

MULTILATERALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF 'MINILATERALISM' IN EU PEACE OPERATIONS

Fulvio Attinà*

Abstract. *In recent years, the multilateral practice of peacekeeping and peace support operations has been growing as legitimate instrument to interrupt violence, strengthen security, and protect against gross human rights violations. Invented by the United Nations, peace operations have passed through a process of change that has given new features to multilateral security. Since the late 1980s, the number of UN-authorized peace operations has been growing. Also regional organisations have engaged themselves in an unprecedented number of peace support operations. Recently, the European Union has entered into the practice of peacekeeping, and put multilateralism at the centre of its presence in the world political system. This paper reviews political science knowledge on peace operations (especially, the legitimacy and efficacy issues), and examines the hypothesis of the appearance of minilateralism as the consequence of the engagement of regional organisations and actors, like the EU, in peace operations. The hypothesis is tested by comparing the data of the peace missions of three European organisations (EU, OSCE, and NATO) with those of the United Nations. The paper conclusion is that the European states are developing a preference for selective engagement (i.e. minilateralism) in peace operations, and the EU is capable of playing both as multilateral and minilateral security provider.*

Key words: *European security, peacekeeping, multilateralism, minilateralism*

Introduction

Multilateralism is the cornerstone of the global action of the European Union (EU), and peace operations and crisis management are the ascribed goal of the European defence policy. EU engagement in peace operations takes place at the time *peacekeeping* is the most favoured practice of multilateral security, and important changes occur in the

organisation and conduct of peace operations. This paper is about European attachment to the culture of multilateralism and the appearance of minilateralism in the practice of peace operations. In part one, multilateral security is defined, and controversial issues like the uncertain nature of the legitimacy of intervention, the scanty efficacy of peace missions, and the rising of minilateralism are examined. In part two, the engagement of the European Union in peacekeeping is analyzed. In particular, knowledge on the propensity of states to participation in peacekeeping is used in order to assess the convergence of European states and international organisations on multilateral security. In the last section, the attention of the reader is drawn to the appearance of *minilateralism* in

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peacekeeping and the role of EU in this change. The hypothesis of the preference of European states for minilateralism and selective engagement in peace operations is supported by the data analysed in this chapter[♦].

MULTILATERALISM AND THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING

Multilateralism is a step down the road of civilizing politics among states. It is truly so, especially if one overlooks the common meaning of multilateralism as the acting together of several states, and sides with the political science view of *multilateralism as the conduct founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action* (see, especially, Caporaso, 1993; and Ruggie, 1993). Regarding security, the key principles of multilateral security are the principle of no aggression, no use of armed force at the exception of self-defence, no gross violation of human rights, no use of terrorist practices, no violation of disarmament and arms control treaties. Preventing the violation of principles and restoring peace and security when prevention fails are the goal of the rules and mechanisms that make multilateral security active in international politics. In the UN Charter, two mechanisms are set down as available to the member states in order to

induce compliance to multilateral security principles. They are the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions, and the intervention in the territory of the states that are responsible for violating security principles. This chapter is about the latter mechanism, which is commonly known as peacekeeping and today also as peace support operations or missions. In legal terms, peace operations are defined as *limited* because (a) they extinguish when pre-selected objectives are achieved; (b) are authorized and organized by an international organization, and conducted by military and civil personnel contributed by the member states of the international organisations; and (c) are set under the military command of a multinational structure in order to ensure impartiality to the parties in conflict.

During the last twenty years, multilateral security operations have been given mandates that were not present at the time the United Nations introduced this type of intervention in international politics. In addition to interposition missions for controlling truces and cease-fires (Chapter 2 of the UN Charter), and interrupting aggression and violence among states in conflict (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter), missions have been deployed to crisis and conflict areas in order to interrupt domestic violence, and stop the serious violation of human rights perpetrated either by repressive governments or in conditions of no effective government. In the years from 1947 to 1988, only 2 out of the total number of 15 peace operations were dispatched by the United Nations to a single country in order to stop domestic conflict, namely Congo in 1960, and New Guinea in 1962-63. In the following years, missions mandated to solve domestic problems under the aegis of the United Nations were far more numerous than other forms of mission. Later on, the mandate of peace missions widened in terms of tasks and

[♦] This chapter is part of the research project on *Italy and Multilateralism* conducted at the Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, as a PRIN (Research Project of National Interest) funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research (contract no. 2005144341_003). The project created ADISM, an electronic archive that contains the data of 126 peace and security missions of the United Nations, NATO, OSCE, and European Union, in the years 1947-2007. ADISM data are available on-line at <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm>.

