GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION AND THE EU-JAPAN-U.S. TRIAD

ADRIAN POP*

Abstract. The globalization triggers macro-regionalization, which, in its turn, generates micro-regionalization – the EU being a good example of both. Second, in virtually all scenarios of geopolitical future the recurrent theme is regionalism, which comes in various “shapes and sizes”. That is why maybe we should start to live with the idea of a sort of regionalization by default. Third, how the relationship among the members of the EU-Japan-U.S. triad will look like in future will depend to a large extent on how the American power is going to prevail within the Western world and how it is going to handle the reassertion of countries belonging both to the Western and non-Western worlds. The various possible outcomes entail a plethora of varieties of geopolitical realignments.

GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION

The development of the regions is a crucial part of the emerging global order in the era of globalization. The two processes are closely intertwined, the regionalization – at both supranational and sub-national levels – being at the same time an intrinsic part of and a response to globalization.

For a long period of time, the debates concerning the regionalization were focused on trade and trade policies, especially when regional trade agreements were reinforced by ultraliberal trade regimes. But globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon, comprising not only an economic dimension, but a social, political, security and cultural dimension, too. Accordingly, how the relationship between globalization and regionalization is taking shape depends on which dimension of globalization one is referring to.

From an economic viewpoint, the regionalization is triggered, to a certain extent, by the trans-national corporations’ quest for new markets and foreign direct investments. The regionalization of investments has become so important that affects the nature of production and trade. To take just one example, already in 1995 more than 10 percent of the Japanese companies’ output was produced outside Japan, as compared with 4 percent in 1986. Whereas nearly all goods produced by Japanese companies in the U.S. are sold on the American market, a significant part of consumer goods produced by Japanese companies’ branches in South East Asia is imported by Japan. In 1992, these imports represented 16 percent out of the total Japanese imports, as compared with 10 percent in 1982. As rapidly as they are attracted by favourable economic circumstances, the foreign direct investments are fleeing to other markets when these circumstances are

* Adrian POP, Ph.D., is Professor and Chair of the Political Sciences Department at “Dimitrie Cantemir” University in Bucharest, and Associate Professor with other universities in Bucharest. A member of the Scientific Board of the Institute for the Memory of Romanian Exile, he is also a member of the Advisory Board of History’s Files journal. He was Deputy Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History in Bucharest, Senior Visiting Fulbright Scholar with the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park, U.S.A., and International Research Fellow with the NATO Defence College in Rome, as well as the editor-in-chief of Romanian Review of International Studies.
changing and the more so when they are declining. As proven by the Asian crisis, starting 1997 the fleeing of capitals and the time needed for designing adequate response strategies have led to a dramatic destabilization of the economic and political set up of some countries.

The EU, as heir of the EEC, is the first economic region of the world. The Asia-Pacific region is characterized by an emerging regionalism focused on market economy development and regional cooperation promoted by organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Established in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the second most powerful form of regional economic integration, after the European one. Its significance should not be underestimated as it accomplished a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy, which started in the mid-1980s, from multilateralism and international cooperation to economic regionalism.1

All three regional structures have already acquired a geopolitical personality. Moreover, each of the three big economic regions of the world has a leader which plays the role of an “engine”. That role is performed by Germany for the EU, by Japan for the Asia-Pacific region, and by the U.S. for the NAFTA region. Consequently, when we speak about competition among the three we should take into account the ability of the “engine” to “push” the region forward, securing the advancement of the region as a whole. From this point of view, ample evidence points to the fact that the EU is lagging behind U.S. and Japan in terms of high-tech products and services. The increased competition from both those developed countries and less developed countries such as China and more recently India have led key European countries to resort in 2005-2006 to a series of protectionist measures – a tendency which weakens the EU efforts to adapt to the challenges of globalization, including and most notably through enlargement.2

Turning to the political dimension of globalization in relation to the above-mentioned triad, things look quite differently. All three big players share the same commitment to democracy, and collaborative ties for securing stability at the global level, but whereas the U.S. upholds a unipolar world and are ready to use what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice calls “transformational diplomacy” as a tool of exporting democracy worldwide3.

