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski sounded the alarm bells in the global public square in November 2008, emphasizing the credibility gap that the Alliance faces along its Eastern dimension and the absolute imperative to restore credibility to the NATO guarantee⁴.

The Reasons behind the Fear

The Baltic States together with the NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe are currently experiencing a growing feeling of "nervousness" as regards their state of security. While their belonging to the Alliance makes the traditional security pledges explicit, the sources of the insecurity perceived along the string of countries that make up NATO's Eastern flank relate to a lack of substantiation of these very pledges, by reference to hardpower. On the long run, the lack of substantiation gnaws at the very credibility of the Alliance. The substantiation of the security guarantees is understood by the states in the region in a very pure and down-to-earth way: empty promises and a cumbersome Alliance won't soothe security concerns, whereas capabilities and contingency planning, together with sound logistics, will.

The confidence crisis built up in time in the countries of the New Europe is also a by-product of a certain defence posture adopted by the Alliance. Designed initially as a political and military mechanism, especially after the first enlargement round, the Alliance became at its core more and more a political machine and less and less a military functional architecture prepared to respond to a crisis; in the words of Ronald Asmus-the main architect of the NATO re-invention

² "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 July 2009 http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html

³ Robert Gates quoted in "Gates Urges Restraint, Resolve for NATO", US Department of Defence News, 19 September 2008, available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51250>

⁴ Radosław Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, "The Barack Obama Promise: A European View", Address at The Atlantic Council Washington, 19 November 2008, available at <http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?document=23143>

in the 1990s, “the power of Article 5 was never simply the words on paper. It was always the fact that this commitment were backed up by planning, exercises and boots on the ground”. It is precisely that sense of “we”-ness – an integrated organizational culture of acting together through collective war-gaming exercises – that seems to be missing in recent years.

These fundamental questions were also raised during the NATO summit in Bucharest, in April 2008, by Radolsaw Sikorski, the Polish Defense Minister at the time: “Do we want to be a worthwhile political club? Or do we want to be a hardcore military alliance in which not just the international staff, but thousands of our officers know one another and have gelled into a collective culture?”. Not only that there are no prudent defence plans active today for the new members of the Alliance, but the old pledge of the mid 1990s, that the Alliance would create an Article 5 reinforcement capability that could be deployed in times of crisis, never became reality.

In the post Russian-Georgian war security environment, at a time when the Alliance ought to have dramatically changed its defence posture towards the Eastern flank, NATO has chosen to do quasi-nothing. For most of the Eastern NATO members the Russian invasion of Georgia was a “game changer. These countries needed reassurance as regards the credibility of the Article 5 commitment, not only words, but some real, tangible evidence that the political will behind the collective defence pledge can finally be translated into “boots on the ground”. In that context, the only way to receive US boots on the ground in Central Europe was to accept the US proposal of deploying a

missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, plus the promise from Washington that it will deploy a Patriot battery system on Polish territory in order to consolidate its deterrence capacity.

The roots of all security dilemmas are in the states’ own back yard. That is to say, the countries in the region find it difficult to reconcile the current strategic perspective of the Alliance, whose core is deployment in expeditionary missions, with their perception that the Alliance should concentrate more on protecting their homeland. This idea was formulated by Radoslaw Sikorski in terms of the relationship that exists between being a security supplier and a security consumer, namely that the states in the region will be more readily available to embark upon out-of-area Alliance missions if they receive strategic reassurance that their home territory is protected.

The catalyst for this perspective was the Russian invasion in Georgia in August 2008. When Russia went breaking international commitments and norms for the dire justification of protecting one’s citizens and the Atlantic community failed to respond, an alarm signal was drawn all along the Eastern flank of the Alliance. If Georgia, then why not Ukraine, “a swing country for the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass”- as Sikorski called it. The explanation for the failure to help Georgia, as identified by those who fear, lies with poor Alliance logistics, which is in its turn one of the underlying causes for the loss of NATO credibility. The possibility that the scenario might repeat makes the events in Georgia a turning point, a “game-changer” for the Baltic States and the NATO

members in Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the trend within the Alliance, especially in the Old Europe, is to ignore this fact, codified in the so-called "Sikorski doctrine". Advertised as "a doctrine for a doctrine" (i.e. a response to the Medvedev doctrine), this principle puts forward a way out of the conundrum: the whole Atlantic community is urged to interpret any further attempt at re-drawing the borders in Europe, either by force or by subversion, as a threat to its security that entails a proportional response.

Russia's assertiveness makes for a good enough reason for concern. As the CEE signatories of the open letter to the Obama administration notice, while NATO is now weaker than it was in the 1990s, Russia is acting out a power duality: globally, a status-quo power, regionally, "a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods"⁵. While the administration in Washington seeks the cooperation of the former, the states that make up NATO's Eastern flank find themselves face to face with the latter: the Russia that in 2007 withdrew Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, that invaded Georgia in 2008, that makes Europe a subject to its energy blackmail. It is against this backdrop that the Obama administration seeks détente, without trying to eliminate first the security dilemmas of the states in the region.

Offering strategic reassurance for the states on the NATO Eastern flank is not chief among the Obama

administration's priorities. This is something that the countries of the region understand, especially if one puts things into perspective: the priorities in Washington are centred on complex dossiers, such as Iran or North Korea, that specifically require Russian input. Under such circumstances, the Obama administration has been tightrope-walking in the debate concerning the missile defence shield, and it is generally difficult to believe that it will undertake any actions that might be interpreted as irksome in Moscow, while pleas are on within NATO for the Alliance to return to "business as usual" in its relationship with Russia.

To put it in a nutshell, assuming for a moment that we are in the Old Town Market Place in Warsaw, the question is, what do we see? An overstretched Alliance that tends to devote its resources primarily to expeditionary missions, without being interested in securing the treaty homeland area, an Old Europe and an Obama administration increasingly willing to kick off again "business as usual" with Russia, an America with an overstrained power portfolio and an increasingly weaker hand in a multipolar setting that commits its resources primarily to the management of Iraq and Afghanistan. How could NATO expect Warsaw to feel secure in a traditionally insecure region, when the alliance has no military infrastructure, no proper logistics, no adequate defence and contingency planning for the Eastern frontier?

⁵ "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 July 2009, available at http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html

An Alternative to the Alliance: between solid European security guarantees and US missile defence

While the term “alternative” is improper in the context - given the assumed complementarity of the security guarantees-, it nevertheless accurately describes the manner in which the states on the Eastern flank understand to allay their security concerns. Looking towards the US for additional security guarantees can be interpreted only as a natural consequence to the fact that NATO credibility is fading away whereas EU security guarantees are still in their infancy.

More than anything, the unrest of the CEE states points to a severe lack of trust in any security guarantees that the European Union might provide, or more specifically, that the Old Europe might assume. From a normative point of view, this perspective is not justified; however, in terms of political will as well as of amount in defence spending, Warsaw and Prague seem to be essentially right in dialling 911 instead of calling Brussels.

The idea that the European Union should provide a security guarantee to

its members has been present on the European agenda ever since the 1950s. In theory, the wording of Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty⁶ provides for a much more powerful collective defence clause than that envisaged by the Article 5 in the Washington Treaty⁷, even more so since the former Article V precedes the latter. Nevertheless, during the Cold War years, it was NATO which took the lead in providing security for Europe. Starting with the 1990s, the EU treaties provide for the coming into existence of a “common Union defence policy”, which “will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”⁸, while the Lisbon Treaty, if ratified by all Member States, envisages some elements of novelty in terms of European collective defence. The Treaty introduces a mutual defence clause which reads that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter [...]”⁹ together with a second solidarity clause, related to Member States assisting

⁶ The Brussels Treaty (signed in 1948), amended by the Paris Agreements (signed in 1954), Article V: “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, *the other High Contracting Parties* will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, *afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.*”, available at <http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm>

⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty (signed in 1949), Article 5: “*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all* and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

⁸ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2008), Section 2, Article 42, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:EN:HTML>

⁹ Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, (signed in 2007), Article 28 A (7), available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF>

each other in cases of terrorist attacks or natural or man-made disasters. The clauses, the wording of which seems solid enough, are to be corroborated with the mechanisms of “reinforced cooperation” and “permanent structured cooperation”, new instruments meant to turn the EU, through the ESDP, into a genuine global actor.

And while the legal and the institutional adaptation seem to be underway, the major drawback – perceived as such on the Eastern flank – is that the normative provisions have to be backed by political will. Up to now, Old Europe has failed to invest the amount of political will necessary in order to adopt the appropriate defence posture that would not only send the right message to any 21st century aggressor but would also correct the trust deficit of the Eastern flank. Learning from the experience of the Alliance so far, the EU has to understand that “it was never the words on paper that by themselves gave Article 5 its power. If it was, then the language of the old WEU treaty would have been more important than the similar clause in NATO because that language is even stronger. What gave those words meaning was that they were backed by political will as expressed through the means and mechanisms to actually come to each other’s defence. And it is the lack thereof that helps explain the problem we have today”¹⁰.

In its turn, political will translates into defence spending. Currently, the amount of defence spending at the EU level is approximately one half of the US budget dedicated to military expenditure. In addition to this, due to the fact that the ESDP is to a large degree intergovernmental in nature, the greater part of the expenditure related to the missions undertaken is supported by the countries which provide troops on the ground, i.e. take the greatest risk, which is hardly a way to demonstrate European solidarity.¹¹ Therefore, there is no surprise that there appear voices who argue that “nobody takes Old Europe seriously from the military point of view. Germany’s military spending is of a trifling amount. In Washington, Republicans, Democrats, Neoconservatives and Wilsonians alike don’t seem to give the defence engagements assumed by the Old Europe much credit. Plus, the budgetary constraints coming as a result of the crisis will curb military spending even more in countries like the UK and Germany and, by consequence, they will also curb NATO operational potential. [...] Under such conditions, the only option for the Eastern flank is to contemplate the US security guarantees. The only ones that matter.”¹²

It is thus understandable why the revision of the missile defence proposal by the Obama administration generated a significant crisis of confidence in the

¹⁰ Ronald Asmus, Executive Director German Marshall Fund of the United States, interview with Octavian Manea, “Flancul estic fara scutul antiracheta”, *Revista 22*, No. 42, 13-19 October 2009, available at <http://www.revista22.ro/flancul-estic-f259r259-scutul-antirachet259-6752.html>

¹¹ Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Editor, “What ambitions for European defence in 2020?”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2009, p. 76, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/What_ambitions_for_European_defence_in_2020.pdf

¹² John Hulsman, Expert in Transatlantic issues, interview with Octavian Manea, “Un deficit de incredere in Vechea Europa”, *Revista 22*, No. 44, 27 October- 2 November, available at <http://www.revista22.ro/biden-reasigur259-flancul-estic-6863.html>

Eastern flank's capitals, especially in Warsaw and Prague. The political elites in the region, who invested a tremendous amount of political capital in pushing the missile defence proposal high on the national and European agenda, now fear that the Americans are not as committed to the security of this geopolitically sensitive and vulnerable part of Europe as they used to be. To a certain extent, the debate surrounding the Obama policy reversal regarding the missile defence had the virtue of clarifying the core security stakes: what really mattered for East Europeans was hardly the shield *per se*, but the informal security guarantees provided by the presence of the US facilities in this part of Europe - an uncomfortable and inconvenient truth that has been there for more than a decade or so: "Poles and Czechs favoured the American bases only because they would bring American troops to their territory. But they favour American troops on their territory only because two successive American presidents have refused to invest in NATO's presence in Central Europe".¹³

What should be done?

A rapid-reaction Alliance is needed. In the words of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, "Poland and Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later-it is no good when assistance comes to dead

people. Poland wants to be in alliances where assistance comes in the very first hours of any possible conflict"¹⁴. NATO's inertial organizational culture, the fact that it usually takes "days, weeks to start that machinery", is what made Poland for instance to go looking for additional security guarantees and sign a mutual defence commitment with the US, in addition to having signed the missile defence agreement, which is basically a mutual assistance clause that provides that the two countries will come to each other's aid in case of danger. This particular mutual defence commitment between Poland and the US, complementary to the NATO's Article 5, should send a very clear message that the alliance is not doing enough in order to secure the countries on the Eastern flank. Moreover, it sets a very dangerous precedent for an alliance presumed to be in the business of injecting a geopolitical sense of territorial and homeland security to all members, because NATO is heading towards a two-tiered membership: those who feel secure and are willing to transform their forces in order to take up an expeditionary operational posture, and those who feel less secure and are more interested in a static territorial defence posture.

As Radek Sikorski put it, the time has come for NATO to recover "its traditional role as a military organization, and once again devote a portion of its energy to the treaty area"¹⁵. We need to get to basics. An Alliance paralyzed by

¹³ Anne Applebaum, "Letting Europe Drift", Washington Post, 22 September 2009, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092103112.html>

¹⁴ Donald Tusk, Polish Prime Minister, quoted in "In your face, Putin! Poland signs missile defense deal", *Foreign Policy*, 14 August 2008, available at http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/category/region/eastern_europe?page=6

¹⁵ Radosław Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, "The Barack Obama Promise: A European View", Address at The Atlantic Council Washington, 19 November 2008, available at <http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?document=23143>

political correctness is useless whereas the answer lies with a full spectrum alliance, both political and military, one in which the threat assessment and intelligence-gathering processes are for real. The danger of politicization is real: once the “the threat assessment is skewed by political correctness, then the process of planning and contingency planning is also skewed”¹⁶.

Apparently, with the Obama new missile defence proposal we returned to where we left off in the first place- the moment of August 2008. There is hardly any change in the NATO defence posture as regards the Eastern flank - no prudent defence planning, no collective war gaming exercises, no reinforcement of Article 5 by hardpower, and no missile defence shield with its core deployed on the territory of Central Europe. But what do we have then?

First of all, an unprecedented US public campaign of reassuring the Eastern flank about the credibility of the Article 5 commitment has been underway. On September 17th, US President Obama sent out a message of reassurance to both the Czech Republic and Poland: “we are bound by the solemn commitment of NATO’s Article 5 that an attack on one is an attack on all”¹⁷. Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, was even more

expressive in trying to reassert the core value of the Euro-Atlantic community - the collective solidarity embodied by the traditional security philosophy of the old musketeers “one for all and all for one”, writing that “an attack on London or Warsaw is an attack on New York or Washington”¹⁸.

Vice-president Biden’s diplomatic tour in Warsaw, Prague and Bucharest between 20 and 24 October 2009 was the final stage of this unparalleled campaign of reasserting at the highest level the credibility of the Article 5 commitment. His message in the capital of Poland was unwavering: “under NATO’s Article 5, an attack on one is an attack on all. And this strategic assurance is absolute, absolute. As one who championed the admission of Poland into NATO, I would also point out that we take not only our mutual commitments seriously, but I take it very, very seriously”¹⁹. Moreover, as Biden emphasized, the American security guarantees as regards Poland are unalterable and they will not change.

Second, the so-called “boots on the ground” dimension, to which the states in the region attach great significance, is still on the table, as inferred from statements²⁰ that still speak about the deployment of Patriot systems in Poland.

¹⁶ Idem

¹⁷ Barack Obama, US President, “Remarks on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe”, 17 September 2009, available at <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/September/20090918102149xjsnommis0.9590876.html>

¹⁸ Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, “The new system offers a real missile defence”, *Financial Times*, 20 September 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b9374ea-a61a-11de-8c92-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

¹⁹ Joseph Biden, US Vice-president, “Remarks with Polish Prime Minister Tusk”, 21 October 2009, available at <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/October/20091021153624xjsnommis0.9384424.html>

²⁰ Philip Gordon, Undersecretary for Eurasian Affairs in the US State Department, “A new era for Transatlantic cooperation”, Remarks at Transatlantic Policy Network, 30 September 2009, available at <http://nato.usmission.gov/Texts/Gordon093009.asp>

Simultaneously, the administration in Washington is also talking about the future NATO Strategic Concept. The speech of US Assistant Defence Secretary Alexander Vershbow, on the 22nd of October in Bratislava, reassured the Eastern flank that the US is committed to correct the security deficit of the new Member States by re-designing the old Strategic Concept of NATO in a way that will help the alliance to strike the balance between old (the static territorial collective defence) and new missions (out of area & expeditionary ones). Vershbow's conclusions were that that the best way for NATO to strike the right balance was to "develop flexible, deployable forces that can be sent into action around the periphery of the Alliance as well as at a strategic distance, for the full range of Allied missions"²¹, together with appropriate prudent planning and exercises in order to address all potential territorial threats to all the member states.

Conclusion

Ignoring or misreading these core trends developing inside the Alliance, for the sake of the greater good of doing "business as usual" with a revisionist Russia, will cause more insecurity and more security dilemmas on the Eastern flank. A détente with Russia may be in itself a very positive outcome, but only if it is doubled by a strategic consolidation of the Eastern flank. Without strategic reassurance of the New Europe in terms of its security, NATO cannot

hope in soothing the security concerns that have been haunting the region for over a year. After all, let's not forget that "hoping for the best, alliances are about preparing for conditions in which your hopes may be disappointed"²²(Sikorski).

NATO needs to rebalance its missions, redesigning its operational postures and its capabilities for both expeditionary missions and classic territorial defence, recalibrating some of its infrastructure and logistics in order to boost the security on the Eastern frontier because there is the need, in Sikorski's words, of "a full spectrum NATO, to maintain NATO as a credible not just as an alliance, but as a credible military organization". The full spectrum Alliance envisaged will be simultaneously devoted to the defence of the "in-area" homeland and to the undertaking of expeditionary missions. There is no need for an asymmetric Alliance, with a strategic landscape of higher and lower security areas. An Alliance which is not able to ensure the security of all its members, as well as to understand that security cannot be taken for granted, should not be in the business of expeditionary missions at all. While acknowledging that "the fundamental nature of man hasn't changed - and that our adversaries and other nations will always seek whatever advantages they can find"²³ (Robert Gates), NATO should not bestow on anybody the window of opportunity to speculate the strategic power vacuum growing on the Eastern flank.

²¹ Alexander R. Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, "Crafting the new Strategic Concept: Ambitions, Resources, and Partnerships for a 21st Century Alliance", Keynote Speech, 22 October 2009, Bratislava, available at <http://nato.usmission.gov/Texts/Vershbow10222009.asp>

²² Radosław Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, quoted in CNN Transcript, *Global Public Square*, 26 October 2008, available at <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0810/26/fzgps.01.html>

²³ Robert Gates, US Secretary, Department of Defence, "Nuclear weapons and Deterrence in the 21st century", Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 October 2008, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_checked.pdf

SELECTED REFERENCES

Speeches, official remarks, interviews

- ASMUS, Ronald, Executive Director German Marshall Fund of the United States, interview with Octavian Manea, “Flancul estic fara scutul antiracheta”, (The Eastern flank without missile defence), *Revista 22*, No. 42, 13-19 October 2009, available at <http://www.revista22.ro/flancul-estic-f259r259-scutul-antirachet259-6752.html>
- BIDEN, Joseph, US Vice-president, “Remarks with Polish Prime Minister Tusk”, 21 October 2009, available at <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/October/20091021153624xjsnommis0.9384424.html>
- CLINTON, Hillary, US Secretary of State, “The new system offers a real missile defence”, *Financial Times*, 20 September 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b9374ea-a61a-11de-8c92-00144feabdc0.html?ncllick_check=1
- De HOOP SCHEFFER, Jaap, NATO Secretary General, Speech in Bratislava, 17 July 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56487.htm
- GATES, Robert, US Secretary, Department of Defence, “Nuclear weapons and Deterrence in the 21st century”, Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 October 2008, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_checked.pdf
- GORDON, Philip, Undersecretary for Eurasian Affairs in the US State Department, “A new era for Transatlantic cooperation”, Remarks at Transatlantic Policy Network, 30 September 2009, available at <http://nato.usmission.gov/Texts/Gordon093009.asp>
- HULSMAN, John, Expert in Transatlantic issues, interview with Octavian Manea, “Un deficit de incredere in Vechea Europa”, (A lack of trust in the Old Europe), *Revista 22*, No. 44, 27 October- 2 November, available at <http://www.revista22.ro/biden-reasigur259-flancul-estic-6863.html>
- OBAMA, Barack, US President, “Remarks on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe”, 17 September 2009, available at <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/September/20090918102149xjsnommis0.9590876.html>
- SIKORSKI, Radosław, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, “The Barack Obama Promise: A European View”, Address at The Atlantic Council Washington, 19 November 2008, available at <http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?document=23143>
- VERSHBOW, Alexander R., Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, “Crafting the new Strategic Concept: Ambitions, Resources, and Partnerships for a 21st Century Alliance”, Keynote Speech, 22 October 2009, Bratislava, available at <http://nato.usmission.gov/Texts/Vershbow10222009.asp>

EU AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF NGOs IN PEACE MISSIONS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Daniela Irrera*

Abstract:** *Social scientists and policy-makers are increasingly concerned with the civil society ability to influence the external policy of EU and the member states. This ability depends to a large extent on the capabilities and instruments of the non-governmental-organizations (NGOs), national and international associations, and lobbies, which represent civil society interests. In order to represent the demands that cut across the borders of states, NGOs are increasingly gaining access to international decision-making institutions. However, this access continues to face with the controversial issue of the NGOs engagement in political participation, representation, and democratization of the decision-making processes of international organizations. This paper aims at analyzing the increasing engagement of NGOs, within and in relation with the EU, in the framework of CFSP/ESDP, and in responding to composite humanitarian emergencies.*

Keywords: *NGO, European Union, security, peace-keeping*
JEL classification: *Z19*

The civil society capability to influence the external policy of the European Union (EU) is increasingly concerning the social scientists and policy-makers. This capability depends to a large extent on the role of non-governmental-organizations (NGOs), national and international associations, and lobbies, which represent civil society interests. In order to represent the demands that cut across the states' borders, NGOs need suitable accession to decision-making institutions. This condition is linked to the general, and controversial, issue of the NGOs engagement in political participation, representation, and democratization of the decision-

making processes of international organizations. As commonly known, the United Nations have reached the highest level of institutionalization of the dialogue with the civil society by delegating to ECOSOC the task to establishing a special procedure of NGOs recording, accreditation, and provision of consultative status. These practices constitute a consistent model which has been claimed for ruling the relationships with civil society also in other contexts, regional and local ones.