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goals. Therefore, three types of multilateral missions were distinguished according to mandate: *peacekeeping*, i.e. interposition missions mandated to watch over truce and cease-fire agreements; *peace building*, i.e. missions mandated to stop domestic violence and accomplish further assignments like protecting minorities, transferring refugees, and reconstructing the political, civil and administrative structure of the target state; and *peace enforcement*, i.e. missions mandated to stop violence, interpose between warring parties, disband irregular military forces, and reconstruct civil life conditions. However, in many cases, it is difficult to recognize the mission type on the ground because various tasks are commonly assigned to the same mission by the intervening organisation. Very often, the military and civil personnel carry out military, political, civil, administrative and police tasks at the same time. Therefore, experts coined the phrase 'hybridization of peacekeeping'. Actually, this phrase applies to a wide set of changes, including the joining of different actors in the conduct of a single mission. This chapter aims at ascertaining one change in particular, namely the emergence of what is hereafter called minilateralism in peacekeeping.

Economists make use of the concept of *minilateralism* in order to study regionalism and other forms of trade and economic cooperation between groups of countries. Minilateral agreements are represented by governments as instruments complementary, and not opposite, to the existing multilateral trade regime. However, analysts are concerned with the effect that trade and financial agreements between restricted groups of countries have on the multilateral practices and rules issued by the world economic institutions. According to different schools of thought, minilateralism is either

neutral, harmful, or inoffensive to the goals and benefits of multilateral economic regimes (see Kono, 2007). Similarly, concern should exist on the effect of minilateralism on the multilateral security practices shared by the states of the world political system. In peacekeeping, minilateralism takes the form of peace support operations organized by regional organisations and ad hoc coalitions (known today also as coalitions of the *willings*). While multilateralism is defined by universal principles, equal participation, and no discrimination, minilateralism is not precisely defined. However, it differs from multilateralism in two respects, namely participation and, consequently, discrimination. Participation is not equal in the sense that is deliberately restricted to the states of a region and coalition. Discrimination ensues in as much as the group of the states of a minilateral agreement adopt practices that discriminate other states. In peace operations, for instance, they can decide intervention according to their own interests and special principles. Actually, also principles of action may characterize minilateralism as far as the governments of a minilateral agreement add special principles to the universal ones.

Peacekeeping intervention and state sovereignty

Hybridization of peacekeeping is consistent with the current culture of global governance, in particular with the principle of responsibility to protect that has been recently added to the existing principles of global politics. Consequently, acquaintance to intervention in order to stop the gross violation of peace and security is present in the current culture of global governance. In addition to the humanitarian principle of responsibility to protect, it is recognized also that, under the pressure of interdependence, domestic

problems drop from one country into neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. Therefore, domestic problems are recognized as influencing the stability of the world system, and become the object of the responsibility of the world political institutions. Actually, sovereignty has been reshaped in the contemporary world system but this change raises controversies. Intervention to protect the victims of human rights violations, even under authorization by the UN Security Council, raises the problem of the *slippery slope*, as Semb (2000) calls the problem of the threshold between legitimacy and no legitimacy of intervention. As Bellamy (2003) reminds to us, the problem consists in choosing between pluralism and solidarism. To the supporters of pluralism, intervention is unacceptable because violates the principle of sovereignty and state self-organization that is valued as the fundamental good of the world system. Pluralist thinkers remind to us also that, since the violation of sovereignty is normally at the advantage of the most powerful states, only the consent of the government of the target state can legitimise multilateral intervention and on condition that consent is given under no external pressure. To the supporters of solidarism, instead, avoiding human suffering is good reason for putting off the principle of no intervention. Today, the solidarity argument is boosted by the principle of responsibility to protect from power abuse all the individuals, i.e. also the citizens of the state in which the government, for reason of failure, negligence, and interest, does not protect all its citizens as is expected to do. Lastly, the problem of the actor that holds the responsibility to protect is no controversial issue to solidarist thinkers. They believe that institutions, like the United Nations and regional organizations, hold this responsibility. When the decision rules of these organizations give place to no

intervention, some thinkers believe that responsibility to protect passes on to the *great powers*, and even unilateral intervention is legitimate action (see, for example, Brown, 2004). The 1992 Anglo-American intervention to protect the Kurdish community in Northern Iraq is often cited as case in point. However, while objective criteria are lacking in the present culture of global security governance, it is admitted that the empirical probability of success and the economic sustainability of intervention are conditions to authorize peace intervention by armed and civilian forces that are multilaterally organized.