---


3 See Transformational Diplomacy, speech of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., January 18, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/m/2006/59306.htm and its commentary in “Public Diplomacy Watch”, January 24, 2006, http://www.publicdiplomacywatch.com/2006/01/transformational_diplomacy.html. The approach has been heavily criticized by Henry Hyde, chairman of the House of Representatives international relations committee and a Republican congressman: “A broad and energetic promotion of democracy in other countries that will not enjoy our long-term and guiding presence may equate not to peace and stability but to revolution ... There is no evidence that we or anyone can guide from afar revolutions we have set in motion. We can more easily destabilise friends and others and give life to chaos and to avowed enemies than ensure outcomes in service of our interests and security.” Quote by Martin Jacques, “Imperial overreach is accelerating the global decline of America”, Guardian, March 28, 2006.
the EU and Japan are in a favour of a multipolar one and are more reluctant to impose their political will upon other countries’ domestic affairs (see Annex 1). What is more, in the case of the EU, its failure to adopt the Constitutional Treaty and to articulate common positions during major international crises (including, most recently, the Lebanese one) as well as the divisions between big and small countries have made the efforts to develop a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) even more difficult, while the split between the “old” and “new” Europe in terms of opposing or supporting the U.S. war against Iraq has pointed out to both an ad-hoc regionalization between the more pro-European and more pro-Atlantic countries of the future EU-27 and an overall weakening of the Union over the long run.

From a security viewpoint, things are even more complicated. We live in a “global risk society” in which is no longer possible to externalize secondary consequences and threats which are intimately linked with the evolution of super-developed industrial societies such as global climate change. Globalization has exacerbated trans-national security threats to all states, obscuring somehow the traditional borderline between them. Security threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal trafficking on drugs, radioactive materials, small and light weapons (SALW) and human beings, ethnic and nationalist conflicts, man-made or natural disasters and pandemics (one recent example being the avian influenza) have increasingly trans-national consequences. All these ask for the worldwide implementation of global agreements meant to counter them. But whereas the European Union and Japan are by and large committed to observe them, the United States has given way to unilateralist impulses more than ever. Within six months of taking office, the first Bush Administration pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, announced its intention to withdraw from the Antballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, manifested its opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the pact setting up the International Criminal Court (ICC), withdrew from establishing a body to verify the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and reduced the effectiveness of a U.N. agreement aimed at controlling SALW proliferation.

Among the most dramatic challenges to global security have been the various forms of international terrorism, compounded by the problem of failed and failing states. The gravity of these asymmetric threats to international stability and global security is significantly enhanced by the potential of the vast devastation that could result from the use of WMD or a large scale coordinated cyber attack directed against the global community’s critical information infrastructure and financial network. The main lesson of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. (11 September 2001) and their

European counterparts in Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) has been the fact that in order to efficiently combat the spread of terrorism big players as well as minor ones should cooperate in ways which are at the same time multidimensional, multilateral, flexible, consistent, and permanent. However, whereas the U.S. are firmly guided by the “pre-emptive strike” concept in their global war against terrorism, only the “new” Europe has aligned itself with the U.S. approach, as evinced throughout the 2003 transatlantic crisis. As for Japan, despite its growing military potential, it has only reluctantly sent some peace-keeping troops in Iraq, being securely entrenched in the anti-militaristic ethic generated by its post-war soul-searching process.

Whereas regional security arrangements are evolving more slowly and are likely to remain informal and flexible, against the background of a rising involvement of non-state actors and the collapse of internal control of weak, failing or failed states a micro-regionalization occurs at the sub-national level in the form of crime-ridden “black holes”. What is more, it might well be possible that using the new information technologies, non-state actors such as terrorists, illegal traffickers, rebel armies and extremist religious groups would get control over non-lethal means of generating violence thus putting an end to an essential characteristic of the nation-state, which is, according to Max Weber, the legitimate monopoly of violence.