Regarding the European Union system, some other variables should be taken into account. The degree of involvement of the social parts is the

* **Daniela Irrera** is Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Catania, PhD in International Relations at the University of Catania. She has published two books and several articles in the areas of International Relations and EU politics, dealing with global terrorism, transnational organised crime, civil society and democratisation processes. E-mail: dirrera@unict.it

**This article was submitted to the RJEA editors in August 2009.

litmus test of the level of integration from below, and the viable relationship between government and people. In other terms, the differentiated structure of the interests represented by the NGOs, the groups and the community-based organizations, as well as the increasing demand for wider popular participation in the civil matters, are imposing on the EU the need to overcome the model of consultation and develop a more effective and integrated system (Attinà – Natalicchi, 2007; Magonette 2003; Panebianco, 2000). NGOs, in particular, represent, among the others, interests pertaining to human development. In doing so, NGOs succeed in managing relations with various sectors in a sort of civil dialogue. Cooperation with neighbouring countries and the developing world is an excellent case study. By participating in the EU official programs, the European NGOs have promoted many initiatives on humanitarian aid, especially in Africa (Ryelandt, 1995). This constituted a good starting point for the increased NGOs' engagement in the field of conflict prevention and management, and a more active role in EU peace missions' deployment (Attinà, 2007).

This article aims at analyzing the increasing engagement of NGOs, within and in relation with the EU, in the framework of CFSP/ESDP, and in responding to composite humanitarian emergencies.

In the first part, the evolution of the role played by the main civil society actors is analyzed by taking into account the evolutionary phases of the European political and economic integration process, and the theory debate. Relationships between NGOs and the EU institutions that are competent in

the fields of security and foreign policy as well as humanitarian intervention are analyzed. The Artemis mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo is shortly presented as a test case. Lastly, brief remarks are made on the NGOs potentialities in reducing violence and managing humanitarian emergencies in conjunction with the role played by the EU as a global actor.

EU governance and civil society: the theory debate

The necessity to understand the level of integration and EU institutionalization has attracted both International Relations [Hoffmann (1964); Waltz (1979); Grieco (1995); Bulmer (1983); Moravcsick (1993); Scharpf (1988); Wallace H.- Wallace W. (1996)] and Comparative Politics scholars [Tsebelis-Garrett (1997); Hix (1999); Majone (1996)], and produced contrasting theory interpretations. Attention has been given mainly to two issues. First, the will of the governments to give life to supranational institutions for better exploiting the advantages of sharing economic resources and a free trade system. Second, the scale of the competences of the European institutions and the consequent problem of a clear division and hierarchy of levels, in a complex structure of coexisting centres of power and decisions (Schmidt, 2004).

At the same time, the specificity of the competences imposes the need of suitable knowledge which is not always available to the states and the European institutions. For this reason, a series of actors of the civil society, and representative of specific economic interests, has increasingly played a role essential to the technical aspects of many

European policies. During the 1970s, the pluralist school scientists started to study this noticeable phenomenon.

The application to the European system of this interpretation model produced a renewed version of the classical functionalist theory [Mitrany (1975); Haas (1964)]. The role played by economic groups in strengthening and diffusing economic integration (the spill-over effect) is at the core of the neo-functional analysis. It is true that these actors are specifically tied to productive categories and, then, determined to represent and defend some specific interests. Nevertheless, their constant work with the Commission as well as the technical support they give to the Commission proposals led the way to a real method of consultation and opened the road to political integration.

Such tendencies continued and strengthened during the 1980s. The publication of the *White Paper* by Jacques Delors, in 1985, supplied a series of provisions necessary to the realization of the single market, while the following Single European Act widened the competences of the European institutions, by modifying the set of decision procedures, and enlarging the power of the European Parliament through the co-decision procedure (Attinà – Natalicchi, 2007). The strengthening of the economic dimension and the widening of common policies further increased the interest and pressure of old and new groups. This phase, named as the *lobbyfication phase* of the European decision-making (Panebianco, 2000), is destined to consolidate and widen further on. This process had important consequences on the policies of the Member states and of the European institutions. The largest

part of the European policies, in fact, took the form of regulative rather than distributive policies, and the need for knowledge and competence resources increased. Thus, non-state actors (albeit the economic ones) become real referents (Magnette, 2003).

Significant changes occurred also in the 1990s. The completion of the Single Market triggered a series of measures of economic and monetary nature that had a cascading effect on the Member States, and involved all the levels of government (Longo, 2005). Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty led to the consolidation of the European ambition to be a political actor. In addition to the economic groups, other groups active on civilian issues knocked at the door of the European institutions. They were new to the European system, and the product of the mature condition of European civil society. Briefly, a new system of interest representation was re-structuring the EU on the initiative of social groups that had no adequate channels of demand articulation and aggregation, but could contribute to narrow the gap between the citizens and institutions, and to manage the problems of democratic decision-making process and institutions accountability at the European level.

The functionalist theories did not focus on this evolution, and failed to give answers to the problem of democracy. The challenges met by the EU, continually reviewed after Maastricht, deal with the fact that the European institutions make decisions on account of the citizens with no citizens' due control and participation. For this reason, in 2001, the Commission undertook a thorough reform of the EU governance system, which was defined as the "*rules*,

*processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence*¹.

A supranational governance must be a democratic governance - and thus can not be separated from true citizens' participation - for at least three reasons: (1) democracy implies not only that citizens can participate and legitimize political power, but also that the latter is, in turn, responsible to the citizen; (2) the concept of public good means that it is widely shared by all those who are subject to jurisdiction; and (3) democracy requires appropriate checks and balances (Nettesheim, 2004).

What emerged clearly from the reflection initiated by the Commission is that, despite apparent shortcomings, the EU is not a beginner. If political participation is not the mere exercise of the voting power, but also the range of activities through which citizens seek to influence political power, then a participation rate which is still low but growing, can be recorded (Longo, 2005). Moreover, referring to Lijphart thesis on heterogeneous democracies (as the EU certainly is), the presence of two factors is essential, the existence of political and institutional mechanisms that allow the participation of all social actors interested in the management of interests, and a model of division of skills that will enable these groups to decide at least the most relevant policies (Lijphart, 2004). In this sense, the EU is, at the same time, a system in which many interests are represented through a plurality of

actors and a system at the beginning of reforming its channels of participation.

Recent studies have attempted to investigate these issues by analyzing the characteristics and outcomes of the EU governance system. Some studies focused on governance as a system of multiple levels of government. The theories of multi-level governance argue that the state, despite being the main actor of the European decision-making, is no longer a unitary actor. It is, indeed, the sum of many other actors (local institutions, representatives of social categories, associations, and groups) which contribute, in various capacities, to the formulation of the position the national authorities have, on a given issue, towards the European institutions (Marks, 1996). Others, however, have focused their research on substantive issues of governance. The objective of network analysis is to verify empirically what direct influence non-state actors have on decision-making processes rather than the indirect one, through state mediation. These studies recognize the growing importance of the groups and organizations concerned with issues different from the traditional, namely economic ones. Accordingly, Peterson distinguishes between *communities* and *networks*. The former are composed of actors provided with adequate technical knowledge but small coordination. The latter, instead, are constituted by the parts of the community that choose to coordinate themselves and interact in order to have a more effective access to the decision-making channels (Peterson, 1995). By analyzing the American

¹ European Commission (2001), *White Paper on European Governance*, Brussels, COM (2001) 428 def., 5.8.2001, p. 8.

political system (on which network analysis mainly focused), and the obvious similarities with the EU system, Peterson argues that these actors respond to the need for technical knowledge that regard the formulation of broader policies. However, this occurs both in traditional sectors (networks), and in those not yet structured that deal with common interests (communities) (Longo, 2005). In both cases, their potential for expertise and values is enormous.

In conclusion, the constant evolution of the theoretical debate is the natural consequence of the transformation which the application of the governance model produces in the EU system by structuring interests, advancing social needs, and, above all, introducing the diversification of the relevant actors.

The role played by civil society in the EU

The analysis of the general concept of civil society within the EU system is extremely important for understanding how NGOs developed in some specific sectors, like security and development.

Such concept appears extremely flexible. The opportunity of giving to the civil society organisations a formal accreditation procedure and the consequent official consultative status has always been excluded by the Commission as stated in the Communication *"An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups"*². This position is probably due to the necessity to ensure that the decision-making process in the EU is

legitimated by the elected representatives of the European peoples. However, this led to difficulties in identifying suitable channels of access to individual interests and, to some extent, slowed down the enlargement of participation. At the same time, the increased flexibility allowed the participation of a wide range of actors, even not provided with appropriate resources. Being involved in the EU system requires resources and imposes costs not affordable by all the groups. However, the great openness of the Commission proved to be beneficial.

As we have already seen, in the first stages, the EU recognized especially the economic interest groups, representatives of specific categories, namely trade unions and employers' organizations. Each of them protected its interests, and formulated needs and demands in their areas of competence. At the beginning, they were mainly linked to the Single Market and the realization of the Economic and Monetary Union (agriculture, fisheries, energy, heavy industry, etc.). The manner in which this happened - and continues to happen - was commonly defined as *pressure*, a very broad term that refers not only to extreme events (strikes, public protests), but also - and more frequently - to the information offering made by the groups to the European institutions (Panebianco, 2000). The term is also used to characterize the groups themselves. The extent of interests represented in the EU system is explained by the EU institutions' need for sound and relevant information. The process by which interest groups provide knowledge to the decision-

² European Commission (1993), *An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups*, Brussels, SEC 92, 2272 def., 2.12.1992.

making bodies is lobbying, a mutually useful activity. The groups have direct access to the institutions, and these, without affording costs, can reduce the information deficit (Panebianco, 2000).

This method, which was strengthened over the years and welcomed for the results obtained, was favourably looked by other groups from civil society, representative of a number of interests other than the economic ones. They were favored by the institutional evolution operated through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The so-called community-based organizations (CBO) are those social groups, variously organized, that bring together European citizens active in local and national life, that represent interests pertaining to human development³. Among these, churches and religious communities, voluntary associations and, of course, NGOs which constitute the largest sector of the organizations of the civil society. Although active in other sectors than the economic one, these actors have been able to learn from their counterparts the way to address their own needs and put pressure on institutions. They had to face many obstacles, mainly due to the Member States resistance. However, they succeeded in managing negotiation in some sectors and gave place to a form of civil dialogue.

Cooperation with neighbouring countries and the developing world is an excellent example of development actions. By participating in official programs, European NGOs have promoted many initiatives of humanitarian aid, especially in Africa (Ryelandt, 1995).

These efforts achieved concrete results by creating, in 1976, the Liaison Committee (*Comité de Liaison*), the representative body of all European NGOs engaged in cooperation actions, in collaboration with the Community institutions. The pressure exerted by NGOs working on cooperation has addressed the EU towards strengthening humanitarian aid, pushing to develop specific policies and programs, and creating a important standard of consultation.

It is clear, however, that in the EU system, civil society presents diversified faces based on the nature of the interests represented. However, they tend to use, with some diversity, similar methods of pressure and dialogue with all EU institutions. The real difference is in how EU institutions have formalized their relationships with various groups. On this regard, two separate strands of the same social governance are emerging, the social and civil dialogue (Mascia, 2004).

Social dialogue and civil dialogue

Since 1985, with the publication of the Single Market White Paper by Jacques Delors, the EU system has provided forms and procedures to make the social dialogue active. Art. 138 of the Treaty establishing the European Community is considered as the legal basis of the social dialogue. The relevant aspects are essentially two. First, the EU clearly identifies the social actors (trade unions, professional associations, multinational industrial groups), organized vertically and engaged in areas strictly identifiable, the labor, with

³ Economic and Social Committee (1999), *The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe*, CES 851/1999, Brussels, 22.9.1999. .

some exceptions (like wage issues). Second, the consultation procedure obliges the Commission to question the social partners in all matters within their competence and before starting the legislative initiative. As already seen here above, the initial direction taken by the process of European integration created the conditions for economic groups to become real political actors, and enabled the consultation procedure to become stronger over time.

Civil dialogue, instead, has no legal basis. This led to great uncertainty about the identity of the actors involved but also on access to the decision-making process. This problem refers to NGOs and associations involved in all areas which do not fall in the economic sphere like consumer protection, development cooperation, environment, human rights, and protection of women and children. The characteristics of represented interests lead to a structure generally not vertical or centralized but very flexible by a network arrangement. There is, of course, no consultation procedure strictly required by law. This did not, however, prevent the Commission from studying a range of initiatives to counteract the “excessive power” of economic groups, by putting civil dialogue in various mechanisms of participation.

Relations with the EU institutions

The lack of standards and procedures ruling civil dialogue began to be felt strongly in the 1990s, in order to become, in the following years, a real need. The enormity and the complexity of the organizations and of the involved interests made the definition of standard mechanisms a difficult task. Taking into account the definition of governance adopted by the Commission, a system of

interactions developed separately with each EU institution, sometimes with some convergence, but often with no coordination., However, it is a system still in action (Attinà – Natalicchi, 2007).

Civil dialogue has always been “recommended” to the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) which is seen as its natural *maison*, not only because it is the representative body of various interests but also because it was given the task of fostering links between society and institutions, acting as the mediator. However, relations have never been very productive. The prevalence of the economic groups within the ESC led to a kind of “fondness” for the social dialogue.

The Commission is the institution which has shown more spending, firstly to an agreed definition of civil consultation and then towards the formulation of more comprehensive procedures. After a structured relationship with the economic interest groups, the Commission noted, during 1990s, a growing demand from actors of a different nature and began reflecting on this phenomenon. In the document “*The Commission and the non-governmental organizations: building a stronger partnership*”, published in January 2000, an accurate, empirical assessment of the initial civil dialogue was made, and a series of problems linked to the lack of transparency and communication, and the excessive complexity of procedures was examined.

Two main difficulties were highlighted. First, the strict division of competences of the Commission into different fields was not always correspondent to the interests represented by various organizations which were, on the contrary, more flexible and interdependent. This contributed to confuse the organizations regarding the

Directorates General to pressure on the issues of concern. Second, financing, direct or mediated by the national authorities, was not intended for the benefit of individual organizations, but for single competence, with the result of limiting their activities, particularly those less endowed with material resources.

To these problems, the Commission replied with a statement of greater commitment but, at the same time, requested to the organizations larger accountability and a greater use of the consultation. The document appears as a platform to launch a cooperation strategy based on five priorities:

1. Fostering participatory democracy;
2. Representing the views of specific groups of citizen to the European Institutions;
3. Contributing to policy making;
4. Contributing to project management;
5. Contributing to European integration⁴.

This strategy was part of the reflection the Commission in these years on the system of governance, and the need to renew it.

Although it was clear that, during a considerably long time, the EU was a unique political system, the need to review its methods and policies was strongly felt⁵. In this context, participation of civil society was an essential element, and enlargement of its base a top priority. The result was the *White Paper on European governance* of August 2001, prepared by the Commission together with over 2,500

experts, academics and NGOs activists, and updated through a mechanism of public and open consultation which continued until March 31, 2002.

The keyword was "participation". If, as the Eurobarometer, and other surveys, repeatedly noted, the interest for policies is very low at the individual citizens' level, but considerably high in structured groups and organizations then consequently, it is on these actors that more attention should be focused. In addition to the traditional economic groups, even the "civilian" ones were finally clearly defined: "*Civil society includes the following: trade unions and employers' organisations ("social partners"); nongovernmental organisations; professional associations; charities; grass-roots organisations; organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious communities*"⁶.

The timing and the ways of that involvement were explained by using the open method of coordination. In other terms, what the Commission was intended to promote was a new culture of consultation by putting together actors (organizations of civil society, local and national groups, ESC, Committee of the Regions and all institutions) and methods (respect for basic principles of good governance) in a framework of interdependence and coordination.

It is true that the document seemed to be highly innovative; nevertheless, a deeper analysis reveals its limits. Even

⁴European Commission (2000), *The Commission and the non-governmental organizations: building a stronger partnership*, COM (2000) 11 def., 18.1.2000, pp. 5-6.

⁵European Commission (2001), *White Paper on European Governance*, Bruxelles, COM (2001) 428 def., 5.8.2001, p. 7.

⁶Ibidem, p. 14

though it is reevaluated, participation must be initiated by the institutions, it mainly concerns the organized civil society, often focused only on specific interests and, above all, remains relegated to the advisory stage and not extended to the decisional one. Neither the amount of actors and levels of government involved (community, national, regional, local) could afford more. The process, however, did not stop. The White Paper was submitted to public opinion, and feedbacks were copious.

The communication *Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission* published in 2002, tries to summarize, by providing an important support to what is already envisaged in the White Paper. In the document, further clarification of actors is made. Additionally, it affirms the necessity of participation on a broader basis and recognizes the active role played by the civil society organizations.

The commitment of the Commission towards civil dialogue is still underway. However, it is possible to say that its major efforts have gone toward a definition, aimed at first to give legitimacy and then to clarify which actors are involved and what methods recommended. This is a request for participation that the Commission makes above all to civil society organizations but extends also to other institutions. If the Parliament is traditionally the house of popular sovereignty, dominated by political parties, the Council, despite its purely intergovernmental nature, has gradually turned its attention to civil dialogue, preparing a series of measures that have facilitated their activities. The main result of this circumstance is the legislation

that gave effect to the guidelines of the Commission. It has allowed the European NGOs to be associated with the processes of formulation of policies in specific areas (such as the environment, development cooperation, etc.) and, more importantly, direct access to funding (Mascia, 2004). This is not yet a legal basis condition, the strong aspect of social dialogue. However, counting on official deliberations of the Council allows to civil society organizations to pretend a greater institutionalization of their presence.

In other terms, there is a strong presence, in the EU system, of a civil society variously organized and eager to be heard in traditional issues as well as in new ones. In addition to pressure on issues relevant to social dialogue actors like agriculture, internal market, and enterprise, increasing pressure is exerted in areas in which different interests are at stake, namely security, human rights, and humanitarian relief. To understand the increasing participation of NGOs in relief and peace-building activities within the EU system, a preliminary analysis of this sector is required. For this reason, the transformation of two main aspects of global security, the nature of contemporary civil conflicts, the so-called new wars, and the attributes of humanitarian intervention in contemporary world politics are examined here.

Conflict management and humanitarian interventions

At the end of the Cold War, the global system witnessed the rising importance of the problems of so-called weak states and, in some case, their collapse. Institutional weakness, no rule of law, and economic backwardness became the cause of "new" wars (Holsti, 1999). These wars

do not share the same characteristics, but common traits distinguish all of them from traditional wars. The most important trait, frequently mentioned by scholars, is the shift from the interstate to intrastate war dimension. This distinction does not imply that the conflict effects are contained within the state borders. On the contrary, conflict normally spreads from the country in conflict to neighbouring countries and regions. An additional and important common feature of these wars is the active, and sometimes conditioning, presence of non-state actors. New wars are fought by a wide range of political and social groups that have different identity and alliance relations. However, conflicting parties are sometimes inclined to easily change alliance alignment (Kaldor, 1999). In many cases, states are not the aggressors, and have no role in the causes and development of the conflicts (Monteleone and Rossi, 2008). Lastly, in these wars, the clear distinction between civilians and combatants dramatically fades out. In many cases, civilians are deliberately chosen as the target of military action, with the consequence of dramatically increasing the number of casualties. All these conditions make the management of civil wars no longer dependent only on military means. For this reason, Doyle and Sambanis rightly observe that peacekeeping missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election monitoring are needed in order to improve the chance of success in containing violence and achieving peace building (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Collaboration between civil and military actors, then, is increasingly important to manage and solve civil conflicts, as acknowledged by governments and

international institutions. Briefly, the changing nature of conflict entails a parallel transformation of the tools for conflict management and humanitarian intervention, and pushes all international and regional agencies to come across such tools. In the case of the EU, some additional events, dealing with the end of the Cold War and the significant changes in the western European security culture should be considered too.