The growth and partial efficacy of peace missions

The practice of multilateral security and growth in number of peace operations owe much to the mass media. In the present communication society, they play an important role in placing multilateral intervention high on the world agenda. Actually, the mass media portray intervention as a viable instrument against violent, inefficient and repressive governments. Jakobsen (2000) represents the role of the mass media in this field as '*the CNN effect*', but claims that they are responsible also of distorting the public perception of intervention, and sometimes wrongly influencing the decision of governments. However, in order to explain the formation of the intervention culture, and the growth in number of multilateral operations since the late 1980s, attention must be drawn also to other factors and contexts.

The transformation of world politics at the end of the cold war, in 1989, is endorsed by analysts as the most important cause of the rising number of interventions in domestic and international conflicts that the two superpowers had blocked in the previous years. At the time the United States and

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Russia decided to reduce aid to the parties in conflict in the countries that had become irrelevant to their foreign policies, these countries turned themselves into *customers* of multilateral missions because of the shortage of funds they faced with in order to keep on with war actions. In addition, the end of the strategic rivalry in Europe gave to West European countries new resources to build up military and civil capabilities of crisis management, and organize the European security and defence policy (ESDP), admittedly for the crisis management goal. On their side, the East European countries did as much as they could on the same line of action in order to earn merit to their application to NATO and the European Union. However, at odds with the *cold war end* interpretation, data on conflicts, like those of the COW, UCDP/PRIO, and other archives, signal that the number of violent conflicts began to grow during the bipolar age, more exactly in the mid 1970s. Therefore, Jakobsen (2002) proposes a different explanation, and charges responsibility on the conditionality clause of the aid programs that the world economic institutions, with the support of the governments of the American coalition, have issued starting on the early 1980s. The programs of economic adjustment and democratic reform that were imposed on countries in need of economic aid, worsened the condition of economic backwardness and social conflict of those countries. Thus, violent domestic conflicts invited multilateral intervention in order to contain the diffusion of disorder and violence to the rest of the world.

Another factor pushing the culture of multilateral intervention upward is the propensity of regional organizations of all the continents, at the exception of Asia and the Middle East, to engage in local conflict management (see more in the last part of this chapter). Lastly, as explained here later,

democratic states contribute enormously to today's multilateral security culture because peace and abstention from violence have been associated to democracy and respect of human rights. With the support of the public opinion and mass media, this theme became priority to the foreign policy of many democratic countries. Consequently, governments decide to join in to military intervention, legitimated by the UN Security Council, also in areas distant from their national territory. The democratic countries that more contribute to security missions are also wealthy ones. Therefore, it can be said also that they defend economic interests when they intervene in violent conflicts that put their interests at risk. However, statistics do not sustain the economic motivation of the UN peace operations. Conflict severity, measured by the number of victims – so, a humanitarian reason - is, instead, the best figure of statistical prediction of the decision of the UN Security Council to deploy peace missions to countries anguished by civil war. Moreover, statistics do not support the thesis that the United Nations intervene more frequently in raw materials exporting countries than in others (see Gilligan and Stedman, 2003).

Briefly, both demand and supply factors stimulate the growth of the number of multilateral missions, and strengthen the global culture of intervention. Resuming, these factors are

1. the increased number of violent conflicts since the 1970s when destabilization hurt the structure of government of the world system;
2. the worsening of social conflicts in countries anguished by economic backwardness, political repression and social quarrels that occurred in the 1980s and the following years because the world economic institutions imposed structural economic

- adjustment policies on the receiving countries;
3. the devolution of violence control to the United Nations and regional organizations after the Soviet-American rivalry came to an end, and the two principal countries of the global power competition restrained their aid policy to governments and groups in armed conflicts;
 4. the principle of humanitarian protection that the political classes and publics of the democratic states of the dominant coalition were inclined to carry on by taking on themselves both the responsibility to protect and the largest portion of the cost of multilateral operations also in order to sustain the stabilization of the world economy