As for the cultural dimension of globalization, one should bring into picture the local rather than the regional. According to Roland Robertson, the local should be perceived as an aspect of the global. In his view, globalization is a process by the help of which local cultures are at the same time concentrated and intersected (leading to a “clash of localities”). Due to this mutual interdependence, rather speaking about globalization and localization as two different processes, one should speak about glocalization. The latter, is creating not a unified global culture but a glocal culture which, according to Arjun Appadurai, has its own relative autonomy.

Geopolitical Future(s) and Grand Strategies

The great powers, as the main actors on the international stage, need a conceptual map in order to devise a sustainable global environment. This necessity is particularly felt in periods of global change such as ours. This need often translates itself into grand strategies. More often than not, grand strategies rely on scenarios of global future. The last couple of years have witnessed a proliferation of such scenarios, the bulk of them being (not surprisingly) American.

In the case of the EU, taking into consideration the failure of the Lisbon Agenda to achieve its goal, and letting aside the politically correct generalities comprised in the European Security Strategy (2003), only the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), could be considered something which remotely resembles to an emerging European grand strategy, as it entails the formation of a “ring of friends” surrounding the borders of the enlarged EU and its closest European neighbours, having as its building block the concept of proximity and as its

---

7 Ibidem, p. 3.
GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION AND THE EU-JAPAN-U.S. TRIAD

theoretical foundation the concentric circle model.8

The Japanese grand strategy for the third millennium was synthesized by Takashi Inoguchi, after a thorough review of statements made by various Japanese opinion leaders – academics, journalists, bureaucrats, business persons, and politicians. He thinks that the Japanese grand strategy could be best described as a mix of three different scenarios, which he labels the Westphalian, Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian. The three scenarios have distinct geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural features. In the Westphalian scenario the actors are “normal states”, the basic principle is state sovereignty, the behavioral modalities are balancing and bandwagoning, the key economic concept is national economy, and the key media is the state run radio-TV. In the Philadelphian scenario the actors are liberal democracies, the basic principle is the ideology of liberal democracy, the behavioral modalities are binding and hiding, the key economic concept is global market, and the key media is the cable TV network. In the Anti-Utopian scenario the actors are failing and failing states, the basic principle is loss of sovereignty, the behavioral modalities are “hollowing out” and collapse, the key economic concept is economic development, and the key media is the underground network/samizdat (see Annex 2). Speaking about a Westphalian-Philadelphian-Anti-Utopian mixed scenario of the global future, Inoguchi refers to the fact that whereas the basic framework will remain Westphalian, the waves of globalization (in the economic field), unipolarization (in the security field) and democratization (in the governance field) will strengthen the Philadelphian framework. In their turn, excessive Philadelphian practices are bound to lead to negative phenomena such as the peripheralization of many parts of the South, anti-globalization and anti-hegemonic movements and democratizing rhetoric which might eventually bring about an Anti-Utopian scenario.9

As for the Americans authors, they have envisaged different grand strategies, whose various approaches depart from opposite premises regarding the continuation or not of the prevailing U.S. hegemony. In addition to this, some of them have gone even beyond the traditional assessment of the geopolitical future broken down into short term (up to 5 years), medium term (5-10 years) and long term (10-20 years) scenarios, venturing to envisage how the world would look like up till the middle of the current century.

The Pentagon’s view on what should be the American post-9/11 grand strategy was formulated by Thomas Barnett, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, in an essay entitled Pentagon’s New Map (2003) and then in a book based on it, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and

8 For the ENP promoting a pan-European and Mediterranean region organized according to the concentric circle pattern see Adrian Pop (coordinator), Gabriela Pascariu, George Anglițoiu, Alexandru Purcăreșcu, Romania and the Republic of Moldova – between the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Prospect of European Union Enlargement; European Institute of Romania, Pre-Accession Impact Studies III, Study No. 5, Bucharest, 2006, p. 163, available also at http://www.ier.ro/PAIS/PAIS3/EN/SI.5.EN_final.PDF.