The EU and Foreign and Defence Policy

The nuclear deterrence strategy and arms control negotiations of the Cold War and subsequent *détente* era, the three-decade-long Helsinki process, and the formulation of national and multilateral defence policies in the 1990s in response to new security threats, like new wars, the rising of civil conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), contributed to the increasing will of the European countries to strengthen their cooperation, also in the field of foreign policy. The convergence of the EU member states towards an important set of international values and goals – which is already visible in the Treaties – led to the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It consists of a set of institutions and mechanisms for making common policies in the area of international politics and economic external relations, which involves, first of all, Member States and require their joint efforts and resources (Attinà, 2006). In other terms, the cooperative multilateral approach became the European common strategy. This meant that a specific European approach to crisis management and conflict resolution should exist

concerning regional conflicts, based upon the principle that any military intervention for interrupting violence must be completed by implementing plans for the reconstruction of the political, civil, and economic structures of the target states. Further historical events contributed to strengthen this concept. The need to react to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and to the political crisis in many European post-communist countries, in the early 1990s, as well as the need to obtain a more coordinated involvement of the European Union governments in serious violent conflicts like that 1991 Gulf War, led to the awareness that a common foreign policy urgently needed also a more structured common defence policy. The 1998 Anglo-French Declaration of St. Malò is commonly considered as the event which started the building-up process. The EU's defence policy was a result of the compromise between different views about how to unite Europe beyond the single market and single currency. However, world-wide context as well as the state of security cooperation in contemporary world politics played a significant role.

The document *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, issued in December 2003 by the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, pointed out the main elements which are required to build a strong and solid *European Security Strategy*. It was, undoubtedly, a message to the world, explaining how EU would be able to face global challenges and threats. At the same time, it was a confirmation of the necessity of a stronger and efficient European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in order to afford the European Union management

of humanitarian crisis, to prevent civil conflicts, to strengthen regional security, to build sustainable partnerships. In other terms, the EU should deepen its capacity to act like a civilian power.

Today, the ESDP is assisted by three ruling structures, based within the Council General Secretariat. They are the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS). They have different tasks and deal with different phases of the decision, preparation, and deployment of a military mission sponsored by the EU. The Political and Security Committee monitors the implementation of policies, and coordinates the crisis management activities. It plays a crucial role, because it prepares and sends its own opinions and advises to the Council on the crisis in which the EU should intervene. When the European military response to a crisis has been decided, the Military Staff - which is composed of military chiefs of staff, provided by Member States - supplies military support to the PSC, and supervises the military activities. In so doing, it is assisted by the military knowledge and techniques provided by the EUMS, which is composed of detached personnel, furnished by member states. Lastly, the need to give to EU capabilities appropriate to military operations, already known as Petersberg tasks, led to the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force, as well as the introduction of the Battlegroups mechanism, involving military bodies provided with their own command and logistic autonomy.

On the other hand, the civilian crisis management is under the responsibility of the *Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management*, which has collected a list of resources, provided by the

Member States and EU itself, in the field of police administration, humanitarian aid, civilian and juridical re-establishment, civilian protection, monitoring activities on elections and human rights. The main tasks of the civilian crisis management deal, in fact, with public order, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection (Attinà, 2006).

The decision to intervene in a crisis is taken by the Council, through a planned procedure which includes all ESDP institutions as well as the Member States. The Secretary General and the EUMS prepare a document in which the plan for police, military and juridical responses are proposed. Then, the Council decides the more suitable response, agreed with the PSC and other involved structures, i.e. the EUMC, when a military response is requested; the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, in case of civilian reaction; and the Commission when the crisis requires a juridical action. In front of a strategic option, which implies military, political and juridical actions, the Council can either approve or refuse the proposed action. In case of approval, it has to structure all details of the action by which the intervention takes place.

Based on the principles, institutions, and procedure abovementioned, in the framework of ESDP, the EU should be able to provide a wide range of military operations, which should cover a large spectrum of actions. Vlachos-Dengler (2002) proposes to list them as follows:

1. humanitarian interventions, including relief, assistance and emergencies;

2. conflict prevention operations (diplomacy, economic initiatives, and military support);

3. peace-keeping and peace-building operations;

4. peace-enforcement operations.

Until today, EU has deployed 24 peace and security operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (see Table 1).

ESDP operations have carried out different tasks and functions, in an increasing and successful manner. The rising complexity of conflicts and crisis management situations and the EU's desire to deploy proper crisis management missions confirm, however, the necessity to develop more multifunctional civilian crisis management resources. As suggested in the Solana's document, the EU operations should be more comprehensive, flexible and adaptable to the needs of specific situations. This means that the common procedures should be combined with the specific expertise required to appropriately meet the challenge of single crisis situation. In addition, the size, composition and precise functions of the operations will vary according to the specific needs. To these purposes, the will and strong cooperation of the Member States are required. The involvement of other political actors, able to provide noteworthy expertise as well as ability to play a role on field should be also taken into account.

NGOs and ESDP

In the field of security and humanitarian

Table 1 – Peace and security operations deployed by the EU⁷

	Acronyme	Area	Countries	Starting date	End	Years	Personnel
1	ECMM / EUMM	Europe	Bosnia	1991, July	active	15,8	59
2	EUPM	Europe	Bosnia	2003, January	active	4,3	202
3	Concordia	Europe	FYROM	2003, March	2003, December	0,8	358
4	Artemis	Africa	Democratic Republic of Congo	2003, June	2003, September	0,3	1800
5	Proxima EUPOL	Europe	FYROM	2003, December	2005, December	2,0	200
6	AMIS II Darfur	Africa	Darfur, Sudan	2004, January	active	3,3	40
7	EUJUST Lex	Middle East	Iraq	2004, February	active	3,2	?
8	EUJUST Themis	Asia	Georgia	2004, July	2005, July	1,0	10
9	EUFOR-ALTHEA	Europe	Bosnia	2004, December	active	2,3	5949
10	EUPOL Kinshasa	Africa	DRC	2005, March	active	2,1	30
11	EUSEC	Africa	DRC	2005, June	active	1,8	32
12	EUPAT	Europe	FYROM	2005, June	2006, December	1,5	30
13	EUSR BST	Asia	Georgia	2005, September	active	1,6	20
14	AMM	Asia	Indonesia	2005, September	2006, December	1,3	80
15	EU BAM Rafah	Middle East	Palestinian Territories	2005, November	active	1,4	70
16	EU BAM Moldova and Ukraine	Europe	Moldova and Ukraine	2005, December	active	1,3	103
17	EUPOL-COPPS	Middle East	Palestine Territories	2006, January	active	1,3	33
18	EUPT	Europe	Kosovo	2006, April	active	1,0	35
19	EUFOR RD Congo	Africa	Democratic Republic of Congo	2006, April	2006, November	0,6	2800
20	EUPOL Afghanistan	Middle East	Afghanistan	2007, May	Active	1,3	185
21	EUPOL RD Congo	Africa	Democratic Republic of Congo	2007, July	Active	1,2	38
22	EUFOR Chad	Africa	Chad	2008, January	Active	0,7	3500
23	EULEX Kosovo	Europe	Kosovo	2008, February	Active	0,6	1900
24	EU SSR Guinea Bissau	Africa	Guinea Bissau	2008, June	Active	0,3	21

⁷ The data for the analysis of ESDP and multilateralism are taken from the ADISM dataset, created by the University of Catania. See <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm>

intervention, the EU dramatically increased its support of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s. EU started to provide foreign assistance through funding to NGOs in the mid-1970s with a small co-financing program, with a budget of 2.5 million euro. From the 1980s, the budget rapidly increased, and by 1995, it had arisen to an estimated \$1.0 billion (between 15% and 20% of all EU foreign aid). The NGO co-financing program and the humanitarian aid program played a pivotal role. The funds for these two programs grew considerably in the late 1980s and 1990s. The work done by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and most of the refugee work made by other Directorate-Generals was essentially implemented by NGOs (Reinmann, 2006). As Manners argues, the EU conflict prevention policy had been radically changed, during 1995, as a result of the constant dialogue between the Commission and NGOs with respect to some crucial areas, namely Africa for development policy, south-eastern Europe and post-conflict rebuilding in Bosnia after Dayton Accords (Manners, 2004). The dialogue with the Commission, in particular, contributed to the development of some conflict prevention norms and schemes that explicitly strengthened the relationships between the structural causes of instability and violence and the need to link aid and foreign policy.

The relations with the EU institutions in the field of assistance and relief were an important experience to the NGOs. The Liaison Committee, in particular, was extremely helpful – as already seen - in providing a platform for a more organized cooperation between the EU need for a stronger presence in the troubled areas of the world and the NGOs capacity to exert their advocacy.

An increasing interest towards the peace missions deployed within the ESDP as well as the exploitation of new possible forms of cooperation has been a natural step forward. The roles played by NGOs in humanitarian interventions are part of a broader theoretical discussion which deals with the issues of their engagement in political participation, representation, and democratization of the decision-making processes of the international organizations as well as the changing nature of multifunctional peace missions.

In order to analyze the system of the NGO involvement in the field of European security and foreign policy as well as humanitarian interventions, the dialogue with the EU competent institutions is examined first. Secondly, some joint forms of cooperation will be briefly described. Thirdly, the case of Artemis mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo will be used to portray the work done on field.

The relations of humanitarian NGOs with EU institutions

Together with the Commission, the European Council started soon to envisage some possible forms of cooperation with NGOs in the field of humanitarian interventions. The military Headline Goal with a 2010 horizon and an Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP have been issued in June 2004. The first aim was to develop EU capability in line with the ambition set out in the European Security Strategy.

As the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP states: *“it will be necessary to broaden the range of expertise upon which the Union can draw for its crisis missions in order to better reflect the multifaceted tasks that it will face. EU missions would in particular benefit*

from expertise in the field of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform (SSR), mediation, border control, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and media policy. The EU should begin work to ensure it is able to identify experts in these fields to be incorporated into future civilian crisis management missions" (Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, 2004: 3). In other terms, NGO experience, expertise and early warning capacity are valued by the EU Council. The area in which such expertise would be best used is undoubtedly the EU civilian crisis management capability. This exchange would positively enhance the quality of civilian aspects coordination, as well as the level of discussion with the Member States. To this purpose, the Council recommends an exchange of information with representatives from NGOs and civil society on a regular basis and strongly suggests incoming Presidencies to facilitate such meetings during their respective mandate. In fact, this practice had been deepened in the following years. To enhance dialogue and exchange of information with NGOs and civil society continued, in fact, to be one of the priorities for the Presidency, as envisaged by the Report on ESDP of the Council of June 2006.

The Presidency regularly invited NGO representatives to give briefings to members of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, especially during the early stages of the planning phase of civilian ESDP missions. A Civil Society Conference with the EULEX KOSOVO mission was organised in May 2008 by the Council General Secretariat in cooperation with the Presidency and EULEX KOSOVO and prepared in association with the European Peace

Building Liaison Office (EPLO). The main aim was not only to assess the level of cooperation in some crucial areas like human rights, gender and accountability, but also to explore how all actors can contribute to the strengthening of Rule of Law in Kosovo (Presidency Report on ESDP of June 2008). Even if these steps can be considered as an unexpected attention towards the expertise provided by humanitarian NGOs, a survey undertaken with all the Heads of Mission and EUSRs to investigate their current and past relations with NGOs reveals that there are still many areas in which cooperation should be taken forward.

The Joint forms of cooperation

As described in the previous sections, the need for more power has pushed civil society organisations to strengthen cooperation among themselves. This happened also to humanitarian NGOs. The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) is the platform of European NGOs, networks of NGOs, and think tanks active in the field of peacebuilding, created with the aim to promote sustainable peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the EU. EPLO had tried to influence the EU institutions by promoting dialogue. However, some Presidencies showed greater interest towards their activities than others.

The Netherlands Presidency of the EU in the first half of 1997 enhanced significantly this cooperation. In February 1997, the European Conference on Conflict Prevention took place in Amsterdam hosted by the Netherlands National Commission for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development in cooperation with the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the EU. It involved a large

public of NGOs and national officials. The output of the conference became "The Amsterdam Appeal: an Action Plan for European leaders", with the subsequent creation of the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (EPCPT) in September 1997 (Kirchner, 2005). The Platform became a huge network of more than 150 organizations working in the field of prevention and resolution of violent conflicts in the international arena, and continued to provide, in the following years, comprehensive information and support for conflict prevention and transformation actions of the different players in the field. Moreover, it became a place in which local and international NGOs, practitioners, academics, donor agencies, policymakers and media share experiences from various perspectives.

The practice of conferences for increasing sharing and participation has been established also in the following years. A conference on "What future for EU Conflict Prevention? Five years after Göteborg and how to move on" was jointly organised by the Presidency, the European Commission and the EPCPT in May 2006. Practitioners and representatives of Member States, the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat, NGOs, civil society, think tanks and academia as well as Members of the European Parliament benefited from the possibility to share best practice and develop ideas for future EU capacity building in the field of conflict prevention. The Centre for European Policy (CEP), in cooperation with the European Commission and the EPCPT organized in Ljubljana in April 2008, a conference on "Increasing the impact on the ground – NGO and EU collaboration in the thematic area of children affected

by armed conflict". Even this conference aimed to gather representatives of NGOs, EU Member States, EU institutions and International Organizations with a proven expertise on the issue to look into how enhanced collaboration at all levels between the different EU institutions as well as between the institutions and NGOs can lead to strong impact on the ground for children affected by armed conflict.

The practice of promoting conference had been extremely useful during the years also for creating permanent places for discussions and development of best practices and, at the same time, for raising a successful methodology. As declared in the Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (approved by the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 November 2007), the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008 has been a transformation process, during which experts from International Organisations and NGOs exchanged information about civilian crisis management capability development, including best practices in the field of training, recruitment and deployment of civilian crisis management personnel. They had been involved in the CHG 2008 process at different levels. As far as NGOs are concerned, the CHG 2008 expert workshops provided a platform for a useful exchange of views, on a more political level. For the first time IOs, non-EU states and NGOs participated together in an EU workshop on civilian ESDP capability development. As declared again by the document, the workshop has brought the EU to a better understanding of the potential contributions from third parties to ESDP civilian missions. This included knowledge of capabilities, best

practices and experience, as well as existing problems and third parties' views and expectations as far as co-operation with EU is concerned.

Obviously, these new forms of cooperation are not sufficient for assessing the quantity of expertise the NGOs are able to deploy, nor the roles they are able to play in parallel with the military personnel. There is not yet an institutionalised link between their (requested) participation to the preparatory phase of ESDP missions and the tasks exerted on field. Any progressive enhancement has been, once again, mainly the result of NGOs efforts. A case study will explain better this assumption.

NGOs on field: the case of Artemis Operation in Congo

In June 2003, the EU sent the Artemis operation to the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was the first mission outside Europe, neither dependent on NATO nor the Berlin-Plus rules. Ruled by a French command, the mission was entrusted with the task of contributing to the stabilisation of the security conditions of Bunia (the capital of the Ituri region), of improving the humanitarian situation, and of ensuring the protection of displaced people in the refugees' camps in Bunia. Its mandate was to provide a short-term interim force for three months until the transition to the reinforced United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNMOC) (Homan, 2007).

Thus, the mission supported the previous attempts made by the UN in the region and prepared the transition to stronger UN stabilisation plans. The "Europeanization" process of the mission itself (as visible in the name) had been supported by the French government, contacted by Secretary General Kofi

Annan, in May 2003. Even though the French personnel were unquestionably the majority, the preparation of the mission was the result of a EU-15 work and included resources from all the EU countries. The PSC exercised the political control as well as the strategic supervision of the military operations. From a political point of view, the Artemis operation had been considered by some scholars as a French operation with a EU cover and was essentially made to show unity after the political debacle in Iraq. It was, however, in line with the Solana's document, especially referring to the "greater capacity to bring civilian resources such as police and judges to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations" (Solana, 2003).

It contains several lessons learned. During the Artemis missions, the roles of the EU as a military and/or civilian actor in the eye and sights of the recipient population had been separated. As Manners suggests, such a civil-military distinction can be useful for the success of the whole operation (Manners, 2004). Considering the growing multifunctional nature of ESDP missions, the management of different aspects of the local conflict to face, done by different actors and according to different methods, revealed more efficiency. At the same time, the local coordination did not suffer the presence of such variety of actors. One of the aims of the mission was to help and facilitate the humanitarian community, and there was a strong coordination with NGOs. They had been able to provide the required expertise to the civil-military liaison officer, established by the French command. In addition, they played an essential role of voice articulation, through an agreement with a local NGO for supporting the re-establishment of the

judicial system. It is true that the French NGOs had been the majority, due to the strong presence of military personnel from France; however, the cooperation with local and international NGOs was not affected (Faria, 2004).

Conclusions

According to some scholars, the process of identifying the tools needed to strengthen the participation within the EU system should start from a preliminary question: why the actors of civil dialogue have struggled for obtaining some mechanisms which are not yet perfect? Is it due to the resistance from the Member States and/or institutions or is it a failure of the organizations themselves, due to a level of maturity not fully accomplished?

The EU political arena is spread over several levels of government, involves various capacities and a high quantity of actors, and follows very complex procedures, calibrated on single policies. These conditions may disorient those who are not in possession of a solid material structure and a strong representative support (Magnette, 2003). This may explain why, in the long process of European integration, only a few actors have had the strength to impose themselves in the complicated labyrinth of EU bureaucracy. Although very broad in principle, the governance for the people and with the people wanted by the Commission was gradually transformed into the governance with "some" people.

According to this interpretation, the civil dialogue actors, with less resources and bargaining power, have chosen to rely for a long time on the mediation of national policy, they had been satisfied with some specific "windows" and tried to take advantage of openings made by the

Commission for offering their potential.

Beyond the historical and political motivations, the distinction that has failed to create a link between social and civil dialogue appears increasingly outdated, if not counterproductive. It is true that this distinction has helped to separate, and discipline, the two kinds of interests; in the long period, however, it has created a disproportion that has become increasingly heavy and which ultimately disadvantaged non-economic actors.

In the field of security and humanitarian interventions, the potential is higher and the level of cooperation more productive. The growing participation of NGOs to conflict management and humanitarian intervention is part of the NGOs struggle for effective international actorness in world politics. They began supporting UN peace missions in the 1990s, and adapted to the change peace missions encountered in their aims and methods in the following time. They have developed a wide range of approaches.

Within the EU system, humanitarian NGOs had to face the variable nature of political integration and suffered the lack of institutionalisation. However, they had been able to develop some practices which, during the years, have revealed their suitability. They have strengthened, at first, dialogue among themselves, and subsequently with the competent EU bodies. Moreover, the expertise they are able to provide suit perfectly with the new characteristics required by the ESDP multifunctional peace missions, namely the combination of the common procedures with the specific expertise required to appropriately meet the challenge of single crisis situation.

REFERENCES

- Attinà F. (2006), *The Building of Regional Security Partnership and the Security-Culture Divide in the Mediterranean Region*, in Adler E., Bicchi F., Crawford B., and Del Sarto R. A. eds., *The convergence of civilizations. Constructing a Mediterranean Region*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press., pp. 239-265.
- Attinà Fulvio (2007), *The European Security Partnership: a comparative analysis*, in Foradori P., Rosa P., and Scartezzini R., eds. (2007), *Managing multi-level foreign policy. The EU in international affairs*, Lanham, Lexington Books, pp. 87-109.
- Attinà F. – Natalicchi G. (2007), *L'Unione europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Bardi L. (2002), *I Partiti e il sistema Partitico dell'Unione Europea*, in S. Fabbrini (eds.), *L'Unione Europea. Le Istituzioni e gli attori di un Sistema Sopranazionale*, Bari, Laterza.
- Bulmer S. J, (1983), *Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", vol. 21, n. 4.
- Doyle M. – Sambanis N. (2000), *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, in "The American Political Science Review", vol. 94, n. 4, pp. 779-801.
- European Commission (1993), *An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups*, Brussels, SEC 92, 2272 def., 2.12.1992.
- European Commission (2001), *Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission*, Brussels, COM (2002) 704 def., 11.12.2002
- European Commission (2000), *The Commission and the non-governmental organizations: building a stronger partnership*, COM (2000) 11 def., 18.1.2000.
- Economic and Social Committee (1999), *The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe*, CES 851/1999, Brussels, 22.9.1999.
- European Commission (2001), *White Paper on European Governance*, Bruxelles, COM (2001) 428 def., 5.8.2001.
- European Council (2008), *Presidency Report on ESDP*, 10415/08, 16 June 2006.
- European Council (2006), *Presidency Report on ESDP*, 10418/06, 12 June 2006.
- Faria F. (2004), *Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of European Union*, ISS Occasional Paper no. 51.
- Grieco J. (1995), *The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neorealist Research Program*, in « Review of International Studies », vol. 21, n. 1.
- Hix S. (1999), *The political system of the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press.
- Hoffman S. (1964), *The European process at the Atlantic Cross-purposes*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", n. 3.
- Holsti K. (1996), *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

- Homan K. (2007), *Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, in European Commission, *Faster and more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity*, pp. 151-155.
- Kaldor M. (1999), *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Kirchner E. (2005), *Security threats, institutional response and governance*, paper presented to the EUSA Conference, Austin, Texas, 31 March-2 April 2005.
- Lijphart A. (2004), *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies*, in "Journal of Democracy", 15, 2.
- Longo F. (2005), *Unione Europea e scienza politica*, Milano, Giuffrè.
- Majone G. (eds) (1996), *Regulating Europe*, London, Routledge.
- Magnette P. (2003), *European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?* in "Political Studies", 51.
- Manners I. (2004), *Normative Power Europe Reconsidered*, Paper presented to the CIDEL Workshop, Oslo, 22-23 October 2004.
- Mascia M. (2004), *La società civile nell'Unione Europea*, Firenze, Marsilio.
- Monteleone C. – Rossi R. (2008), *Security and Global Management: A Global Perspective*, in geistlinger – Longo – Lordkipanidze – Nasibli (eds.), « Security Identity and the Southern Caucasus », Wien, Verlag, pp. 49-80.
- Moravcsik A. (1993), *Preferences and Power in the European Community : A Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach*, in « Journal of Common Market Studies », vol. 31, n. 4.
- Nettesheim M. (2004), *Decision-making in the EU: identity, efficiency, and democratic legitimacy*, in "Revue européenne de droit public", 16, 1.
- Panebianco S. (2000), *Il lobbying europeo*, Milano, Giuffrè.
- Reinmann K. (2006), *A view from the top: International politics, norms and the worldwide growth of NGOs*, in "International Studies Quarterly", 50, pp. 45-67.
- Ryelandt B. (1995), *Pourquoi la Communauté européenne travaille avec les ONG*, in "Le Courier", 152.
- Schmidt V. (2004), *The European Union: democratic legitimacy in a regional state?* Center for European Studies Working Paper No. 112.
- Scharpf F. W. (1988), *The Joint-Decision Trap: lesson from German Federalism and European Integration*, in "Public Administration", vol. 66.
- Solana J. (2003), *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
- Tsebelis G. – Garrett G. (1997), *Agenda Setting, Vetoes and the European Union's Codecision Procedure*, in "The Journal of Legislative Studies", vol. 3.
- Vlachos-Dengler K. (2002), *Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP*, ISS Occasional Paper no. 38.
- Wallace H. – Wallace W. (1996), *Policy-making in the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press.
- Waltz K. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, Addison Wesley, Reading.