All these factors explain the growth of multilateral security but do not inform us about the final outcome, i.e. the expected effect of the stabilization of the receiving countries. Appraising the output of peacekeeping is hard and controversial task because operations take place in serious and difficult conditions. Actually, in the receiving states, minimal security conditions are lacking; governments are unable to exercise authority but use force to repress opposition; mutual trust is missing among social groups; and no party is stronger than the others. These conditions induce the parties to converge on accepting external intervention but hinder the formation of the agreement to solve the conflict. Moreover, the agreement of third parties important to the fate of the conflict, like states concerned with the conditions of the geographical area of the receiving states, is also needed. In addition, intervention can have unwanted effects like the introduction of new forms of crime and the breakdown of the social structure of the target state (see, as example, the study of the

Somali case in Coyne, 2006). Lastly, missions are usually under-resourced and short in duration to cause the change wished for, and bring lasting peace, order and stability. In conditions like these, intervention can hardly achieve other objectives than the immediate one, i.e. the interruption of large violence.

All such problems notwithstanding, researchers have drawn lessons out of their analysis, and hinted at the conditions that make the interruption of violence to last enough to introduce democracy and social order. In the seminal analysis of 124 civil wars, which occurred from 1944 to 1997, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) got the lesson that constructing peace, order and stability is highly probable only if the conflict source is not ethnic and religious, civil war is not particularly costly in human lives, the economy of the country is relatively good, and multilateral operations give large financial aid to the receiving countries. In the analysis of 38 civil wars concluded between 1945 and 1998, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) demonstrate that prior democratic experience, conflict time length, the introduction of territorial autonomy, and multilateral intervention are all positively correlated to enduring the restoration of peaceful conditions. Fortna's (2004) analysis of 111 civil wars from the end of the Second World War to 1999, finds no strong statistical correlation of the positive end of intervention to variables like the cause of conflict (ethnic, religious, etc.), the interruption of violence (victory of one party, peace agreement, armistice), and the economic development of the contenders, but confirms that the probability of lasting peace is higher when multilateral forces intervene rather than not. By comparing the data of the unilateral intervention of France, Great Britain and the United States and those of multilateral UN-authorized operations for the sake of

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democratizing the target country in the period of time 1946-1996, Pickering and Peceny (2006) demonstrate that the success rate of UN-authorized intervention is higher than that of unilateral intervention. They explain that United Nations intervention takes place under favourable conditions because all the parties in conflict consent to external intervention. Lastly, Mukherjee (2006) maintains that the reconstruction of political, civil and administrative structures of receiving state depends on inducing the parties in conflict to adopt the parliamentary rather than presidential regime, and the proportional rather than majority electoral system, because the former ones create the correct relation that must exist between majority and minority groups. Achievement of this result, however, is rarely possible because peace missions do not last enough time to build that constitutional solution. On the whole, these analyses recognize that multilateral intervention normally achieves the goal of interrupting large violence. At the same time, they invite to caution regarding the long-term result of stabilizing the target country because very long time is needed to produce this result.

EU ENGAGEMENT IN PEACE MISSIONS

During the last ten years, ESDP, the security and defence policy of the European Union, has been put in place, and military and civilian capabilities for crisis management

have been made operational by the member states. These actions are consistent with the goal of *effective multilateralism* and *robust intervention* that the *European Security Strategy*, in 2003, declared as the main goal of the European Union in the global governance of security (Attinà and Repucci, 2004; Biscop and Andersson, 2008; Lindstrom, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 20065; Ojanen, 2006; Toje, 2005). So far, the European Union has been able to engage itself in 21 peace and security operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. To 20 ESDP operations, the monitoring mission in Bosnia (ECMM/EUMM), launched in 1991 when ESDP was not yet in place, is added to the list of European Union peace and security operations (see list in the Appendix to this chapter).

EU operations are truly multilateral in nature when the EU military and civil personnel participate in missions organized by the United Nations together with the personnel of other states. This is the case of about half the number of all EU operations. In few cases, operations are conducted by EU and NATO forces. In one case, the operation in Sudan, the EU mission has been arranged in agreement with the African Union. The remaining number consists of minilateral operations, i.e. interventions decided by the Union with the consent of the government, and/or parties in conflict, of the state where the operations are deployed (see Table 1).