ARE CONTEMPORARY WARS “NEW”?

Clara Darabont*

Abstract:** *This paper will assess the existing perspectives on “new wars” in the literature. It will then analyze the degree to which contemporary wars are “new” by looking firstly at the changing nature of the state. It will not however support the view that state’s weakness is a structural cause of conflict but rather that it is a facilitator one. Finally, it will explore the degree to which globalization has impacted the role Romanian forces have to play in hotbeds such as Irak or Afghanistan. While engaging the existing literature, I argue that we must understand the “new wars” as an adapted form of engagement and not necessarily as a new breed of war.*

Keywords: *contemporary conflicts, “new wars”, globalization, transnational networks, means of engagement, Romanian military strategy*

War waging is a millennia old activity and while ever changing in manifestation it is usually based on the pursuit of power in one form or the other. Some argue that precisely this continuation of core incentives does not make for “qualitatively” new wars. Still, the form of power in today’s world is no longer necessarily linked to state form and therefore it is qualitatively new in this sense. The contemporary conflicts rely on expanded means of engagement and could be viewed as “Meta-Wars” because they mirror the elements of classical wars while adapting to the context of a *Globalized World*. The redefinition of power in the context of a variety of influences and authority structures that forgo known territorial boundaries makes for the novelty of wars.

Globalization has changed war waging in a **two-phase action** (Figure 1).

Firstly, it **eroded the state’s** jurisdiction and its monopoly on the use of force. In consequence, by melting borders and identity divisions, it provided **new means of engagement** and **popularization of particular grievances**. The literature deals with this interaction between global dynamics and local power structures in different ways. Some look at the specificities of conflict dynamics or their historical predisposition. Others address the issue of state weakness as a necessary and sufficient cause for conflict. Finally, a third category goes beyond the analysis of state’s powers or of the wars by themselves, and deals with the overall impact of a globalized world over conflict situations. For normative purposes, Kaldor’s understanding of **globalization** shall be used throughout this paper: **“the intensification of global interconnectedness—political,**

* **Clara Darabont** holds an MSc degree in Comparative Politics with the specialization in Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is currently doing a MRes/PhD in Political Science at the same academic institution. Her research interests are: local power structures, the impacts of globalization and regional integration, contemporary conflicts and the causes of radicalization. E-mail: clara_darabont@yahoo.com

** This article was submitted to the RJEA editors in August 2009.

economic, military and cultural—and the changing character of political authority” (2006:4). By this definition we can therefore consider the changing character of political authority as the first phase of the globalizing action and the intensification of global interconnectedness as a second phase. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that these are mutually reinforcing processes that only together form the actual process of globalization.

Newman (2004) are the main figures of this approach together with Headley (2006: 155) who doesn’t assesses conflicts like Chechnya to be “qualitatively new”. Historicism is one subfield of this branch of literature. The most prominent figure of this approach is Robert Kaplan who considers ancient hatred beyond any outside control in regions like the Balkans or the Caucasus. Charles King ethnographic account of the Caucasus supports to a certain extent the same take




Fig. 1 The Impact of Globalization on the Nature of the State
Source: the author

The Spectrum of approaches on New Wars

A first approach on contemporary wars is represented by the literature that accounts for the **particularities of conflicts**. This literature does not recognize any substantive difference between old wars and new wars and considers the analysis of the particularities of the conflicts to be more useful than generalizations. Kalyvas (2001) and

that historical context leads to nowadays conflicts. He finds identities in the area to have been “always relational” and that imposed distinctions are at the root of today’s confrontations. This view doesn’t deal with the shifting dynamics of new wars nor does it substantively account for potential solutions.

A second take on the subject is a varied critique of globalization. This view considers the **weakness of states** as a central cause of conflict and globalization

as an erosive agent. Dietrich Jung (2003) accounts for “shadow globalization”, while William Reno (2000) talks of “shadow states” in the general lines of State Capture thesis. Martin Shaw (2002) refers to “degenerate warfare” and political economists such as Paul Collier (2000) or David Keen (2000) discuss the profits of war and how they become an incentive for protracted conflict in line with the Greed vs. Grievance Debate. This area of literature moves forward in accounting for potential remedies, but it is still centered on statist measures. It is essential to move passed the dichotomy of strong—weak states and to see the opportunities for peaceful, dynamic co-existence that reside in an open society. The main risk is not the weakness of a state but the application of double standards within the international community.

Finally, a more nuanced category of scholars consider the **globalization** a major factor of change, affecting the structural context in which these conflicts take place. This approach views globalization as a substitutive force that makes the state an obsolete counterbalance agent in the face of growing para-state perpetrators and transnational networks. It therefore encapsulates in its thesis that potential solutions for contemporary conflicts can reside only in global re-action. Mark Duffield(1998: 65) defines the “post-modern” conflict in association “with innovative and expanding forms of political economy”. Kaldor (2006) goes beyond economics, considering these changes and their impact and establishing the traits of “new wars” along the lines of goals, mode of warfare and finances. Munkler (2005) supports her view on the novelty of wars and underlies the fact that contemporary disputes are new in form.

Nevertheless, he considers the claims to be roughly the same and usually ignited by “ethnic conflicts traced back to pre-colonial times”.

1. State’s Demise

The decentralization of statist structures of power is the first phase of changing the setting and implicitly the dynamics of wars. This is not a disintegration of the state itself, but rather a change of the role states play in the global system. In today’s interconnected environment, states can seldom settle conflicts by themselves and therefore their role as guarantor of peace can be maintained only through the support of the international community.

a. Territoriality

The first distinction made between previous wars and contemporary ones was that of jurisdiction: inter-state wars vs. intra-state wars. The **Intra-state wars** are frequently defined as civil wars. This automatic internalization is becoming erroneous as civil wars are increasingly surpassing the respective state’s jurisdiction over the conflict, either geographically (e.g. boarder conflicts) or ideologically (e.g. active support from transnational allies). Most of the new wars aren’t constrained by state boundaries. They follow the lines of ideological communities that often transgress borders. The “territorial state as container of society” (Beck GCS2003: 46) can no longer be found in today’s fluid global society. Through ICTs even the remotest areas of the globe become interconnected. Not even closed, authoritarian regimes such as North Korea can’t really block the insurgency of WWW. A continent

apart may be closer than the neighboring village. Maps are recharted in accordance to the communication infrastructure. In addition to virtual interaction, the physical migration has increased exponentially and transnational networks of aid and crime are taking form.

No more truly symmetrical **inter-state wars** can be found today. While states may be participants in the new wars, they are almost always doubled by sub-state and supra-state actors and networks that complicate and expend the confrontational capacity. This reduces not only the territorial reach of the state, but also its policy space—many functions that were previously exclusive attributes of the state are now externalized (e.g. security agenda, economic policies). Few conflicts today are still covered by Westphalian principle of non-intervention. These are usually territories that belong to “large transition states” that have the power to resist to a certain degree global or regional political integration and to “engage in counter-insurgency in order to defeat extremist networks” (Kaldor 2003: 126-127) within their borders. Examples of such inner-conflicts are Chechnya, Kashmir or Tibet in Russia, India and respectively China. Nevertheless, these conflicts quickly evolved and even without the declared intervention of foreign state actors, the global dynamics play a significant part through diasporas, media, religious and nationalistic support networks and others. Therefore the Democratic Peace Theory is only half right: while liberal democracies are no longer fighting each other, the international networks they’ve put in place—international organizations (e.g NATO, WTO, UN) or NGOs, are active parts in the existing conflicts to the benefit or the deficit of those involved. I

shall further detail, when discussing the contemporary means of engagement, how sometimes precisely aid and assistance can end up being rerouted to further sustain the fighting.

Finally, territorial control as an object of war waging has become rather obsolete. Even in the case of secessionist claims both the state and the sub-state actors fight for political control and only implicitly the surface per se. The role of politics has greatly increased in new wars and has transformed the resolution of the conflict in a matter of infinite debate. Derluguian (1999:26) describes the wars of the end of the 20th cent. as “collective police operations of the core capitalist states in the increasingly volatile periphery”.

b. Historical construction and deconstruction

“...the age of globalization is characterized by a gradual erosion of state authority” (Jung 2003: 2). Without giving in to historical determinism, some scholars argue that due to the erosion of state power and the diminishing influence of empires there is a “throwback to the past, a resurgence of ancient hatreds kept under control by colonialism and/or the Cold War” (Kaldor 2006:7). Duffield (1998) talks of “new medievalism” and Toeffler (1994) of “new dark ages”.

Authors that account for the demise of the state in present times usually observe this symmetry with pre-state formation when mercenary armies were such sub-state actors as today’s paramilitary forces and the borders were as blurred as in most of the “new wars” cases. In reference to the Caucasus, King talks about the **fluidity of borders**—it wasn’t until the first decades of the 20th century that

clearly delineated borders were drawn “along boundaries that had few historical antecedents”(2008:15). He goes on to consider also the **fluidity of identities** “the limits—of an empire, a cultural group, or even a continent—were usually in the eyes of those who believed they had stepped over them.”(2008:21). This historical symmetry does not support the “ancient hatred” thesis, but rather a view that certain structural circumstances facilitate the de-statization of war.

Still, this comparison is limited to the role of the state. Even if in pre-modern times as well as in post-modern times the monopoly of force doesn’t belong to the state, in the first case the conflicts were still territorially bound, while in the latter, due to globalization, the staging of the conflict is world wide.

Nevertheless, the historical context is significant in understanding why in the context of post-colonialism some conflicts resurge and other don’t. The answer to this question depends significantly on how we choose the cases. European countries fought for centuries to establish their shared borders and the long standing of this process assured a mutual recognition of both territory and identity. In the case of the peripheries and colonies, the borders were established by imperial will. In areas where empires were frequently clashing with each other such as the Caucuses, the African continent or even the Balkans, the local self-perception was overruled by the colonial powers politics creating false identities and unrecognized borders. These manufactured delimitations are no longer sustainable in today’s world and the repressed processes of secession reemerge.

Still, these are not always natural and inevitable urges, but rather credible

slogans and excuses used by able leaders who stand to gain politically or materially from conflict. David Keen observes that “there are reasons to believe that Milosevic has seen conflict as inherently useful” because it helped “rally political support behind him” and “provided an excuse to suppress the media and elements of the opposition”(2000: 34).

2. Fruits of Globalization

a. Nationalism and Religious Fundamentalism

The spatial context of a conflict has been for centuries an indication of who the protagonists are. As territoriality is becoming less and less an indication of identity, new forces are binding communities together.

At the center of this reshaping of communities is **identity politics**. Kaldor (2006:80) uses this term as portraying “movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power”. In the background of the demise of the state and the growing incentives for war, it can be argued that the pursuit of power may or may not aim at a stately form. Most of the religious networks take on great projects such as Islamic unification or the destruction of the West. Such aims are closer to geopolitics than state-formation. On the other hand most nationalist movements do focus on state formation, sovereignty, irredentism or political autonomy, as in such cases as Chechnya, Kosovo or Northern Ireland. Kaldor and Muro (2003: 154) argue why the distinction between nationalism and religious fundamentalism can’t always be made. They refer to Smith’s (2000) “sacred dimension of nationalism” and

consider nationalism as a political, “secularised religion”. Said made a similar connection between nationalism and fundamentalism—nationalism “makes a fetish of national identity and can pull along with it religious sentiment” (Sprinker: 1993).

Whether religious, ethnical or both, transnational network are one of the main empowering agents of “new wars”. Such organizations “often provide the only social safety net available for newly arrived immigrants from the countryside or from other countries”(Kaldor 2006:87). Facilitated by globalization, increasing flows of immigrants are populating metropolises around the world. Such networks provide a sense of belonging to displaced, frustrated individuals while fueling their radicalization. Post (2005:61) reports its interviews with one of the defendants in the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Tanzania. The young man lost his father when he was young and was educated in a madrasa where he “was shown videos of Muslim mass graves in Bosnia” and “the bodies of women and children in Chechnya”. He was persuaded to such a degree that “using his own funds, he went to Pakistan and then to a bin Laden training camp in Afghanistan” to help suffering fellow Muslims in Bosnia or Chechnya. Such a case is a classic example of a fundamentalist network fueling into national secessionist conflicts. It also exemplifies how the conflicts mutate and in cases such as Chechnya shift “from nationalism to jihad” (Hughes 2007). While nationalist conflicts usually have specific demands, the fundamentalist ones are far less reconcilable and often become protracted hotbeds.

Not only Islam has such transnational religious networks. Kaldor (2006: 90)

accounts for a visit at an official’s office in South Ossetia and how “he had a picture of the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on his wall”, being given to him by “the delegation from Republika Srpska when he attended a meeting of Eastern Orthodox Christians. In such cases it is hard to separate the political from the religious incentives, but it is obvious that one enforces the other.

b. Intensity and Means of Engagement

Munkler (2005:3) underlies as a characteristic of New Wars “the greater asymmetry of military force, so that the adversaries are as a rule not evenly matched”. Through the lenses of classical military power, one is lead to believe that this asymmetry involves a stronger and a weaker adversary in the conflict and that inevitably the stronger one will prevail even if it is through attrition. Nevertheless, due to the modern methods of engagement (guerrilla tactics, insurgency, terrorism) the adversary that is perceived to be weaker in military capacity is the one that has the greater potential for attrition. Clausewitz defines war as an act of force meant to compel one’s enemy to do one’s will (1989: 75). By this definition, the goal of wars remains the same today in any given conflict, but the means of compelling the opponent are significantly more nuanced. This constitutes the main argument of this paper that is in favor of an ideatic distinction between old, classical wars and new, meta-wars.

Opposed to the Nation-Building Wars of Pre-Modern Europe, contemporary conflicts seem to have less obvious goals and are frequently labeled as “low intensity conflicts”. When in fact we give

them a closer look, we can see that they have complex political motivations and due to their perpetuation they add up to high casualties in deaths and refugees. Another denomination of contemporary conflicts is “small wars” which is generally considered to portray wars fought through **broader means**. It is essential to understand that this broadening is not only **intensification** or **extension** of violence which will further be discussed, but also **diversification** through non-violent means of engagement.

Diversification of the means of engagement sometimes mistakenly leads researchers to believe that wars are both less numerous and less violent. Diplomacy, lobby and negotiations are clearly non-violent means of obtaining the desired results. These are in fact the premises of a Global Civil Society that’s meant to prevent bloodshed through a “plurality of global networks of (a.n. peaceful) contestation” (Kaldor 2008:10). The threat of violence may be another example of possible means of “low intensity” conflicts. Kalyvas (2004:101) supports this distinction by explaining how “terror is not synonymous with mass violence”, but in fact “implies low levels of violence” being considered unsuccessful “if it merely destroys the subject whose compliance is sought”.

Still, this deflating action of diversification and dialogue is surpassed by the intensification and extension of the methods of violence. The first argument against the denomination “low intensity” is the **extension of means of warfare**. Kaldor (2006) portrays the new wars as consisting of **war, crime and human rights violations**. Following through Kaldor’s logic we can see at play both global dynamics and localized action. In terms of war objectives there is a general shift

from territorial control towards political control which sometimes involves more specifically the control of the population. In respect to Liberia, Ellis concurs: “the aim is control of people and acquisition of booty more than control of territory in the conventional military manner” (1995:185). This account touches to another important distinction: control of the population to achieve political goals may constitute a legitimate grievance, while control of the population to obtain political control to “acquire booty” is in line with the “Greed” thesis of predatory war which will be detailed in the following subchapter. From the indiscriminate targeting of civilians as a means to an end derives the change occurred in the extent of Human Rights Violations. If in classical warfare the extent of human right was considerable, it was none the less collateral. Now, the oppression of the civilian population is a specific target of “new” combatants constituting a way to bend the will of the rulers without employing vast military resources. The final dimension of Kaldor’s new wars is that of crime. This again falls into the war economy thesis which will be discussed below and suffers a change in dimension and reach—from local to transnational.

In contradiction to Kaldor, authors like Kalyvas (2001) argue that both crime and human rights violations have been a trait of war since ancient times. Nevertheless, if crime and human rights violations did exist during the World Wars they were actions of the groups or of the individuals engaged in combat and not policies from above. Even more so, because the state was responsible for war waging, rules of conduct were imposed with the aim of maintaining discipline on the front. Given the de-statization of conflict, such high authority capable regulating war no

longer exists. The parties involved are usually loosely organized as networks or gangs. Because new wars are based on radical claims such as ethnic cleansing, they employ violence and sadism as weapons of destruction, often more effective than bullets. Kalyvas (2001:115) himself argues that “the “senseless” violence of new civil wars is often not as gratuitous as it appears”. Munkler (2005:85) explains how “women are no longer just booty, trophies or sex objects; they have rather become the conqueror main target of attack” as part of the strategies of ethnic cleansing, through forced pregnancies or mass deportations. This pattern is unfortunately present in all the contemporary conflict areas—from the Balkans to DRC. Such strategies of intimidation and terror are employed as an equally effective alternative to mass killing and although the Geneva Convention sanctions them as genocidal by intent, they are less obvious and therefore contribute to the difficulty of assessing the true scale of casualties. Because of this broad array of threats, only a “global surveillance infrastructure” (Held 2007:53) could constitute an effective security reinforcement.

Another observable shift in new wars is that of the **intensification** of the means of violence. On one hand there are significant technological advancements that allow big powers to keep their troops mostly off the ground. LIC (low intensity conflicts) which are generally perceived to be the wars where the use of force is discriminately used. The technological advancement would apparently facilitate the discriminate use of force through “surgical strikes”. Nevertheless, however much the military technology evolves, the lack of intelligence generates still high casualties amongst civilians or

non-combatants. The air bombings by NATO in Kosovo or by Russia in Chechnya demonstrate that LIC isn’t an accurate description of the reality on the ground. In fact, the war that is waged on the ground becomes more primitive and brutal and the violence spreads door to door, applied by neighbor to neighbor—as in the Balkans, Chechnya, South Ossetia or Rwanda. In addition to this, the unaccounted for commerce of weapons on the black market neutralizes the advantage of the more developed adversary because both parties can easily acquire highly destructive weaponry. Therefore, the intensification of means of violence is only a zero sum game and not a way of reducing the extent of the confrontation.

In this context of concomitant extension and intensification of the means of warfare, David Keen (2000: 25) makes a useful distinction between Top-Down violence “that is mobilized by political leaders and entrepreneurs—whether for political or economic reasons” and Bottom-Up violence that relies on more immediate incentives of the local perpetrators—whether to assure their own security and survival or to inflict damage to a perceived enemy. In line with his argument one might associate the intensification of the means of violence with the Top-Down mobilization and the expansion with a more informal Bottom-Up action. This distinction is useful in understanding the escalation of the use of violence against civilians. In the background of the state failure, the Bottom-Up violence is harder to control, censure or punish. While both levels of engagement are responsible for human rights violations, the majority of these are perpetrated by loose agents of war.

Finally, in line with the critics of Globalization such as Jung, it must be observed that this process has led to an increasing polarization between North/South, Developed/Developing Countries. The first achieve inclusion and increase of transnational flows, the latter suffer an increasing process of exclusion from the rest of the world and of fragmentation from within. With the collapse of the State-backed Industry of War of the Cold War period and the end of the support it provided for Third World countries, these countries fall increasingly more into another type of war economy based on black market activities and looting. Kaldor (2008:95) also observes that in the new environment, “the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support”. In economical terms the predatory behavior can be easily understood as “Asset Transfer” that is defined as “the redistribution of existing assets so as to favor the fighting units” (Duffield in Kaldor 2008: 108). The motivations behind it are harder to define. In this sense, Kalyvas (2001:103-104) points out that “the concept of looting is analytically problematic because it is unclear whether it refers to causes of war or the motivation of combatants (or both)”. He goes on to draw attention to the “direction of the causality—do people wage war in order to loot or do they loot to be able to wage war?”.

3. Romania's Security Role

Romania has a UN membership for more than a half century—since the 14th of December 1955. On the 29th of March 2004, at the Prague Summit, Romania has joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 2007, the country also became a member of

the European Union. The Romanian Army has played an active role in several international military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan amongst others. According to the Ministry of Defense, 1258 Romanian military units have been deployed under NATO, EU or UN missions to date. Given all this, it is only reasonable to consider that the part Romania has to play in the contemporary international security context is a significant one. It has in this quality several duties and it encounters certain risks.

Geopolitically, Romania has always been situated at an inflexion point. The Eastern Europe has traditionally been the transit area between the classical Europe and the Asian powers—Ottomans and Russians. More recently, the Balkan wars have flared up security threats right in the heart of Europe that was simultaneously leading a process of integration and unification. It was then, more important than ever for the West to have a strong and reliable ally in the region. As mentioned before, Romania played its part both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo. After the cease-fire in the Balkans, Maior and Matei explain how ‘(t)he end of overt conflicts in the Balkans has created the basis for the entire region to open itself to broader European security developments, including the new partnership with NATO and the transformation towards new types of military forces’ (2003:67). This ‘new type of military forces’ is the main reform objective of a country engaged in “new wars” such as those in the Balkans, Iraq or Afghanistan. Maior and Matei go on to emphasize how ‘accountability and transparency in armed forces reform have been defined as sine qua non criteria for participating in international security

cooperation networks (as, for example, in joining the Partnership for Peace)’ (2003:67).

As part of an international response force, the Romanian Army has pursued and accomplished a series of objectives in the last 5 years:

- International Civil-Military Cooperation in Security oversight and Defense planning framework (Maior and Matei 2003)
- Coherent Regional Security Plan vis-à-vis the Black Sea area (Maior and Matei 2005)
- Professional Army (forgoing the mandatory military service) (Maior 2009)
- Modernization and Reform at the Logistical and Resource level—both in terms of Human Resources as well as the weaponry (Maior 2009)

While there is still room for improvement, the modernization endeavors that took place so far have maintained the performance level the Romanian Army has to possess in the context of contemporary conflicts.

The strategic and political risks Romania encounters are also derived from the globalization process. On one hand, there is an obvious strategic mission as a bordering EU state with regard to the transnational networks of crime. Unfortunately, as the CIA’s Fact book shows, Romania is still a major transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin transiting the Balkan route and small amounts of Latin American cocaine bound for Western Europe. Glenny confirms the high debit activity of organized crime networks transiting the Balkans and warns to the important role Romania and Bulgaria, as EU members, have to play in fighting transnational crime in the area (2009). Another risk that Romania faces in terms of military affairs

is that its NATO and UN membership (as well as its bilateral relation with the USA) have brought about hard choices in terms of the extent of involvement in the GWOT. In a 2006 interview with the BBC, the former Minister of External Affairs, Mihai Ungureanu, declared that as “we are all part in the battle against terrorism, cooperation between intelligence services is likely and absolutely normal”. While cooperation is normal, taking part in abuses is not. In the same interview the former minister was confronted with evidence the BBC had about secret CIA prisons on the territory of Romania and rendition programmes that Romania was condoning. Even if Mr. Ungureanu denied the allegations, a year later, in 2007, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe assembled a Report according to which Secret detentions and illegal transfer of detainees was in fact occurring on the Romanian soil as part of a CIA run “HVD” (High Value Detainees) Programme. In the background of increased criminal and destructive capacity of terrorist networks and organized crime groups, such bilateral agreements as the “Agreement between the United States of America and Romania regarding the activities of the United States Forces located on the territory of Romania” (2005), are not only inefficient, but run the risk of damaging the trust and effectiveness of international action plans.

Conclusion

Munkler (2005) describes the *differentia specifica* of the new wars by contrast to the earlier forms of warfare and Kaldor (2006) accounts for an ideatic novelty driven by globalization. From both perspectives, although not explicitly, the

change in state's powers and attributions is central to the change in warfare. This paper has analyzed the changes in the involvement of the state in contemporary wars and the shifts in warfare driven by globalization. It was shown that the consequences of a "smaller" world are most obvious in terms of reasons and means of engagement. The role Romania has to play in this "new" world dynamic is a significant one. Its status as member of the UN, NATO and the

EU brings about certain obligations and certain risks. It is essential for decision-makers to understand that Romania can no longer afford a bilateral policy and, in the context of globalization, it has to act locally, while thinking globally. The contemporary nature of conflicts demands an above-state level strategy and a higher degree of cooperation and integration on the regional as well as on the international stage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Books:

- Glenny, Misha (2009) *McMafia: Seriously Organized Crime*, Vintage Books: London
- Headley, Jim (2006) *Globalization and the "new wars": the case of Chechnya*. In Patman, Robert G. "Globalization and Conflict", Routledge
- Jung, Dietrich (2003) *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflict and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State Wars*, Routledge
- Kaldor, Mary (2003) *Global Civil Society*, Polity Press
- Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New & Old Wars*, Polity Press
- Kaplan, Robert (2002) *Eastward to Tatar*, Vintage Books
- Kaplan, Robert (1994) *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*, Papermac
- Keen, David (2000) *Incentives and Disincentives for Violence*. In Berdal, Mats and Malone, David (eds.) *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Rienner/IDRC
- King, Charles (2008) *The Ghost of Freedom. A History of the Caucasus* Oxford University Press
- Maior, George Cristian (2009) *Noul Aliat: Regandirea Politicii de Aparare a Romaniei la inceputul secolului XXI*, RAO: Bucharest
- Munkler, Herfried (2005) *The New Wars* Polity Press
- Post, Jerrold M. (2005) *The socio-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology*. In Bjorgo, Tore (ed.) *Root Causes of Terrorism*, Routledge
- Reno, William *Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars*. in Berdal, Mats and Malone, David (eds.) *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Rienner/IDRC
- Sprinker, Michael (1993) *Edward Said: A Critical Reader* WileyBlackwell
- Toeffler, Alvin; Toeffler, Heidi (1994) *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* Little, Brown et Co

Articles:

- Duffield, Mark (1998) “Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment States and Private Protection” *Civil Wars* 1(1): 65-102
- Ellis, S. (1995) “Liberia 1989-1994 a study of ethnic and spiritual violence” *African Affairs* 94:165-197
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001) “New” and “Old” Civil Wars—A Valid Distinction?” *World Politics* 54: 99-118
- Kalyvas, Stathis N (2004) “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War” *The Journal of Ethics* 8: 97-138
- Maior, G.C. and Matei, M. (2003) ‘Bridging the Gap in Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern Europe” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Spring 2003, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p60 Journal article
- Maior, G.C. and Matei, M. (2005) “The black sea region in an enlarged Europe: changing patterns, changing politics”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 2005 (Winter), v.16 (no. 1), p33 19 pages
- Newman, Edward (2004) “The “New Wars Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed” *Security Dialogue* 35(2): 173-189
- Shaw, Martin (2002) “Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres and the Historic Legitimacy of War” *International Relations* 16(3):343-359

Reports:

Marty, Dick (Rapporteur) on behalf of the Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights (2007) ‘Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report”, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe

Podcast:

1. Podcast: CIA’s Secret Wars First broadcast March 2006

Websites:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html#Military> (accessed last 2nd of August 2009 at 22:11)

CHANGES IN ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP

Agnes Nicolescu*

Abstract:** *This article aims to analyze the main changes and factors which have an impact on Romania's foreign policy agenda, considering the fact that our country is a member state of the European Union and also a NATO member. The goal is therefore to identify the possible changes in the decision-making process as far as Romanian foreign policy is concerned, in the context of its accession to the European Union and the major topics that may involve an adaptation to the European Foreign and Security Policy. Romania's accession to the European Union involves that domestic foreign policy structures function in the spirit and according to the European norms, which means that certain changes and transformations need to be assumed in order to be able to fulfil the proposed objectives. This also implies a revision and ongoing adaptation of the main topics on the Romanian foreign policy agenda, such as, for instance, the issue of how viable the deployment of Romanian troops in Iraq is and its implications in the long term on our country's relations with the other EU members as well as with the other allies in NATO, or the conflict in Transnistria. With regard to this matter, it is interesting to point out that this situation has sparked off greater interest among the European audience only over the last few years, as Romania joined the European Union, rendering Brussels more sensitive to this issue which, however, is still far from being properly tackled. This has prompted Romanian decision-makers to consider in a more pragmatic and dynamic manner relations with its Eastern neighbours, through already existing instruments such as the Black Sea strategy and the ones still under elaboration, like the European Danube Strategy.*

Keywords: *foreign policy, Romania, Eastern Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Black Sea Synergy.*

The EU integration process implies a very complex and multi-faceted array of implications for Romania in its relation with the European and transatlantic partners, and, last but not least, with neighbours to the East and the Middle East. This involves therefore

the necessity to constantly review and rethink Romania's strategic foreign policy objectives and policies, so as to be able to better deal with the emerging tensions and challenges in the security field, and with its obligations as EU and NATO member. By joining the European Union,

* Agnes Nicolescu is Project Coordinator with the European Institute of Romania. She is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences, Bucharest University and holds an MA degree in International Relations. Her areas of interest include European Security and Defence Policy, the evolution of NATO and security in the Middle East region. E-mail: agnes.nicolescu@ier.ro.

** This article was submitted to RJEI editors in October 2009.

Romania became the Union's Eastern border, which requires us to be prepared to face all types of risks, imbalances and conflicts stemming from the East, the most pressing issue in this respect being Transnistria and, in correlation with that, a pragmatic management of relations with Russia.

From this perspective, it is relevant to analyze the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in order to grasp and understand better the responsibilities and challenges facing Romania, which is also a NATO member, and therefore assume the entire set of obligations, including those in the field of foreign and security policy.

At the level of the European Union structures, the development of common strategies and crisis management procedures are a reflection of efforts to improve coordination with NATO member states. The practical cooperation between NATO and the EU in the Balkans, where the necessity for continuous regional security remains a constant preoccupation for both actors, has been reflected in the successful take-over by the EU force of the mission previously led by NATO troops in the area. At the level of EU institutions, the main structure responsible for overall co-ordination is the European Council, which gives strategic direction to EU security policy on the basis of proposals from both the Council and Commission. Given the current multi-faceted security challenges and risks at the international level, the role and importance of connecting EU-

internal and external aspects of security is becoming more and more obvious.

The gradual absorption of former WEU tasks by the EU triggered a series of consequences for the NATO- EU relationship, reflected in developments within both organizations. The Helsinki meeting of the Council of the European Union in December 1999 established a "Headline Goal" for EU member states in terms of their military capabilities for crisis management operations. The objective of the *2010 Headline Goal* is to enable the EU by 2010 to deploy rapidly forces capable of applying "a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union"¹, namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping missions, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. Moreover, they may also engage in joint disarmament operations, and provide assistance to third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform².

Authors tackling the issue of Europe's enlargement towards the East in the aftermath of the fall of communism have analyzed the sources of instability that manifested after the collapse of the Soviet block, generating a trend for states in Eastern and Central Europe to seek the fulfilment of their security and prosperity objectives within the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and respectively those of the European Union. Other authors pointed to Europe's new security order as manifested in the form

¹ 2010 Headline Goal, 17 May 2004, p. 1, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>, last accessed on 7 August 2009.

² 2010 Headline Goal, 17 May 2004, p. 1, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>, last accessed on 7 August 2009.

of a “pluralistic security community”³, the concept being introduced by Karl Deutsch in 1957, and a period when the European Communities were in their initial phase of making. This concept was characterized by the compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and mutual responsiveness, based on mutual identity, sympathy and loyalty considerations, both of these developing around ‘cores of strength”, manifested in fact in the form of European Communities⁴.

In these conditions, “the conflict between democracy and efficiency is an unavoidable dilemma of the present times. Similar difficulties arise with any international institutions that have law-making or law-enforcing powers.”⁵ The current state of the ratification process provides an opportunity to reconsider and tackle the relationship between democracy and efficiency, especially in light of the latest geopolitical transformations, which give Europe a long awaited chance to make its voice heard as a global actor. Whether EU institutions will manage to sort this problem out also has deep implications for the continuation of the democratisation process in fragile states such as those in the Balkans, considering the fact that EU membership has represented a strong incentive for political elites in these countries to introduce reforms and aim at achieving the European standards in various areas. Essentially, the most important elements

regard the respect of human rights and ethnic minorities as prerequisites for avoiding further tensions and conflicts in the area.

Gerald Knaus, policy director of the European Stability Initiative, a policy think-tank based in Berlin, goes even further with commenting on the implications of a potential European crisis for the Balkans region, by stating that if European institutions were to reject Western Balkan states the possibility of joining the EU in the future, this would basically mean the disintegration of the EU policy in this area, since “the legitimacy of our intervention in the region is completely underwritten by taking steps toward the European membership”⁶.

According to this line of judgment, the integration process of Central and Eastern states into both the EU and NATO is largely seen as a manifestation of the principle that international or continental interdependence “increases with geographical proximity, member states on the Eastern border of the EU being more sensitive to developments in Central and Eastern than the more remote member states”⁷. At the same time, the enlargement of the EU has brought more focus on dealing with unstable regions at its borders that had been repeatedly neglected before, such as it is the case with Transnistria, which gained new dimensions when Romania joined the European Union in 2007, bringing thus

³ Beverly CRAWFORD (ed.), *The Future of European security*, University of California & Berkeley, 1992, p. 291.

⁴ Beverly CRAWFORD (ed.), *The Future of European security*, University of California & Berkeley, 1992, p. 291-292.

⁵ Martin WOLF, “A More Efficient Europe is Less Democratic”, *Financial Times*, 14 June 2005, p. 10

⁶ Nicholas WOOD, “Crisis Chills Prospects for Nations outside EU”, in *International Herald Tribune*, 17 June 2005, p. 7.

⁷ Frank SCHIMMELFENNIG, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe- Rules and Rhetoric*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 178.

the conflict in the area more and more to the attention of European institutions acting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy field.

Understanding the political and security context in which the Common European Foreign and Security Policy emerged is critical to the analysis of Romania's perspective and contribution to this sector, taking into account the fact that it already was a NATO member when it joined the European Union. The issue at stake is therefore to establish whether Romania's EU membership is compatible with its previous commitments towards NATO. Despite numerous and more or less nuanced disagreements at the level of the transatlantic institutions, EU and NATO decision-makers tend to see the solution to all these issues as coming down to a burden-sharing problem, where Europeans find themselves forced into taking more decisive steps as far as the future of the foreign and security policy is concerned.

Another significant dimension Romania should pay attention to regards the evolution of its relations with Turkey, an important actor in the Black Sea region with connections to the Caucasus area also, as a state with European aspirations. Turkey is a revealing example of peaceful coexistence of Islam and democratic rule, being at present the focus- subject of attempts to include a largely Muslim

country in its institutions, which might contribute to promoting democracy and human development in the region⁸.

In this regard, Turkey may be a very constructive partner in the Black Sea region, and particularly valuable from the perspective of its renewed commitment as long as the incentives aimed to keep Turkey connected to the European Union are maintained. In relation to the issue of enlargement, it is argued that EU's conditionality has been essential in triggering democratic reforms in Turkey⁹.

Turkey's relationship with the EU is at a critical point now, taking into consideration two major factors: the change in the US administration, which ensures a focus on multilateral mechanisms in relations with the Europeans and an international context which is more favourable to finding a solution to the Cyprus issue¹⁰. At the same time, the coming in power of the Obama administration means that Romania can assume a more pragmatic attitude in relations with its Atlantic partners, which allows it at the same time to have a more balanced relation with Russia in all the sectors.

The objective of this paper is to analyse the circumstances and directions in which EU- NATO relations are likely to evolve as far as Romania's major foreign and security priorities are concerned, as well as the manner in which these

⁸ Ronald ASMUS, Larry DIAMOND, Mark LEONARD, Michael Mc FAUL, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East", in *The Washington Quarterly*, 28:2, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005, p. 17.

⁹ Helene SJURSEN, "Integration Without Democracy? Three conceptions of European Security Policy in transformation", Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Working Paper no. 7, February 2008, <http://www.arena.uio.no>, accessed on October 13th 2009, p. 18.

¹⁰ Atila ERALP, "Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship Discussion", EDAM series, 2009/02, <http://www.edam.org.tr/images/PDF/yayinlar/makaleler/discussion%20paper%20series-2.pdf>, last accessed on October 13th 2009, pp. 2 - 10.

developments interact with Romania's foreign agenda and objectives. Over the past decade, both the EU and NATO have faced a radical rearrangement of their neighbourhoods, given the gradual enlargement of these organisations towards the southern, the northern and the eastern frontiers of the continent. The impact is obvious at the level of EU's enlargement policy through the development of a common foreign and security and defence policy, aiming to equip Europeans with more efficient tools to combat the current security challenges. But the confusion between foreign policy and enlargement policy generated certain ambiguities and inconsistencies, not the least because the further East and South-East the border of the EU moves, the more potential aspirants for EU membership emerge.

The changing geopolitical and geo-strategic context of the European Union requires measures which are more difficult to achieve than the mere act of drawing new borders on the European map: "Geopoliticians need not be too concerned with defining exact boundaries within an international system marked by spheres of influence, heartlands and border regions. Institutionalisation however requires hard decisions"¹¹.

Romania's accession to the European Union involves multiple significant changes and transformations of conceptual and institutional nature at the level of Romanian foreign policy mechanisms and decision-making structures, so that our country is capable to pragmatically manage the various

topics or policies elaborated by the European Union. Moreover, starting with the moment when our country became an EU member, these changes already needed to have been internalized and assumed, so that Romania can participate at the elaboration, shaping up and implementation of the policies that is also bound to follow.

Romanian foreign policy decision-makers should also focus more on consolidating political relations with another major international actor such as *China*. As Dingli Shen, Executive Dean at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai points out¹², China is carefully monitoring developments connected to the EU integration and enlargement, and mostly the evolution of its security and defence policy. In my opinion, this obviously shows Beijing's special interest in the way the European foreign policy can shape up international affairs, especially in light of the appreciation China seems to have for the European Security and Defence Policy, which is perfectly understandable considering the fact that China supports a multipolar vision of the international system.

One of the most challenging dimensions which have to be dealt with is the manner in which Romania considers and acts as part of NATO, on one hand, and within the European Union, on the other hand, in its relationship with Russia. Out of a pool of options, the one favouring Romania the most is the one which helps avoid a direct confrontation with Russia and has good chances to win the support of European allies. However, the fact that

¹¹ Andrew COTTEY, Derek AVERRE (ed.), *New Security Challenges in post-communist Europe, Securing Europe's East*, Manchester Univ. Press, 2002, p. 5.

¹² Dingli SHEN, "Why China sees the EU as a Counterweight to America", in *Europe's World*, no. 10/2008, p. 48.

this partnership has worked so far does not guarantee the fact that it will work just as easily in the future, since the West has less instruments in the Black Sea region than in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia's political and economic interest in this part is greater¹³.

Another relevant fact that Romania should take into consideration is that non-EU states bordering on the Black Sea are less developed and less democratic than the Western Balkans, for example, which makes it more difficult for Romanian decision-makers to bring a positive and coherent contribution in the region.

Besides that, Russia's attitude towards the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership more specifically continues to be negative, as shown by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas during an interview: "I have been witnessing the evolution of the Russian thinking about the Eastern Partnership. I think they had a misguided perception of the Eastern Partnership, and I hope that as we move forward with the Eastern Partnership, our colleagues in Moscow and across Russia will appreciate the value and positive impact..."¹⁴.

Moscow could not hide its resentment concerning this issue when the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the Eastern Partnership a "sphere of influence" in

Brussels in March 2009, and Russian analyst Sergei Karaganov considered that the "core of all differences between the West and Russia is the question of whose sphere of influence the Soviet successor states fall into"¹⁵.

In light of these elements, Russia's cooperation may be more difficult to obtain in this region as compared to Central and Eastern Europe, where the European Union has more functional assistance instruments in place. Moscow needs more incentives to feel that it has cooperation in this part of the world is more convenient than confrontation with the West on certain issues. In order to ensure cooperation with Russia, the West needs to set up a system of incentives and limitations, of which Romania must also be a part of. One way would be to offer Russia a set of favourable assistance options with regard to Northern Caucasus, as a means to help stabilize this region¹⁶.