Table 1


EU's Peace Operations Name	Initiative and organization
ECMM / EUMM - European Community Monitoring Mission/European Union Monitoring Mission	EU
EUSEC - EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	EU
AMM - Aceh Monitoring Mission	EU
EUPOL-COPPS - EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories	EU
EU BAM Rafah - EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories	EU
EUPT - EU Planning team in Kosovo	EU
EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine . EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine	EU
EUJUST Themis - EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia	EU
EUJUST Lex - EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq	EU
EUSR BST - Border team Georgia	EU
EUPOL RD Congo - EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	EU
AMIS II Darfur - EU Support to AMIS II	EU-AU
EUPM - EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina	UN
EUFOR RD Congo - EU Military Operation in RD CONGO	UN
Artemis - EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo	UN
EUPOL Kinshasa - EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC)	UN
Concordia - EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	UN-NATO
EUFOR-ALTHEA - EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	UN-NATO
Proxima EUPOL - EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	UN-NATO
EUPAT - EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	UN-NATO
EUPOL Afghanistan - EU Police mission in Afghanistan	UN-NATO

All of the EU missions carried/carry out various tasks and functions, like truce monitoring, border control, rescue actions, humanitarian protection, and political, social and administrative reconstruction. Few of them were short term missions, i.e. few months long. As of December 2007, seven EU missions completed their mandate. The personnel employed by all the operations is counted in


more than 10 thousand units. However, in more than 50% of the cases, the number of personnel units is below one hundred; only in three missions is over one thousand. Balkan and Eastern Europe receives the largest number of ESDP operations, followed by Africa. Also duration of operations in Europe is the highest, followed by that in the Middle East (see Graphs 1 and 2).

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Graph 1




Graph 2



All ESDP missions have been deployed starting in 2003. Therefore, the number of EU active operations has been growing very fast in the short period of time thereafter. Over the years, the number of active operations has been growing equally in and out of Europe (see Graphs 3 and 4). This signals the increasing capability of the European Union to act both as a regional (Europe) security organization, and a global security player. At the same time, attention is drawn here to the hypothesis, which is discussed later in this chapter, that by


organising and conducting peace operations all alone, although under the authorization of the United Nations, the European Union is reinforcing multilateralism, both as regionalization and decentralization. In other terms, EU acts as peacekeeping organization in its own region, and the member states act as a coalition that supplement/replace the world system institution, the United Nations, when this one faces the problem of building an agreement on deploying multilateral missions in places out of Europe.

Graph 3



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Graph 4



The analysis of this topic takes us to further analyze two critical issues of global security governance, namely the reason why democratic and rich states, like the EU member states, are disposed to intervention, and whether ESDP operations can be interpreted as a case of minilateralism, i.e. of the current practice of peacekeeping regionalization and emerging decentralization of the agency of intervention.

State Propensity to Engagement in Peace Operations

State propensity to engage in multilateral operations can be explained by egoistic and altruistic motivations, i.e. both selfish interest and commitment to defend public goods and humanitarian values. In principle, the two drives are not incompatible to one another. In reality, it is difficult to separate one from the other. In participating in multilateral operations, states pursue national/individual as much as system/collective interests.

Stability in areas of concern, enhancement of the national army, and promotion of the state position in the structure of the world government are examples of the national interest that the state defends by participating in multilateral operations. Peace, security, law and humanitarian principles in the world system, instead, are examples of the public goods the state defends by participating in multilateral operations. Furthermore, every time state interests are pursued by taking part in such operations, multilateralism is reinforced as normal structure of action, and becomes the constitutive part of the foreign policy culture of the participating states.

A different question on state propensity to participate in multilateral operations, however, is that about the attributes that make some states ready to take part in peace operations more than others. Researchers answered to this question by sustaining that data demonstrate that democracy makes states disposed to take part in peace operations more than other state regimes (Andersson,

2002, 2006; Daniel and Caraher, 2006; Lebovic, 2004). Actually, despite the very recent increase of the number of not democratic countries that take part in peace operations, the preponderance of democratic states remain strong. In the table here below, all the states contributing troops to the Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) of the United Nations in the year 2007 are distinguished

according to the Freedom House classification of the political status of the state, i.e. Free or democratic, Partially free or quasi-democratic, and Not free or not democratic (see www.freedomhouse.org). Two on three democratic countries and almost all quasi democratic states contribute troops to UN PKOs as against one on three not democratic countries (see Table 2).