One particular fact which is worth drawing upon while analyzing relations with Russia, from the perspective of Romania's EU membership status, is the fact that the European Security Strategy did not include Transnistria among those situations identified as potential regional conflicts, and acknowledged as having a direct and indirect impact on European interests at the time of its elaboration¹⁷. This

¹³ Ronald ASMUS, Konstantin DIMITROV, Joerg FORBRIG (eds.), *O nouă strategie euro-atlantică pentru regiunea Mării Negre*, București, Editura IRSI "Nicolae Titulescu", 2004, p. 59.

¹⁴ Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas for the interview "Summit Sidelines: Lithuania's Foreign Minister on EU Eastern Partnership", http://www.rferl.org/content/Lithuanias_Foreign_Minister_On_The_EU_Eastern_Partnership/1623605.html, last accessed on October 18th 2009.

¹⁵ http://www.rferl.org/content/Eastern_Partnership_The_EUs_Accidental_Sphere_Of_Influence/1622923.html , last accessed on October 18th 2009.

¹⁶ Ronald ASMUS, Konstantin DIMITROV, Joerg FORBRIG (eds.), *O nouă strategie euro-atlantică pentru regiunea Mării Negre*, București, editura IRSI "Nicolae Titulescu", 2004, p. 59.

¹⁷ Javier SOLANA, "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in A Better World", *The EU Institute for Security Studies*, Brussels, 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, p. 9, last accessed on October 7th 2009.

represents a significantly worrying aspect, given the fact that efforts undertaken by the European Union in this direction have not gone beyond including Moldova in the Eastern Partnership, which, however, does not guarantee EU membership for Kishinev.

The document sets itself the following strategic objectives, with a view to tackling these problems, by the following means: addressing the threats as it has already done by pursuing policies against proliferation; the ongoing transformation of the concept of self-defence, which at present involves that the line of defence lies abroad; building security in Europe's proximity, as enlargement should not produce new dividing lines in Europe and "it is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed"¹⁸. This principle seeks thus to extend the security values of the European Union also to the neighbouring regions, building a consolidated security framework in Europe's proximity, capable of managing conflicts, organized crime and other state weaknesses.

The European Security Strategy reiterates the task of "promoting a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean..."¹⁹, designating the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a strategic priority for Europe. This explains the European Union's overwhelming interest in the Palestinian problem for a significant number of years, as opposed to the little concern shown towards the new Eastern neighbours, until Romania

became the European Union's Eastern border.

The EU's new Neighbourhood Policy aims also at achieving through primarily diplomatic and economic incentives several objectives of democratization in the Middle East region that the United States has failed so far to attain²⁰, by finding more appropriate communication instruments with the Arab partners. The particular attention paid by the European Union to the settling of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should also involve a greater preoccupation for this issue at the level of the Romanian foreign policy, so that our country is able to contribute to the peace process and better cope with similar challenges in our immediate neighbourhood.

This requires therefore a review of the approach adopted so far by the Romanian diplomacy in this respect, which, as suggested in the document, should perhaps consider a broader engagement with the Arab world, taking into account the fact that the European Union's interests demand a continued cooperation with the Mediterranean partners.

In this particular region of the world, the European Neighbourhood Policy appears to have more functional instruments at hand than NATO, for instance, whose Mediterranean Dialogue framework has not witnessed major improvements, benefiting also from more legitimacy in terms of cultural and trade relations. At present, the European Union provides significant economic assistance to the

¹⁸ Javier SOLANA, "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in A Better World", The EU Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, December 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, p. 8, accessed on 19 March 2009, p. 7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

Middle East region, apart from opening up its domestic markets and offering political assistance in the framework of the Barcelona Process, launched in the mid-1990 in the Mediterranean basin, as well as through the more recently adopted Neighbourhood Policy. This policy aimed to deepen ties with countries on Europe's periphery; moreover, the Action Plans concluded by the European Union with Middle Eastern states in the framework of its New Neighbourhood Initiative might develop into a model for a stronger regime, should the countries concerned meet the conditions formulated in these documents. The positive aspect about these Action Plans is the fact that they are elaborated in a very detailed manner, containing more than 200 concrete steps for reform, and that they have been negotiated with input from these states, including their civil society groups²¹.

This involves that the European Union should be able to take action before states surrounding it deteriorate, as well as anytime signs of proliferation are noticed or humanitarian emergencies arise. This is the major reason why the EU promotes and expresses itself in favour of 'preventive engagement', which involves also for Romania the necessity to rethink and reshape in a more efficient manner its security conception, according to the emerging security threats at the regional and international level. European troops need to transform into more flexible

and mobile units, in order to be able to address the new threats, in which the systematic use of pooled and shared assets and resources reduces duplication of the existing structures. At the same time, the document admits the necessity to enhance civilian capabilities in the aftermath of military operations, so as to manage more efficiently post-crisis situations.

The Wider Europe - Neighbourhood Policy underlines the important role held by this policy in further developing the EU-Russia partnership, but, at the same time, notes that reasons related to Russia's size and resources' potential confer a very high importance to EU's relations with the Russian Federation conducted even outside of this framework.

According to the authors of a study on the chances for the European Union to induce more democratic openness in the Middle East area as part of its new Neighbourhood Policy, "neighbourhoods do matter, however, and one can hardly imagine a less auspicious neighbourhood for building democracy today than the Middle East"²³. This idea reveals the difficulties encountered by EU diplomacy in the conduct of its foreign relations with states in this region, due to, on one hand, to the lack of a sufficient number of effective multilateral structures that can contribute to softening bilateral or regional tensions, not to mention the necessity to ensure regional cooperation in the security sector.

²¹ Ronald, ASMUS, Larry DIAMOND, Mark LEONARD, Michael Mc FAUL, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East", in *The Washington Quarterly*, 28:2, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005, p. 8.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 21

²³ Ronald, ASMUS, Larry DIAMOND, Mark LEONARD, Michael Mc FAUL, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East", in *The Washington Quarterly*, 28:2, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005, p. 13.

The change of administration in Washington at the beginning of 2009 has been largely seen as a significant opportunity to improve transatlantic relations, by ensuring more mutual understanding and a renewed sense of shared interests and visions of international security. Proof of this was the visit of the newly elected US president Barack Obama in Egypt, where he held a speech symbolically entitled "A New Beginning"²⁴. This episode is deemed to represent only the beginning of a significant trend in the new US administration's stance on international relations, which is likely to seek more common ground with partner countries, including Muslim countries, rather than act unilaterally, as we have seen quite often with the Bush administration.

More importantly, Obama's speech targeted at identifying other common discussion topics with the Muslim world than cooperation to combat terrorism and pointed out to the positive aspects of progress and diversity that Islamic citizens can bring to their immediate communities in Western countries.

Romania needs to be aware that, in order to increase and maximize the potential of the Black Sea Synergy, which was somehow neglected since the creation of the Eastern Partnership, the Synergy must be correlated with the future European Danube Strategy, which will focus on transportation, environment and economic development. The necessity to elaborate such a strategy has come

to the attention of the European Union after Romania's and Bulgaria's accession to the Union in 2007, which had as a consequence the fact that Danube became an internal EU waterway. Just as in the case of the Baltic Sea, the Danube strategy is likely to include concrete measures and involve some member states in the actual implementation. Several forms of cooperation on Danube are already in place, such as the Working Community of the Danube regions, the Danube Commission on Transport Issues and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River²⁵.

Major European and Euro-Atlantic players should make a priority out of developing a political formula capable of balancing the interests of NATO, EU and countries bordering on the Black Sea as well as the functional instruments used in the region, such as the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and the other forms of bilateral cooperation among states. NATO's expansion to the shores of the Black Sea brought the Atlantic Alliance closer to the Middle East region and enhances its ability to contribute to the peace and security process in the wider Black Sea area, while the EU has created more opportunities to develop a set of 'low level intensity' missions through its European Security Strategy²⁶.

The Wider Europe - Neighbourhood Policy report consolidates the importance of EU-Russia partnership, but, at the same time, notes that reasons related to Russia's

²⁴ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/NewBeginning/>, last accessed on October 7th 2009.

²⁵ Valentina Pop, "Danube Strategy to focus on transport and environment", <http://euobserver.com/882/28387>, last accessed on October 18th 2009.

²⁶ Ronald ASMUS, Konstantin DIMITROV, Joerg FORBRIG (eds.), *O nouă strategie euro-atlantică pentru regiunea Mării Negre*, Bucureşti, editura IRSI "Nicolae Titulescu", 2004, p. 59.

size and resources' potential confer a very high importance to EU's relations with the Russian Federation conducted even *outside* this framework. With regard to this issue, the main task that European diplomacy intends undertaking is to find a reasonable solution to the Transdnistrian problem, where Russian troops continue to be present in a significant number. European official documents concerning this topic tend to conceive the solution to this situation in terms of balance relations in the region, with a particular focus on Ukraine's role in the region and implicitly in the elaboration of the solution²⁷. In light of these elements, it is recommendable that Romania should seek enhanced dialogue with the Ukrainian counterparts on this subject.

The Black Sea Strategy aims to correlate region-wide developments with the resolution of the 'frozen conflicts' in Georgia, Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, drawing on existing resources and on joint financing instruments with other international actors operating in the region²⁸.

It is highly likely that Russia's policy towards the West when dealing with the Black Sea region might be more aggressive than in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, for various reasons. Basically, these reasons concern the greater influence exerted by Russia from an economic and political point of view in relationship with the weaker governments in this region,

than in relationship to the governments in Central and Eastern Europe²⁹.

In relation to this point, it is worth mentioning Europeans' constant fear about their energetic security as one of the potential reasons for engaging in a more vivid dialogue with Moscow, on this topic, as during the EU-Russia summit held- symbolically I would add- in Khabarovsk, Russia on May 21-22nd 2009. The reunion dealt essentially with energy, energy security and trade, leaving aside topics such as the unstable situation in Moldova, which would have undoubtedly caused little positive reaction if not downright opposition with the Russian counterparts.

Conclusions

The most difficult problem faced by Romania as well as by all EU member states interested in bringing forward the European Neighbourhood Policy and more particularly its Eastern dimension is the fact that the Union still lacks the political will and mechanisms needed to implement and sustain a viable solution in the region. The European security policy is still far from being completely coherent and unified in terms of working concepts and instruments used to achieve the set goals. Examples of other situations in which the EU adopted a clearly structured foreign policy strategy but failed to implement it include the

²⁷ Report of the European Parliament on 'Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, last accessed on October 5th 2009.

²⁸ Fabrizio Tassinari, "Sailing the Black Sea at last", 07.02.2008, <http://euobserver.com/9/25615#>, last accessed on October 5th 2009.

²⁹ Ronald ASMUS, Konstantin DIMITROV, Joerg FORBRIG (eds.), *O nouă strategie euro-atlantică pentru regiunea Mării Negre*, București, editura IRSI "Nicolae Titulescu", 2004, p. 64.

Euro-Mediterranean Policy, while its approach in the Baltic Sea region has brought significant progress in the region.³⁰

Another significant dimension for Romanian foreign policy decision-makers is the necessity to coordinate the Black Sea Strategy with the envisaged Danube Strategy, as a means to bring closer Central and Eastern Europe through common interests, such as trade exchanges and a shared vision of the energy needs in the region.

As far as other major actors in the Black Sea area are concerned, it would be in Romania's best interest to continue the pragmatic dialogue with Russia and Turkey, in order to contribute to maximizing the cooperation instruments offered by the Black Sea strategy.

A clear procedural setback would be the fact that the European Parliament lacks decisive competences in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, serving more as a framework for discussing policy options. From a democratic perspective, the European Parliament's position in this respect is interesting not only because it is a directly elected body, but also because its informal practice may acquire a formal shape in the future, making the foreign

and security policy more accountable to the parliament members³¹.

The current situation at the European level and the lack of consistency in the field of foreign policy have a lot to do with the existence of complex internal difficulties in EU member states themselves, and these obstacles should be taken into consideration in a more serious manner, as they have a negative impact upon the further consolidation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an efficient policy instrument, and, for our country, on the way Romania conducts and shapes its own foreign policy. This would also contribute to undermining efforts to seek viable solutions for conflicts and tensions developing in Europe's immediate Eastern neighbourhood, such as that in Transnistria, which would involve serious risks for Romania's security and Europe's Eastern border.

However, as far as the European security in the short and medium-term is concerned, a lot has to do with the way in which the European Union will manage to build more consistent relations both with Russia and with other European countries, which used to be part of the Soviet block before 1989, without bringing prejudice to either's interests.

³⁰ Stephan KEUKELEIRE, "Solana's Security Review should introduce "Structural" Foreign Policy", in *Europe's World*, no. 10/2008, pp. 82- 83.

³¹ Anne Elizabeth STIE, "Decision-Making Void of Democratic Qualities? An Evaluation of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy", Arena Working Paper no. 24, December 2008, <http://www.arena.uio.no>, last accessed on October 17th 2009, p. 12.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- ASMUS Ronald, DIAMOND Larry, LEONARD Mark, Mc FAUL Michael, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East", in *The Washington Quarterly*, 28:2, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005
- ASMUS Ronald, DIMITROV Konstantin, FORBRIG Joerg (eds.), *O nouă strategie euro-atlantică pentru regiunea Mării Negre*, București, editura IRSI "Nicolae Titulescu", 2004
- COTTEY Andrew, AVERRE Derek (ed.), *New Security Challenges in post-communist Europe*, Securing Europe's East, Manchester Univ. Press, 2002
- CRAWFORD Beverly (ed.), *The Future of European security*, University of California & Berkeley, 1992
- KEUKELEIRE Stephan, "Solana's Security Review should introduce "Structural" Foreign Policy", in *Europe's World*, no. 10/2008
- SCHIMMELFENNIG Frank, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe-Rules and Rhetoric*, Cambridge University Press, 2003
- SHEN Dingli, "Why China sees the EU as a Counterweight to America", in *Europe's World*, no. 10/2008
- WOLF Martin, "A More Efficient Europe is Less Democratic", *Financial Times*, 14 June 2005
- WOOD Nicholas, "Crisis Chills Prospects for Nations outside EU", in *International Herald Tribune*, 17 June 2005

Internet sites:

- ERALP Atila, "Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship Discussion", EDAM series, 2009/02, <http://www.edam.org.tr/images/PDF/yayinlar/makaleler/discussion%20paper%20series-2.pdf>
- Pop Valentina, "Danube Strategy to focus on transport and environment", <http://euobserver.com/882/28387>
- http://www.rferl.org/content/Eastern_Partnership_The_EUs_Accidental_Sphere_Of_Influence/1622923.html
- Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas for the interview "Summit Sidelines: Lithuania's Foreign Minister on EU Eastern Partnership", http://www.rferl.org/content/Lithuanias_Foreign_Minister_On_The_EU_Eastern_Partnership/1623605.html
- SJURSEN Helene, "Integration without Democracy? Three conceptions of European Security Policy in transformation", Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Working Paper no. 7, February 2008, <http://www.arena.uio.no>

- STIE Anne Elizabeth, "Decision-Making Void of Democratic Qualities? An Evaluation of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy", Arena Working Paper no. 24, December 2008, <http://www.arena.uio.no>
- TASSINARI Fabrizio, "Sailing the Black Sea at last", 07.02.2008, <http://euobserver.com/9/25615#>
- <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/NewBeginning/>

Official documents:

- 2010 Headline Goal, 17 May 2004, p. 1, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>
- SOLANA Javier, "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in A Better World", The EU Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, December 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>
- Report of the European Parliament on 'Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf

BETWEEN HAMMERS AND ANVILS THE SOCIALIZATION OF EUROPEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES: ROMANIA AND BULGARIA - A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

Neculai-Cristian Şurubaru*

Abstract:** *The question of administrative governance in the European Union reflects the links between the decision-making process and the national Member States. The Permanent Representations are the key institutions translating Brussels policies into the national sphere. This article contradicts the constructivist/ Europeanization arguments for thick socialization of permanent representatives and focuses on Romania and Bulgaria, in the institutional medium of the Political and Security Committee. The author claims that the adaptation - thin socialization - of the permanent representatives can be measured differently, within a theoretical framework based on intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and "Brusselization". Specific for the Bulgarian representatives is their slow pace in acquiring the formal and informal procedures of the committee, while the Romanian diplomats have a different relation with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both countries are similar in terms of networking and their logic is driven by national interests. It is important to look at these countries as a potential model of comparison between Member States, in how they integrate in the multi-level diplomatic layers in Brussels.*

Keywords: *Permanent Representations, Political and Security Committee, intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, "Brusselization", Romania, Bulgaria*

In 2002 the European Council officially started negotiations to welcome Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union. The accession treaty for both countries was signed in April 2005, establishing as membership date 1 January 2007. Nevertheless, there were many critics of the accession of the two. For example, in an article symbolically titled "Two new entrants into the EU", Romania and Bulgaria were seen as "the new kids on the block, characterized by economic and political backwardness"

(The Economist, January 2007), a view which expressed a typical and generally negative opinion on the two new members. In terms of foreign policy after 1989, the two post-communist countries have had quite a similar course. EU accession has been a major objective in terms of foreign policy. Their foreign policy discourses, both before and after 2007, were based on the idea of returning to and integrating into Europe. Thus, NATO membership and EU accession were seen as a major breakthrough, in

* **Neculai-Cristian Şurubaru** is currently following an MA in European Studies at Maastricht University, and has finished his BA in Political Science at Bucharest University, and an MA in International Relations and European Studies at Central European University (CEU) in 2009. E-mail: cristi_986@yahoo.com

Author's note: This article is dedicated to Adriana Duta for her continued advice and loving support.

** This updated version of the article was submitted to the RJEA editors in October 2009.

the sense of getting back on the tracks of history, for the first time after the 1989 revolutions.

The multitude of theories explaining the accession process of new Member States has scarcely touched upon the question of administrative governance. This is an important question in terms of how the inside decision-making process of the EU takes place. Moreover, the lack of individual studies which address the question of how the new member states have integrated in the EU institutional medium accounts for an actual literature gap. Therefore, this article seeks to bring in new theoretical perspectives and to facilitate a theory-based explanation- on the one hand, more generally, of the EU's administrative governance, and, on the other hand, more specifically, of the Council working groups such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), in relation to the Permanent Representations of the newest members, Bulgaria and Romania.

It is important to permanently link the EU literature with the possible effects of enlargement over inner institutional changes. Therefore, it is extremely puzzling that the branch of European Studies that looks at administrative governance has not examined so far the accommodation of the new Member States in the Council framework. In this light, the aim of the present research is (1) to link the theoretical framework drawn in the first chapter with the institutional environment of the Council of the European Union, especially the Political and Security Committee (PSC),

in relation to Romania and Bulgaria; (2) to criticize the concept of socialization used mainly by constructivist/Europeanization scholars such as Jeffrey Checkel, as a central explanation for the adaptation of the Permanent Representatives, and to advance a theoretical and research scheme based on a combination of intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and "Brusselization"; (3) to reveal the adaptation/socialization profiles of Romania and Bulgaria, inside the PSC.¹ The overall goal is to approximate the differences between the two countries, in terms of how they fitted into the Brussels institutional environment. Subsequently, the main research questions of this article are:

1. To what extent does socialization play a role in the case of the Bulgarian and Romanian Permanent Representations, after 2007?

2. How do Bulgaria and Romania interact with one another, and the other Member States in the working groups of the Council, more exactly inside the PSC?

3. Is there any notable difference in the process of adaptation between Romania and Bulgaria?

The main existing research scrutinizes the accession of the two countries, concentrating on the process of negotiations, implementation of the *acquis*, or drawing cost-benefit analysis of the integration. In this sense, it is important to grasp the newcomer's involvement in the Council medium, as a way to analyze the efficiency of the European institutions, and the links that

¹ Throughout this study the author uses adaptation not as synonym of socialization, but more as a thin concept which can reflect the effect over the two Representations, implicitly the dependent variable. Although the two are juxtaposed, the second is closer to the idea of a means of adaptation, a process, and an independent variable.

they create between Member States, a reason for which the article deals with the cases of Bulgaria and Romania. Without differences, the already existing studies generalize and miss out the point of each country's specificity. In order to criticize the concept of socialization, the present article presents the author's personal hypotheses on socialization (see table 1).

The dependent variable of the present research relates to the overall process of adaptation of the Permanent Representatives, particularly inside the PSC, after Romania's and Bulgaria's accession period. Setting out the measurements of this adaptation process is challenging. Therefore, the independent variables seize the concept of socialization, in different relations, and constitute the dimensions at which this study looks empirically. The indicators are drawn out from the author's alternative hypotheses (see table 1) which form the independent variables used to differentiate between the two countries: relation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), national interest, speed of adjustment to formal and informal procedures, coalition formation and networking.

The above-mentioned items make up the methodological toolkit, used in examining the two Representations. In the present article, the author has employed a qualitative analysis, based on semi-structured interviews with the Romanian and Bulgarian officials from the Permanent Representations. Similar, but slightly different questions were addressed to third party Representatives, in order to obtain their perspective on the adaptation/socialization of the first two entities inside the PSC. The data collected as well as the indicators are

subject to a scheme of evaluation and are tested through the method of difference. The purpose of the this latter method is that of depicting what differentiates Romania and Bulgaria, on the level of EU diplomacy, revealed from the activities of their representatives in the PSC working group.