Table 2

STATUS	Free	Partially free	Not free
States in PKOs (2007)	58	42	19
Total number of states (2007)	89	44	59

One can interpret these data, and the evidence provided by the analysts, as suggesting that democratic states have qualities that are congenial to engagement in multinational security mechanisms, namely (a) institutional and cultural attributes, which provide for adhesion to norms and procedures of mediation and negotiation as means of conflict solving; (b) foreign policy culture attributes, which sustain state conformity to the legal use of force in international relations and the respect for human rights and democracy; (c) attributes of economic-technical efficiency, which make democratic states both more capable than others to pay the costs of intervention, and more able to put in action military and civil personnel for crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. However, it is also true that democracy may hinder participation in peace operations. The institutional and political actors of democratic countries have at their disposal many instruments for defending contrasting opinions on the benefits and costs of military intervention. Party competition negatively influences decisions on taking part in peace missions, and constrains governments to abandon membership in missions that causes

victims to national armed forces. Lastly, the probability that democratic states reduce their propensity to participate in multilateral operations is high when they are rich, more exactly when they have a high gross national product and, consequently, a lower rate of incidence of financial contribution to missions on the gross national product. This happens because the *spill over of benefits* of peacekeeping is distributed to all the states. Consequently, small contributors and *free riders* get from peace missions more benefits than great contributors do. In these circumstances, rich countries may count the benefits they draw from, and the public good they offer with, participating in peace missions as exceedingly disproportionate to the cost they bear. Consequently, as Shimizu and Sandler (2002) remark, it is probable that rich countries become selective. Rather than joining in as member of truly multilateral operations under the United Nations command, rich countries will prefer to engage themselves in unilateral operations, i.e. operations conducted by regional organizations and *ad hoc* coalitions because they can control better the objectives and costs of these operations. This observation is

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
relevant to assess the emerging European way of taking part in peacekeeping.

European operations and peacekeeping minilateralism

In this last section, European contribution to the regionalization and decentralization of

peacekeeping in global security governance is analysed. Analysis is made on three European international organizations, NATO, OSCE, and the EU. From 1991 to 2007, these organizations entered into 66 peacekeeping operations either on United Nations authorization or on their own initiative (see Graph 5).

Graph 5



Difference in the three organisations approach to peacekeeping notwithstanding, their involvement in peace operations has the same impact on the present state of peacekeeping, i.e. altogether it presses ahead regionalisation and decentralization within the current practice of multilateral security. Before going into checking this topic, information on the contribution of NATO and OSCE to peacekeeping is given here to complete the information on European organizations' involvement in multilateral security.

In June 1992, at the Oslo meeting of the NATO Council, the member countries decided to widen the collective defence mission of the Organisation, and authorized the creation of peacekeeping capabilities in order to make NATO forces able to accomplish military and

civilian crisis management tasks. The decision changed NATO into a minilateral coalition on stand to carry out security missions either by its own or within a multilateral set. Since 1992, NATO has carried out 9 security operations, 2 of them authorized by the United Nations. In the last seven years, at least three NATO security operations have been active each year. All the NATO missions have been deployed to Europe, namely the Balkans, but one to Asia, Afghanistan, and a small one to the Middle East with the mandate restricted to training Iraqi armed forces. Intervention in Afghanistan was decided for the sake of containing the threat of Al-Qaeda to the security of the world system, and punishing terrorist organizations for the 9/11 attack. Interventions in the Balkans, instead, are

considered as humanitarian because violence was encapsulated within the borders of the former Yugoslavian states (Matlary, 2002).

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has a membership of 55 states, and a mission encompassing activities in security, economic, political, communication, and national and territorial affairs. The successor to the Helsinki Process and the European Conference for Security and Cooperation (ECSC), OSCE has been particularly active in facilitating the closing of the division of Europe, and rebuilding East European and former Soviet Union countries after the end of the cold war. Notwithstanding the role of ECSC/OSCE in fostering dialogue between the two parts of Europe, and building the European security partnership, governments did not show much concern to enhance OSCE activities because this could harm the role of NATO and the EU in the continent. Nevertheless, OSCE actions for peace and security are manifold and important. In particular, the civilian and also military personnel of OSCE's Long-term missions (LTMs) are active in member countries when serious crises and low-violence conflicts may lead to open civil war. In the past 15 years, up to 10 LTMs have been active each year in European and Asian member countries.