The first part of the article looks at the concept of socialization as presented in the constructivist and Europeanization literature, and criticizes its assumptions by putting forth a different theoretical model based on: intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and "Brusselization". The second part broadly focuses on the institutional environment of the Council, especially the PSC. Finally, the third part evaluates the differences between Bulgaria and Romania in terms of their adaptation to the PSC and the Brussels institutional spectrum.

I: Examining the Brussels Permanent Representations – A Theoretical Model

The nature of the EU bureaucratic system is both administrative and regulatory. This division has been fused inside the EU administrative system. The bureaucratic machinery of the EU and most of its regulative nature involves the Council working groups. This first part sets an alternative to the theoretical framework developed by constructivist scholars, such as Jeffrey Checkel, by challenging the concept of *socialization*, which is too *thick* in order to explain the diplomatic interaction between the national representatives. The alternative presented in this paper is based on a combination of three theoretical elements, which can accurately portray these relationships: Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalism and "Brusselization".

I.1 Socialization- the Constructivist turn:

The concept of Socialization has been seen by Alastair Johnston as a “neglected source of cooperation in International Relations theory”. (Johnston, 2001, p.458) Constructivism highlights the “inseparability of a social ontology and epistemology, which accepts the possibility of reality being constructed”. (Fierke, 2007, p.174) One of its main premises is that the material world is socially constructed, and that concepts presume a large degree of inter-subjectiveness. Jeffrey Checkel emphasizes that in relation to IR theory, the concept of socialization is paradoxically used, meaning that it loses its sociological significance and gets closer to the idea of soft power. Checkel has been classified as a conventional constructivist scholar, which seeks a middle ground for constructivism as an approach and the discipline of International Relations. (Adler, 1997, p.319)

The question that underpins the definition of socialization from Checkel’s perspective is: “In what times, under what conditions and through what mechanisms can socialization be understood?” (Checkel, Moravcsik, 2001, p.225) However, before reaching his point, there has to be a clear difference in how socialization is understood in different contextual and theoretical frameworks. On the one hand, socialization is seen as an effect, as a dependent variable, with a teleological meaning, a factor which evokes a concrete pathway, a process with clear consequences as regards the actors. On the other hand, socialization presumes a constant process of institutional formulation and other socialization agents which are

continuously driven by sentiments.

Extending the reflections on social learning, Checkel argues that “agents may behave appropriately, by learning a role, acquiring knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations- irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially accepted in a given setting or community” (Checkel, 2005, p.804). Type I of socialization is defined through the logic of appropriateness as “a shift from a conscious instrumental calculation to a conscious role playing”, and a transformation towards a logic of consequence (Ibid, p.805-806). A type two of socialization “requires the actors to go beyond role playing and implies that agents accept community or organizational norms, as a normative stance, taking for granted the idea that this is the right thing to do” (Ibidem). Constructivists suggest that the EU institutions have *thick* socializing effects on actors. Checkel’s argumentation on socialization is that of a process of social learning, deeply rooted in the phenomenon of social interaction.

In the present article, the author contends that the theoretical framework created by literature leaves room for improvement, in accounting the administrative governance of the EU, as a distinct part, without considering the specific polity and governmental apparatus that is formed inside the Communities. The interpretation of the constructivist approach presumes that the staff working in the Permanent Representations is usually alienated from the demands of their capitals, and socially tends to act inside the supranational framework, allegedly being loyal to it. In this context, “a prolonged exposure

to the EU environment causes many diplomats to acquire a certain sense of "We-ness" (Beyers, 2005, p.899). In day-to-day activities, the EU bureaucrats are exposed to a type of official discourse which makes it hard for any of them to go beyond. Adopting the official EU "language", rhetoric or dress code, has inherently psychological effects and establishes a certain sense of positive vanity among the EU staff, which may be interpreted in terms of adopting a social role. The effects of socialization are more a matter of prestige, and, concurrently, there can be no place for an empty/senseless socialization.

1.2 The Alternative: Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalization, "Brusselization"

The aim of this section is to depart from the traditional approach of socialization in regards to the European Union, by presenting an adequate theoretical alternative model to the above underlined socialization debate. Consequently, the author draws his assumptions on the concepts of intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and "Brusselization", as a way of drafting a different perspective on how Brussels has developed a common administrative and institutional culture.

(A) Intergovernmentalism - One of the oldest debates regarding the formation of the European Communities is centered on the concept of intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes the centrality of nationalities and the importance that the European project had to achieve for the interest of the states (Rosamond, 2000, p.76). Andrew Moravcsik claims that integration is not due to supranational institutions but to national preferences which choose them through

bargaining. The question now is how can socialization be instrumentalized into acquiring rational features? Is there a certain degree of rationalization in assuming an identity? Are the actors conscious of the role they have to play, and do they internalize its norms and rules in a rational fashion? In this respect, the intergovernmental account of actors maximizing their own profit and using the European pathway as leeway for pursuing their interests, serves as a more comprehensive explanation of the rationale behind the Permanent Representations in Brussels. However, intergovernmentalism alone cannot provide the necessary background for reflection and action inside these representations.

(B) Institutionalism - There are several accounts of institutionalist paradigms. The main idea they zoom in is that institutions play a cultural part in which individuals are socialized in having certain roles, and, in addition to this, institutions do not only shape preferences but also create identities. In relation to the EU foreign policy, this is what Michael Smith calls *institutionalization* (Smith, 2004, p.26). He covers a rationalist perspective of institutionalization, as a process which relies on assumptions of economic incentives and on the idea that "actors have a fixed set of preferences and their behavior is driven towards maximizing gains through strategies and calculations" (Ibidem). However, the focus in this article lies with the pressure that the EU exerts on the Permanent Representation in Brussels, especially the newcomers, having as assumption the fact that the process of institutionalization began before their accession period.

(C) **“Brusselization”** - The concept of “Brusselization” reveals a different perception of the Brussels social milieu, other than through socialization. In this article, the concept is enclosed in three different approaches. The first approach looks at “Brusselization” in respect to the development of the EU as an international actor, and its attempts to develop an individual foreign policy apart from that of its member states. David Allen claims that there is more than one foreign policy making culture in Brussels. The “Brusselization” of foreign policy is translated in “the steady enhancement of Brussels based decision making bodies that show no signs of abating” (Allen, 1998, p.42). The main idea behind this is that Brussels tends to become a center of power which to a certain extent constrains the national foreign policies. The “Brusselization” process is synonym with “a gradual transfer in the name of consistency of foreign policy, shifting authority away from the national capitals to Brussels” (Ibid, p.53). This transfer is made through a Brussels based machinery and institutional framework. Thus, the meaning behind the first interpretation is that of a power transfer from the capitals to Brussels, at least at a symbolical level.

Secondly, the concept of “Brusselization” is embedded in what Chris Shore defines as “engrenage”- as a mechanism of institutional and ideological incorporation, or “agent of European consciousness”, because its functions are to integrate and socialize national subjects into the structures, norms and values of the EU (Shore, 2000, p. 149). Brussels reflects a phenomenon of “ghettoisation” in which bureaucrats are characterized by quasi-diplomatic identity and a multilingual working

environment, in which they have separate schools for their children and financial and bureaucratic immunities offered by the Belgian state (Ibidem).

Finally, deriving from the second approach, the concept of “Brusselization”, presumes a negative meaning in the sense that the Brussels-based institutions are criticized for being too bureaucratic, and suffering from a democratic deficit. Implicitly, the representations focus and follow their activities in this medium, being influenced by it institutionally, strategically and culturally. Consequently, the term “Brusselization” better reflects the socialization process, starting from an agent A- in our case EU institutions such as the Council and the Commission, to an agent B- the Permanent Representations. “Brusselization” entails a form of specific governance which reunites the supranational Institutional features of the Commission and of the Council, in an effort to condensate the national policies, and to provide the adequate framework, in which 27 national interests are mixed.

1.3 Socialization: concluding remarks

It is rather difficult to set out specific patterns of socialization outcomes, but the literature does not present any diplomatic profile, and tends to focus specifically on the decision-making process, the interaction between the diplomats and socialization mechanisms, such as *consultation-reflex*. This being the case, socialization is reduced in the literature only to its internalizing features, with reference to factors such as prestige or a strong sense of *We-ness*. However, it is hard to measure the existence of such of feeling among Permanent Representatives. The author of the present article inclines more

towards the rationality emphasized by Juncos and Pomoroska in the decision making of the Representatives, and less towards the internalization of norms and values, in the sense of an identity formation, stressed by Checkel's *thick* description of socialization. (Juncos, Pomoroska, 2007). *Thin* socialization is more effective in revealing the differences between adaptations of member states, a dimension not taken into account so far by the literature, and with which my study deals in the third chapter. Finally, there is the idea that that intergovernmentalism, combined with Institutionalist features and the "Brusselization" framework, succeeds in portraying a more accurate theoretical stance towards understanding the nature of the Permanent Representations. A mix between all the three, driven particularly by the intergovernmentalist logic, is more prolific in exposing the process faced by Representatives, in contrast to the *thick* concept of socialization, which entails a certain degree of supranationalization.

II: The Political and Security Committee - Socialization or intergovernmental agent?

In order to maintain the theoretical perspective of this paper, and, more importantly, to underline its accuracy, this section examines the exact institutional environment from which the hypotheses described in this article are derived. There are two reasons for which the PSC was chosen. First, the PSC is a relatively new institution, which gained important prerogatives during its short existence, especially in the field of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Second, and most importantly, the purpose of examining the PSC is linked with the overall aim of the present

research, and provides the institutional background to which the author's empirical assessments are attached. The question raised so far is to what extent the PSC can represent a factor of socialization or a neutral medium driven by an intergovernmental logic? Thus, the PSC depicts the adequate diplomatic environment which can portray whether or not there is a top-down socialization process affecting the Permanent Representatives.

In this respect, the historical evolution of the Committee is tackled in the following instance. The institutional landscape of the European Union became richer after 2000, with the appearance of new working groups, which had the aim of providing expertise on the political level for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP frameworks. One of the main assumptions in the specialized literature is that the PSC working group acts as a "government in the shadow" (Juncos, Reynolds, 2007, p.142).

It has to be noted that the PSC did not develop from institutional scratch but it is rather the case of a historical evolution. Its predecessor, the Political Committee (PoCo), dates back 1970, the time of the establishment of the European Defense Community (1950-1952) and the Fouchet Plan. Due to the CFSP, during the 90's, the European Union started to develop its own identity in terms of foreign policy.

II.1: The PSC - features and prerogatives

The decisive moment in developing the actual functional PSC was the Nice Council of 2000, and the framework of the Nice Treaty. The PSC is seen as the main administrative body of the new ESDP,

responsible mainly for implementing its military and political aspects. The Committee's main prerogatives are:

remains an intergovernmental type of institution, with a vague trend towards supranationalization, but which does

(a) "keep track of the international situation
(b) examine the areas of GAC draft conclusions
(c) provide guidelines for other Committees
(d) maintain a privileged link with the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR)
(e) send guidelines to the Military Committee
(f) receive information, recommendations and opinions from the Committee for Civilian Aspects
(g) coordinate, supervise and monitor discussions on CFSP issues
(h) lead the political dialogue
(i) provide a privileged forum for dialogue on the ESDP
(j) under the auspices of the Council, take responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities" ²

In order to understand the relations between the PSC and the other institutional structures of the Council, figure 1 is illustrative. It presents the complex linkages between the PSC apparatus, the Council working groups, and the source of mainly all of its members, the Permanent Representations.

II.2: PSC- the nature of interaction


Does the PSC have the capacity of socialization over its members, or is it just an intergovernmental forum? Does the nature of the meetings presume a socialization pattern, in terms of its members internalizing certain values, norms, rules and procedures? These are two questions that have to be asked at this point. My assumption is that the PSC

not have any consequences at the level of decision-making. In terms of loyalty, the Permanent Representatives, the PSC ambassadors implicitly are still there to represent the interests of their states. This gives the intergovernmental flavor of the negotiations, which is still the main logic, reflecting the national positions. It is however a multi-level diplomatic game, which does not constrain its actors, in terms of socialization, but offers them the choice of a "different logic of diplomatic appropriateness with important repercussions over the traditional sense of diplomacy" (Batora, 2005, p.61-62).

Officially, the PSC constitutes the key strategic actor leading the formulation and implementation of the ESDP operations

² Council of the European Union, *Council Decision of 22 January 2001, setting up the Political and Security Committee, 2001/78/CFSP*, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/1_02720010130en00010003.pdf

Figure 1³



(Nice European Council, 2000). Thus, the diplomatic responsibilities of its representatives are extremely important. Keen observers of Brussels have come to the conclusion that there is a certain familiarity inside the working groups, which entails a certain *esprit de corps*, a club spirit “which does not necessarily imply that actors, the diplomats of the new member states internalize certain norms” (Juncos, Pomoroska, 2007, p. 8). An interesting detail of the PSC gatherings is that there are no available translations, all of the meeting workings being conducted either in English or in

French. Moreover, another part which supports the idea of familiarity is that the Ambassadors do not address themselves with the delegation name, but through their first name (Juncos, Reynolds, 2007, p.137).

Thus, the PSC represents an interaction forum with its own set of prerogatives, norms and pre-defined informal rules. Among the informal processes that take place within the PSC, the “coordination reflex” and “consensus-building” are most important. The first one is defined by Tonra as a process in which the “policy-makers see themselves not as

³ The figure represents the relation between the PSC and other Committees, and aims at showing exactly the source from which most of them draw their staff: the Permanent Representations of the member states.

emissaries of pre-defined positions but as policy arbiters, seeking to internalize the identity ambitions of colleagues so as thereby to see that their own positions are at least complementary” (Tonra, 2001, p.12). The coordination reflex built inside the Committee and outside its walls is constantly maintained through e-mails, mobile phones and frequent meetings with other colleagues in the corridors, and most importantly during lunch (Juncos, Pomoroska, p.7).

The goal of the informal meetings is double-edged. On the one hand, during these meetings there is a massive exchange of information, on the positions of their governments, which leads to the fact that almost up to 90% of the issues are negotiated outside the formal meetings (Ibidem). On the other hand, the exchange of information leads to the formation of “like-minded groups”, which approach issues having the same position, most likely around the old member states (Ibidem). At the same time, consensus building is an important informal mechanism of interaction inside the PSC. It is characterized by the overall search for consensus in taking decisions; and as one diplomat noticed: “compromise is the king in Brussels” (Relex Councilor, 2009). The mechanism of “coordination reflex” deliberately influences the development of “consensus-building”, because the exchange of information implicitly transforms the relations between the diplomats. Nevertheless, the present contribution seeks to disconfirm the possibility of *thick socialization* in the PSC, and analyze, in its third section, whether such a process affected, and how could it differentiate between, the newest Member States: Romania and Bulgaria.

III. Romania and Bulgaria - The Socialization of Permanent Representatives

III.1: Bulgaria

Before 1989, Bulgaria was under the soviet sphere of influence. After the collapse of its communist regime, the discourse adopted by Sofia moved towards the EU. Bulgaria now sees its relations with the European Communities as an “essential partnership”, and a gateway towards development (Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). Its diplomatic relations and all the day-to-day necessary coordination is directed from the Permanent Representation in Brussels. After the country’s accession, the Representation suffered two major changes: logistical and strategic. First, the number of its personnel increased up to 106 members, which turned it into one of the largest Representations in Brussels (Nicolaidis Group, 2009). Strategically, and at the internal level, the Representation has adopted a few action plans in order to deal with its priorities in the CFSP, mainly concerning the Western Balkans, and to “coordinate through different channels of communication with the Presidency, Council and the Commission” (Ibidem).

In terms of third party opinions on Bulgaria, the Dutch and Hungarian representatives interviewed stated that the Bulgarian representatives demonstrated a lack of cooperation in the case of the “Evro” dispute, when they threatened to block the EU financial initiatives towards Montenegro (Western Balkan Group, 2009). At the same time, they see Bulgaria’s CFSP approach limited only to Macedonia and Serbia. Also, the Bulgarian representatives were sometimes portrayed as having “a lack

of practical knowledge and that they are not up to the standards" (PSC Counselor, 2009).

In the light of these statements a preliminary profile can be outlined for the Bulgarian Representatives, drawing on possible specificities. The Bulgarian representatives are friendly towards other countries, willing to learn and self-aware of their technical errors and slow pace adaptation, and with a complicated foreign policy orientation. They see Romania as a close partner, admired for its active approach. Inside the PSC, the Bulgarian Representatives rely on the "personal-qualities of the PSC ambassador". At the same time, the Bulgarian Representatives are nursed by their MFA, with specific instructions.

III.2: Romania

Two issues were problematic in Romania's accession period: its system of agricultural subsidies, which was not clearly developed, and secondly, the high-level corruption cases that involved figures like former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase and many former MPs. With all this, starting with February 2005, Romania received the status of active observer in the EU Council working groups and in the Commission. This was an important step in the future adaptation in the Council working groups, particularly in the PSC.

After the accession period, the Romanian representation became the "main channel of communication between the EU institutions and the Romanian authorities", and faced two major changes. First, it had to shift from its pre-accession strategy, focused mainly on implementing the *acquis communautaire*, towards a high-degree of specialization. Secondly, the

Representation was specialized through a division of labor and an increase of its personnel, which reached up to 80 people, recruited mainly from the home Ministry (Deputy Permanent Representative, 2009). One of the main challenges, pointed out by the diplomats, was to organize and prioritize the massive flow of information, which was sent to the capital, in order to receive specific information on different issues (Relex Counselor, 2009).

The view of third party representatives over their Romanian colleagues was useful in initially creating a profile for their representatives. The Romanian representatives are seen as open and vivid, flexible on compromise making, and in the full process of acquiring the formal and informal procedures (PSC First Secretary, 2009). At the same time, what was highlighted in their case is the value of their diplomats, and most importantly their "good command of language" (PSC Counselor, 2009). These skills have helped the Romanian representatives to focus sharply on their interests and to participate actively in the PSC meeting, by forming alliances. An initial profile of the Romanian Representatives in the PSC shows that they are practical, realistic, topic and policy oriented. In comparison to the Bulgarian case, the Romanian representatives are seen as depicting a more proud foreign policy tradition. Although the Representatives have a greater autonomy, their relation with the MFA reveals a special case, a first flaw. This concerns the need to translate the EU policies into expertise and to send an input to Bucharest, so that the MFA will follow the procedures admitted in Brussels. Even if at a first glance this looks like a socialization mechanism, it is however more an institutional

problem, where the MFA has the last word in taking decisions in the case of sensitive issues, and having the ability to periodically shift the personnel based in Brussels (Ibidem).

III.3: Socialization hypotheses

Furthermore, the present analysis first discredits the possibility of *thick* socialization occurring inside the PSC, and secondly looks at the differences of adaptation between Romania and Bulgaria, inside this institutional framework. Initially, the author did not expect any differences between the two countries, due to the similar process undertaken, the roadmaps and

verification mechanisms that they had to face. Several testable hypotheses are present in this article, constructed by the author using indicators that oppose Jeffrey Checkel’s main causal mechanisms of socialization- social learning: 1) “Social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional backgrounds. 2) Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure. 3) Social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants. 4) Social learning is more likely when a group is

Table 1 - Alternative hypotheses

1: The closer the relation between the PSC ambassador and his home ministry, the likely that he will receive specific instructions.
2: The smaller the amount of time spent in the PSC by the new ambassadors the less likely they had time to adapt to the formal and informal procedures.
3: The sharper the notion of national interest of the PSC ambassador, the less likely he has been socialized.
4: The bigger the Representation, the less likely that they adapt fast and easily to the procedures of the assembly.
5: The smaller the country the more likely that the Representatives will ask the MFA for specific instructions. ⁴
6: Coalitions in the PSC are based on pre-existent foreign policy views, geopolitical and economic ties, between two countries.
6a: Coalitions in the PSC are mainly based on security and geographical ties, influenced by each country’s interest.
7: The bigger the country’s foreign policy tradition, the more likely MFA will send and rely on an experienced ambassador in the PSC.

⁴ This hypothesis contradicts Juncos and Pomoroska’s claim that the bigger the country, for example: Germany or France, the likely that they receive specific instructions. The smaller the country is, the most likely the representatives will be closely monitored by their Ministry, due to the importance attributed to diplomatic relations with the EU.

insulated from direct political pressure and exposure” (Checkel, 1999, p.549).

These hypotheses are irrelevant to the idea of socialization inside the Permanent Representations, because they provide a *thick* and general account of its processes, which cannot explain the differences in adaptation/socialization of two countries to the same institutional environment. For example, in the case of the PSC, all the staff has diplomatic background-thus common professional backgrounds. It is therefore not the case of any policy failure but more the issue of coordination between the representatives. All in all, the author argues that representatives adapt - *thin socialization* - to the Brussels environment, but the purpose of the analysis is to see exactly how this process occurs.

III.4: Evaluation: Bulgaria versus Romania⁵

A. The relation with the MFA and Networking


The relation between their Representatives and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs is crucial in understanding the function of the Representation and the activity of the PSC ambassador. This relates to three of my hypotheses: H1, H5 and H7. For example, the Bulgarian Representatives receive the general instructions- “red lines”- but usually ask for specific instructions (Nicolaidis Group, 2009). A two-way relationship may be identified: Sofia sends in the specific instructions, which are demanded by the Representatives, in an effort to present precisely the country’s

national interest, leaving however the impression that the Ministry exerts a strict control over the Representation. A proof in this sense is the permanent phone contacts with the Ministry during the meetings.

At the same time, the diplomats noted the important relation between the Political Director of the MFA and the PSC ambassador, seen as the key mechanism of coordination between Sofia and Brussels, in terms of sending and receiving instructions (PSC First Secretary, 2009). In the same manner, the Romanian counterparts point out in that the Political Directors “contribute very much in the decisions taken by the Representation” (Deputy Permanent Representative, 2009). Similarly, the MFA provides the general mandates, the documents that provide the general framework through which the Representatives act, and when sensitive issues are discussed in the PSC, “the instructions are specific and read out loud” (Relex Counselor, 2009). This validates the first hypothesis (H1), stated above. However, in contrast to the Bulgarian representatives, Bucharest expects expertise from Brussels, allowing it a certain maneuvering room in formulating policies (Political Director of MFA, 2009). (See figure 2) Thus, in the case of Romania, “the nuances are given by the Representation, which has its intellectual autonomy” (Ibidem). Nevertheless, the safety measure taken up by the MFA is to shift periodically the personal of the Representation, as a means of control over the Representation. This validates only partially the fifth hypothesis above.

⁵ This subchapter correlates the empirical findings with the above indicators, in an attempt to form a more exact profile of the countries aforementioned.

Figure 2



Networking as a means of adapting mostly to informal rules is seen by the Bulgarian representatives as “normal and rather good between the members of the Committee” (PSC First Secretary, 2009). The Bulgarian Representatives noted that social events have a strictly professional orientation, and in this sense they “rely on the capacities and personal qualities of the PSC ambassador to carry out these social duties” (Ibidem). The Bulgarian diplomats envision networking as a process coordinated from Sofia. The Romanian counterparts depicted more pride in addressing informal settings. Luncheons were portrayed by them as the key moments of the day, when problems are clarified before the meetings. These “informal meetings” set the agenda of the formal meetings, and reflect the moments when diplomats agree on the topics of interest and tend to form alliances (Relex Counselor, 2009). This shows that the Representatives see these events as crucial in terms of socializing, but it does not necessarily validate the seventh hypothesis, although the Bulgarian representatives emphasized that they rely on the personal qualities of the ambassador to deal with these events.

B. Speed of Adjustment to formal and informal rules

In terms of acquisition and compliance with formal rules, the diplomats have argued that it is normal to play by the rules

of the game, although Representatives admitted that not complying with these rules would most probably affect their credibility (Ibidem). Compliance is too general an indicator. To differentiate between two countries it is important to see how fast they processed the formal and informal rules.

The Bulgarian representatives stated that this adaptation has been “smooth and progressive so far” (PSC First Secretary, 2009). However, they admitted that the process of adaptation has not ended yet, and that they are working on a mechanism of coordination inside the PSC (Ibidem). Thus, a full grasp of informal procedures has yet to be fulfilled: “we are still in the process of learning these procedures” (Ibidem). At the same time, informal procedures such as “consultation-reflex” or “consensus-building” are still being learned, through practice (Ibidem). A partial explanation for this could be the large size of the Representation, correlated to the small amount of time they had to integrate.

Differently, the Romanian representatives suggested that the process of adjustment and compliance to the formal rules occurred mainly during the observer status. Thus, from 2005 to 2007, the Representatives have learned the basic procedures of their working groups, transmitted to the newcomers. Without knowing these procedures, one diplomat noticed that they would have been “sitting ducks” (Deputy Permanent

Representative, 2009). At the same time, the formal rules of the PSC are constant subject for lawyers which provide legal counseling (Relex Counselor, 2009).

However, in terms of adapting to the informal procedures of the PSC, the Romanian diplomats expressed that this is still “learned by doing”, interestingly due to the fact that these change along with the shift of the Presidency, making it an “evolving challenge” (Ibidem). The Romanian representatives seemed aware of the “consultation-reflex” and when a new issue arises, the tendency is to speculate and to find as fast as possible the position of the other 26 member states, which is why “90 % of the energy is focused on the position of the others” (Ibidem). “Consensus-building” is seen as the prime mechanism of cooperation inside the PSC, because it deals with sensitive issues and it is more political, thus being more prone to reach consensus, in contrast to lower level working groups, where the atmosphere is more relaxed, but where the Representatives simply state their positions. Consequently, one Representative noted that the PSC is in this sense a “Council of Wisdom” (Ibidem).

Thus, the Romanian representatives differentiate in this dimension, because they took an active approach during the observer status, in familiarizing with the formal rules, and constantly employing legal consultancy in order to better understand these rules. At the same time, they emphasized the importance of compromise for adapting in the group. However, the view from Bucharest seems to incline to the Bulgarian case. The Political Director claims that it will take Romanian representatives at least five years to fully integrate and learn the procedures (Political Director

MFA, 2009). Thus, the variables of time and size of the Representation validate hypotheses H2 to H4 and reflect a main difference between Romania and Bulgaria. The first started the adaptation process sooner, and its Representation is smaller in size than the latter one, while the second has the impression that it still is in the learning process.

C. National Interest

Due to its discrete political nature, the PSC is seen as a forum in which states juggle their national interests, and focus on tactics in an attempt to speculate the other countries position. Tactics are important in the sense because they presume a certain strategy adopted by Representatives, which confines them in different alliances. Inside the PSC negotiations are guided by brute national interest and competition is seen as the mechanism underlining the general struggle.

However, when the new 2007 members entered the PSC structures, “they felt a certain inferiority complex felt by the new member states in relation to the experienced ones” (Political Director MFA, 2009). The author’s argument is that this feeling derived from the limits of the country’s own national interest. As one Bulgarian diplomat stated, in CFSP matters, their national interest revolves mainly around the Western Balkans, leading him to declare that: “We cannot be concerned with African issues. That would not make us look serious” (Nicolaidis Group, 2009). At the same time, the Romanian diplomats noted that still, inside the PSC, “you speak in the name of your government” (Relex Counselor, 2009). There are two implications deriving from this. The first comes from the question of who defines

the national interest, and as previously shown, the input of the home ministry is essential. Second, the clearer the national interest of a representative is, the clearer their position is going to be in the PSC. Consequently, in relation to hypothesis H3, there are fewer chances of the ambassadors to be socialized in a supranational fashion. However, this hypothesis applies only partially, because smaller states, such as Bulgaria, are considered to have complicated and unsure foreign policy views, therefore they are more likely to be influenced by other states in fixing policy preferences.

D. Coalition formation and Bulgarian-Romanian Interaction

In constructing alliances, the Bulgarian representatives emphasized two major factors. The first is given by the weight of economic ties. Bulgarian representatives are more prone to ally with countries with which they have strong economic ties, mostly Germany. (Nicolaidis Group, 2009). Secondly, the design of the alliances is thematic and geographical. These variables interrelate, as Bulgaria pursues its main interest dossier in the PSC, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PSC Counselor, 2009).

For the Romanian representatives, alliance formation is a feature which reflects a full integration: "it is not good to remain isolated" (Deputy Minister, 2009). Thus, it is critical to undertake different tactics and to seize the most suitable coalition, as to "fault other states" (Political Director MFA, 2009). Romania emphasizes the geopolitical and economic weight of the alliances, being most likely to join a group where the French portray their interests (Ibidem). This relates to the

sixth hypothesis, and to the idea that pre-existent traditional alliances on the one hand, and geographical ties, on the other, have an important bearing on the formation of alliances. This contradicts the assumption of Juncos and Pomoroska that new member states tend to act as a block (Juncos, Pomoroska, 2007, p.12).

However, when it comes to the interaction between Romania and Bulgaria in the Committee, H6 is partially validated, because one would presume that geopolitical and geographical ties are important, and the two countries should have a special relation due to their geographical proximity. The Bulgarians consider that there is a certain "synergy" between them and Romania, by having for example "the same language" in the dossier that concerns the visa regime for the United States. However, on a technical level, and in foreign policy choices, there is a certain disagreement between the two, for example in "different analysis of the Middle East dossiers" (Ibidem). Also, the two have a different position on the issue of recognizing Kosovo's independence, which the Bulgarian representatives stated that they "perfectly understand- as a matter of tactics" (Nicolaidis Group, 2009). The Romanian representatives have different perspectives on their contact with Bulgaria. The dominant one is that between the two there is an ongoing "healthy competition" in which disagreements are seen as a normal feature of the PSC (Relex Counselor, 2009). The only regional topic, in which they fully cooperate, is the *Black Sea Synergy*, in which Romania "is considered to hold up the flag" (Ibidem). However, third parties noticed a weak normative bond between the two, due to "close historical ties and their similar

accession process” (PSC Counselor, 2009). This disconfirms the sub-H6 in the sense that relationships are always built in the name of geographical linkages.

III.5 Method of Difference

The evaluation above showed that there is a difference in adaptation between countries in general, and Bulgaria and Romania in particular. After their evaluation, a simple-qualitative differentiation has been drawn (see figure 3) while the Method of Difference is employed in order to contrast the two countries.

This method is based on the assumption that the two countries are

similar systems, differentiating only on one issue. All the variables are the same, except one- in this case the speed and the overall compliance with formal and informal rules. It is the author’s assertion that in the Romanian case this has been done faster, and eventually this is what differentiates between the two representatives in the PSC, based on the Bulgarian representative’s recognition of the fact and on the third party opinions.

However, in the real case other indicators point out to some differences as well. In their relation with the MFA, the Romanian representatives have a larger room for maneuver and are expected to send expertise back to Bucharest,

Figure 3 - Evaluation scheme

Criteria	Relation with the MFA	Networking	Speed of Adjustment	National Interest	Coalition Formation	Interaction (between the two)
Bulgaria	+++++	+++--	++---	++---	+++--	+++--
Romania	++++-	+++++	+++--	++++-	+++--	+++--

Method of Difference

Romania

IVa Relation MFA	IVb Networking	IVc Speed Adjust.	IVd National Interest	IVe Coalition Formation	IVf Interaction
YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Bulgaria

IVa Relation MFA	IVb Networking	IVc Speed Adjust.	IVd National Interest	IVe Coalition Formation	IVf Interaction
YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

DV: Differences in Adaptation- RO-BG

while the Bulgarian representatives ask and receive specific information from Sofia. In terms of Networking there are no major discrepancies, while both of the PSC representatives use every informal event as a means to involve and strengthen their position. It is clear to both parts that their mission is to pursue their national interests, although the Bulgarian side has been accused of having complicated foreign policy views, while their counterparts are more confident in their approach. In terms of coalition formation, what is interesting is that both of them have emphasized that besides thematic alliances, most of the alliances that form are based on pre-existent geopolitical and economic ties; Germany is favored by Bulgaria, while France is preferred by Romania. However, their interaction is not special although they had similar accession roads and close regional ties. Without any further explanation, the conclusions touch upon these points as well.

Conclusions

The present article has aimed at achieving three main goals. First, the author has criticized the *thick* meaning of socialization, assessed by authors such as Jeffrey Checkel, exemplified by actors which internalize norms, rules and values and are socialized in an institutional setting based on normative judgments. The possibility of *thick* socialization occurring in the PSC is rather obsolete. There is a certain group-feeling, which arises as a normal feature and in the context of these people spending more time with their colleagues than with their families (Deputy Minister, 2009). However, this sentiment does not have any impact on the decision-making of the

Representatives. This argument relies on a *thin* version of the concept, which sees the adaptation of new Member States as a process with different degrees, described by a combination of three alternative theories: Intergovernmentalism- the rationale behind the decision-making process, Institutionalism- the setting in which Representatives act, and finally, "Brusselization"- as a symbolical transfer of power, without effects on the intergovernmental power of the Representations. The representatives only use Brussels as the medium in which they promote their views and national interests, translated into policies at the domestic level, and do not emphasize on the European dimension of problems.

Secondly, the author has investigated the institutional milieu of the socialization/adaptation process. Socialization in the PSC is not a rule. Basically, the degree of supranationalization of the Council working groups, especially the PSC, is relatively small. The Committee is seen as a forum of interaction, between the member states, characterized by a game of political tactics. As Jan Beyers noticed, national representatives as diplomats are not "structural idiots" (Beyers, 2005, p.903). Socialization in the Brussels environment comes as a complementary identity, and the possibility of these diplomats to shift their allegiances towards the Community, is more a problem of "fundamentals" as one of them stated. However, socialization as envisioned by constructivist scholars is a concept which presumes more substantively the acquisition of European values. On the contrary, diplomats are aware of the Communities goals and principles, but they hold that their primary function is to serve their countries. All in all, the

system is characterized by a multi-level diplomatic game, different from the bilateral settings.

Thirdly and most importantly, testing the hypotheses in Table 1 provided the possibility of differentiating between two countries that integrated recently in the PSC medium. The main discrepancies between the adaptations of Romania and Bulgaria regard the speed of adjustment and compliance to formal and informal rules, the capacity to formulate a coherent national interest. At the same time they involve in different coalitions, based on pre-existent economic ties. Similarly, they are close to their MFA, which excludes the option of them being socialized. In terms of how they interact, there is no special relation between the two. The Bulgarian diplomats are more institutionally shy, while their counterparts are more active and outspoken. From this perspective, they have not been socialized by the overall

structure, but have brought with them their own way of socializing.

However, the possibility of Bulgaria and Romania influencing through their accession the framework of the PSC is slightly unrealistic because upon their arrival, the procedures and norms were already established. Even the previous wave of Enlargement, when ten new members joined the Union, did not manage to change, but only to affect its dynamics (Juncos, Pomoroska, 2007, p.29). This has not been the case with the 2007 members. The Romanian and Bulgarian diplomats are more or less half-way through, self-aware of their need to adapt more to this competitive institutional environment. All things considered, this study opens the question of research that would scrutinize more the implications of EU administrative governance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adler, Emanuel (1997) "Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, 3; 319.
- Allen, David, (1998), Who speaks for Europe?, in John Peterson, Helene Sjurzen, *A Common foreign policy for Europe? Competing visions for CFSP*, Routledge: London and New York.
- Batora, Josef, (2005) "Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12.
- Beyers, Jan, (2005), "Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The case of Council Officials", *International Organization*, vol. 59, no.4.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, (1990), *The logic of Practice*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Burke, Peter J., (2004), "Extending Identity Control Theory: Insights from classifier systems", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 22, No. 4.
- Calhoun, Craig, Gerteis Joseph, Moody James, Pfaff Steven, Schmidt Kathryn, Indermohan Virk, (Ed.), (2002), *Classical Sociological Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Checkel, Jeffrey, (2005), *International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe*, New York: Cambridge University.
- Checkel, Jeffrey, (1999), "Social construction and integration," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6.4 549.
- Checkel, Jeffrey, Moravcsik, Andrew, "A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?" *European Union Politics* 2.2 (2001)
- Christiansen, Thomas, Kirchner, Emil, (ed.) (2000), *Committee Governance in the European Union*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Cowles, Maria Green, Caporaso James, Risse Thomas (eds.), (2001), *Transforming Europe*, Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press.
- Duke, Simon, Vanhoonecker Sophie, (2006) "Administrative governance in the CFSP: Development and Practice", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11.
- Duke, Simon, (2005), "Linchpin COPS. Assessing the workings and institutional relations of the Political and Security Committee", Working Paper 2005/W/05, European Institute of Public Administration.
- Durkheim, Emile, (1956), *Education and Sociology*, trans. Sherwood D. Fox, New York: Free Press.
- Emirbayer, Mustafa, (2003), *Emile Durkheim- Sociologist of Modernity*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Fierke, K.M., (2007), *Constructivism in International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gheciu, Alexandra, (2005), "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the New Europe", *International Organizations*, 59.
- Hall, Peter, Taylor, Rosemary (1996): "Political Science and the three New Institutionalisms", *Political Studies*, 44:5.
- Howorth, Jolyon, Anne Marie Le Gloannec, "The institutional logic behind EEAS", in *The EU Foreign Service: How to build a more effective common policy*, European Policy Center, Working Paper 28

- Howorth, Jolyon, (2001), "European Defence and the changing politics of the European Union: Hanging together or hanging separately"?, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 39,no.4.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain, (2001), "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments", *International Studies Quarterly* , 45, 487–515.
- Juncos Ana E., Reynolds, Christopher, (2007), "The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12.
- Juncos, Ana, Pomoroska, Karolina, (2007), "The deadlock that never happened: the impact of Enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy Groups", *European Political Economy Review*, No.6.
- Juncos, Ana, Pomoroska, Karolina, (2006), *Playing the Brussels game: Strategic socialization in the CFSP Council Working Groups*, p. 4, accessible on http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2006_011a/33
- Knill, Christoph, (2001), *The Europeanization of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, Jeffrey, (2005), "The Janus face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union", *International Organization*, 59.
- March, J.G., Olsen, J., (1999), *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, New York: Free Press.
- Major, Claudia, (2005), "Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy-Undermining or rescuing the Nation State?" *Politics* 25(3).
- Merlingen, Michael, *EU Security and Defense Policy: What it is, How it works, Why it matters*, forthcoming 2009.
- Moravcsik, Andrew, (1993), "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:4.
- Nuttall, Simon, *European Foreign Policy*, (2000), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Olsen, Johan, (2002), "The many faces of Europeanization", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (5).
- Payne, Rodger A., (2000), *Habermas, Discourse Norms, and the Prospects for Global Deliberation*, International Studies Association, working paper available on <http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/par01/>
- Radaelli, Claudio, (2004), "Europeanization: Solution or problem?", *European Integration online Papers* (EIoP) Vol. 8 (2004) N° 16, accessible on <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm>
- Rosamond, Ben, (2000), *Introduction in Theories of European Integration*, London: Macmillan.
- Smith, Michael, (2004), *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The institutionalization of cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stevens, Anne, Stevens, Handley (2001), *Brussels Bureaucrats? The Administration of the European Union*, New York- Palgrave.
- Tonra, Ben, (2001), *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, Ashgate: Aldershot.
- Tonra, Ben, (2003), "Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41/4.

- The Economist, “Two new entrants into the EU”, 4th of January 2007, accessible on http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=548554&story_id=E1_RQJNVQJ
- Weber, Max, (1993), *Basic concepts in sociology*, translated by H. P. Secher, New York: Carol Publishing Group Edition.
- Zurn, Michael, Checkel, Jeffrey, (2005) “Getting socialized to construct bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-state”, *International Organization*, vol. 59, no.4.

Official Documents

- *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community*, <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:PDF>
- Council of the European Union, *Council Decision of 14 February 2000, setting up the Interim Political and Security Committee*, Official Journal of European Communities, L49/1, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:049:0001:0001:EN:PDF>
- Council of the European Union, European security and defense policy- Contribution by the Secretary General/High Representative: reference framework for crisis management, article 3, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/00/st13/13957-r1en0.pdf>
- Council of the European Union, *Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee*, 2001/78/CFSP http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/l_02720010130en00010003.pdf
- European Council, Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, <http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki-European20Council-AnnexIVof%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf>
- The European Commission, *European governance. A white paper*, accessible on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf
- The European Commission, *Roadmaps for Romania and Bulgaria*, accessible on <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50011.htm>,
- The European Commission, *European governance. A white paper*, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf

Interviews

Deputy Prime Minister, 2009
 Relex Counselor, 2009
 Nicolaidis Group, 2009
 Political Director MFA, 2009
 PSC First Secretary, 2009
 Western Balkan Group, 2009

Guidelines for Authors

Romanian Journal of European Affairs is a publication that deals with a wide range of topics pertaining to the realm of European Affairs. Its articles focus on issues of significance in the EU today (institutional building, economic policies, energy, migration etc.), the effects of the European integration process on the new member states (with a particular focus on Romania), as well as the EU's relations with other global actors.

Issued on a quarterly basis by the **European Institute of Romania**, the journal has been largely distributed both in Romania and in prestigious universities and research centers across Europe. Since 2007, the Journal has been scientifically evaluated by the National University Research Council (RO – CNCSIS) as „**B+**” category and its articles have been included in various academic electronic databases, such as Social Science Research Network.

We warmly welcome submission of articles or book reviews. Each article received for publication enters a thorough selection procedure before being accepted or rejected. All articles under analysis are made anonymous and handed over to two referees whose reports shall be synthesized by the editorial team and provide the basis for acceptance or rejection. Even when an article is accepted, the editorial board reserves the right to ask for changes, both in form and scope. Within the evaluation procedure, there are several factors, both quantitative and qualitative, that are taken into consideration. The main selection criteria are: scientific excellence, originality, novelty and potential interest for the journal's audience.

The ideal length of an article (in English or French) is from 4 000 to 8 000 words, including a 200-word abstract in English and a very brief autobiographical note. Book reviews should be no longer than 2 000 words. All articles should be presented in Microsoft Office Word format, Times New Roman, 12, at 1.5 lines, and will be sent to the address rjea@ier.ro mentioning “For RJEА”.

Please send your contribution **before February 1st, May 1st, August 1st and November 1st** respectively.

For more information, please visit www.ier.ro/rjea or contact us at rjea@ier.ro

**Rien ne se crée sans les hommes. Rien ne dure
sans les institutions.**

Jean Monnet



**EUROPEAN INSTITUTE
OF ROMANIA**

ISSN 1582-8271