To some analysts, the organization of peace operations by regional and sub-regional organizations, like the European ones, is not a new phenomenon. Peacekeeping regionalization is just a *process of natural selection rather than intelligent design, shaped by the proliferation of institutional frameworks* (Gowan and Johnstone, 2007:3). Moreover, hybridization of peace operations does not set aside the United Nations, which remain the principal institution in charge of peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). However, though the contribution of regional organizations to peace and security

operations is frequently authorized by the United Nations, their presence in peacekeeping, which has been increasing impressively in the last decade, is connected to other important change in the world system. Consequently, some analysts, censuring regional organizations for leaning toward conducting peacekeeping operations in their own region (see more here below), call attention to the growing separation of Western from non-Western operations (Sidhu, 2006), and blame on regional organization operations to be *ad hoc* coalition operations (Wilson, 2003). Notwithstanding the continuous importance of UN peacekeeping and the still uncertain nature of regional peacekeeping, the last part of this chapter aims at enlightening the additional, and not necessarily opposite, phenomenon of peacekeeping decentralization from the United Nations to European/Western regional organization, and sustain the hypothesis that minilateralism is siding with multilateralism in global security governance.

Let us check first the quite uncontested hypothesis of regionalization. It must be said that this is not general and uniform in nature. It is very much advanced in Europe, as data presented here above demonstrate. It is not practiced at all in Asia, though Asian countries contribute many troops to UN operations, and the Middle East, where peacekeeping personnel is contributed by countries of other parts of the world. In America, especially in Central and Caribbean America, it is scarcely present on the initiative of the Organization of the American States. But in Africa, peacekeeping regionalization has been growing fast in past years on the initiative of the African Union and sub-regional organisations. The effort to build up the Peace and Security Council of the African Union is important contribution to the *Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa*. Assistance given to the creation of this security mechanism by the

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
United Nations and Western actors, namely the European Union, the United States, and the G8, is worth noting here. In particular, on the initiative of the United States, the G8 launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and created in Rome the Centre of Excellence for Police Stability Units that within 2010 will train 75000 soldiers, above all from African countries, to run peace operations. The African sub-regional organizations' involvement in peacekeeping is exemplified by the operations of ECOWAS (the Organization for economic cooperation of the countries of Western Africa), SADC (Southern Africa Development Community), IGAD (the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development), and CEMAC (the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa). In addition, intervention of single states like South Africa and Nigeria, and not African ones like France and Great Britain, is present in the African continent.

Is the growing involvement of the European international organizations in multilateral security to count as normal case of peacekeeping regionalization? Granted that, at present, the three above mentioned organizations are active predominantly in Europe (see here below), is the *Europeanization of peacekeeping in Europe* to count as twin to the *Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa*, though better equipped and capable than the latter? Or is the European attachment to multilateral security to count also as the symptom of something different, which is boiling up in the global security governance, i.e. the decentralization of the peacekeeping agency?

In the past fifty years, Africa and Asia received the largest number of UN peace and security missions (see Graph 6). By going into the peacekeeping business, the three European organizations changed the geographical distribution of the whole set of

peace missions. Though collection of data on the *Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa* is in progress, it can be said that the absolute number of peace missions in Europe is close to that in Africa but the number of violent conflicts and wars in Africa is much higher than the number of violent conflicts in Europe. This opposite match is explained here as it follows. The number of domestic and international conflicts in Africa does not go with the number of African security operations because, in addition to Africa's shortage of economic and military capability of crisis management, in the past years, Africa did not progress as much as Europe did towards collective security culture. Only recently, African Union started building up its own collective mechanism for conflict and crisis management. On the contrary, since the time of the Helsinki Process, the European states have been developing a preference for collective crisis management. Therefore, Europe has been able to form the most advanced regional security partnership. Elsewhere (Attinà, 2006 and 2007), *regional security partnership* is defined as the region arrangement that originates from inter-governmental agreements to cooperate on enhancing security, stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of agreements, instruments and mechanisms such as formal treaties, rules of the game, international organizations, joint actions, trade and economic treaties, political dialogues, and agreements on confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy measures, and also measures of cooperation on domestic problems. In this perspective, peacekeeping regionalization fits to the current practice of security regionalization, and the more the partnership model is adopted by governments to manage security at the region level, the more peacekeeping regionalization will grow.

Graph 6




Let us now check the additional hypothesis, i.e. the incoming decentralization of peace missions in global security governance, by looking, first, at the available data. The growing contribution of the European organisations to the rising trend of multilateral intervention is apparent by confronting the number of new and active operations of the United Nations and European organizations (see Graph 7). From 2002 to 2007, the number of European organizations' missions is greater than that of UN missions just as, in the years from 2004 to 2007, the number of active operations of the three European organizations is greater than the number of UN active missions.

In addition to evidence provided by numbers, further information on the European contribution to peacekeeping decentralization is given by facts like the following ones. The NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 was

deployed under no authorization by the UN Security Council. Thus, this is a case of peacekeeping decentralization. The NATO's ISAF mission and EU's EUPOL mission, which have been dispatched to Afghanistan on demand of the UN Security Council, can be counted as peacekeeping decentralization given that the Security Council decision is the outcome of Western diplomatic pressure. Similarly, the EU diplomacy obtained from the United Nations and African Union authorization to intervene in the Sudan area. Lastly, participation of European countries in ad hoc coalitions under the leadership of the United States is a further case in point, participation in the *coalition of the willings* in Iraq included. However, it is here recognized that further study is needed to forward the decentralization of peacekeeping agency hypothesis.

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Graph 7



CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, European attachment to the practice of peacekeeping reinforces peacekeeping minilateralism, both as regionalization and decentralization. European security organizations have deployed to their own region 30 out of a total of 43 missions because the European states are rich and military capable enough to deal with their own security problems, and have developed a strong cooperative security culture. At the same time, NATO and the European Union have deployed missions to other parts of the

world, and this case sustains the decentralization of peacekeeping practice on the assumption that the European countries are taking into serious consideration the problem of balancing the costs of participation in peacekeeping with the benefits of controlling security and peace missions by holding on themselves all the operation aspects. In other words, the UN authorization of European missions notwithstanding, it can be said that the European governments are moving towards becoming able to play on all the tables of global security governance, the multilateral and *minilateral* alike.

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Appendix: European Union peace and security operations (December 2007)

	Acronyme	Area	Countries	Starting date	End	Years*	Personnel	Fatalities
1	ECMM / EUMM	Europe	Bosnia	1991, July	<i>active</i>	16,5	59	0
2	EUPM	Europe	Bosnia	2003, January	<i>active</i>	5,0	202	0
3	Concordia	Europe	FYROM	2003, March	2003, December	0,8	358	0
4	Artemis	Africa	Democratic Republic of Congo	2003, June	2003, September	0,3	1800	0
5	Proxima EUPOL	Europe	FYROM	2003, December	2005, December	2,0	200	0
6	AMIS II Darfur	Africa	Darfur, Sudan	2004, January	<i>active</i>	4,0	40	0
7	EUJUST Lex	Middle East	Iraq	2004, February	<i>active</i>	3,9	12	0
8	EUJUST Themis	Europe	Georgia	2004, July	2005, July	1,0	10	0
9	EUFOR-ALTHEA	Europe	Bosnia	2004, December	<i>active</i>	3,1	5949	0
10	EUPOL Kinshasa	Africa	DRC	2005, March	<i>active</i>	2,3	30	0
11	EUSEC	Africa	DRC	2005, June	<i>active</i>	2,6	32	0
12	EUPAT	Europe	FYROM	2005, June	2006, December	1,5	30	0
13	EUSR BST	Europe	Georgia	2005, September	<i>active</i>	2,3	20	0
14	AMM	Asia	Indonesia	2005, September	2006, December	1,3	80	0
15	EU BAM Rafah	Middle East	Palestinian Territories	2005, November	<i>active</i>	2,2	70	0
16	EU BAM Moldova and Ukraine	Europe	Moldova and Ukraine	2005, December	<i>active</i>	2,1	103	0
17	EUPOL-COPPS	Middle East	Palestine Territories	2006, January	<i>active</i>	2,0	33	0
18	EUPT	Europe	Kosovo	2006, April	<i>active</i>	1,7	35	0
19	EUFOR RD Congo	Africa	Democratic Republic of Congo	2006, April	2006, November	0,6	2800	0
20	EUPOL Afghanistan	Asia	Afghanistan	2007, May	<i>active</i>	0,7	172	0
21	EUPOL RD Congo	Africa	Democratic Republic of Congo	2007, July	<i>active</i>	0,5	39	0