Peace in the Twenty-first Century (2004). According to Barnett, the world is divided into two camps, the nations that have successfully implemented globalization (the Functional Core) and the nations that have rejected globalization (the Non-Integrated Gap). Examples of Core states are “North America, much of South America, the European Union, Putin’s Russia, Japan and Asia’s emerging economies (most notably China and India), Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa, which accounts for roughly four billion out of a global population of six billion.” Examples of Gap states are “the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia.” On the borders between the Core and Gap states are the so-called Seam states, often used for exporting terrorism and instability from the Gap to the Core. Examples of Seam states are “Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.” Looking at a Mercator projection of the world, solution set countries lie in a ring along the edges and potential problem countries largely rest in the middle forming a black hole of trouble for those embracing globalization (see Annex 3). The disconnectedness vis-à-vis globalization defines the current and future threats to global security. Consequently, recent military actions, as well as future one, are and will be conducted in the Gap states or along the Seam states continuously throughout the 21st century, until globalization takes hold. In order to win the war on terror, which he views as a result of problems with globalization, the U.S. should increase the

Core’s immune system capabilities for responding to 9/11-like system perturbation events, work with the Seam states to firewall the Core from the Gap’s exports (terror, drugs, pandemics), and shrink the Gap. This could be done by “exporting” security and globalization to the Seam and Gap states. In order to do that, the U.S. military should be reorganized into two components, a heavy force structured much like today’s military (Leviathan) and a light force designed for nation building (System Administration). Barnett’s solution for world stability is to reduce the size of the Gap by recreating Iraq as a functional society, let China become a near-peer of US, removing North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, create an Asian NATO, depose Iran’s mullahs, develop an Asian NAFTA, bring free trade to all of the Americas, admit new states to the United States, bring Africa into the Core by 2050, and – on the energy security side – move from burning oil to natural gas.

In a follow-up study written with Professor Bradd C. Hayes, Barnett proposed four scenarios for the evolution of globalization according to the states’ ability to set new rules for guiding the globalization and to cooperate for containing those who oppose it, including super-empowered individuals such as Ossama bin Laden and transnational networks such as Al-Qaeda. “If new rules don’t emerge and the developed world doesn’t get together to challenge those who oppose globalization, the world could remain a very messy place in which to live. We call this future Globalization Traumatized. If the world cooperates to advance globalization, but fails to adopt a new rule set, economic growth will proceed haltingly and governments will be

---

GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION AND THE EU-JAPAN-U.S. TRIAD

reactive rather than proactive. We call this future Globalization Compromised. Those are the darker scenarios we posit. On the brighter side, if developed nations agree on some broad rules directing how globalization proceeds (rules, for example, that would protect workers, the environment, and tax bases), but fail to cooperate when dealing with those opposing globalization, they should expect to be plagued by continual, large-scale protests. We call this future Globalization Stabilized. The best scenario would see developed countries cooperating to ensure that the world’s economy expands smoothly and justly. They agree on rules that protect workers’ rights, local cultures, and the environment. They also cooperate to contain disaffected groups and work to bring opponents into the fold. We call this future Globalization Normalized. 11

Alternatively, a comprehensive survey conducted by the National Intelligence Council with non-governmental experts on the main drivers of global change and how they would interact through 2015 led to four scenarios of global future. The four scenarios could be grouped in two pairs: the first pair contrasting the “positive” and “negative” effects of globalization – Inclusive Globalization vs. Pernicious Globalization; the second pair contrasting extremely competitive but not conflictual regionalism and the plunge into regional military conflict – Regional Competition vs. Post-Polar World. From the viewpoint of this study, of particular interest are not so much their differences, but the generalizations across the scenarios. In all but the first scenario, globalization does not create widespread global cooperation. Rather, in the second scenario, globalization’s negative effects promote extensive dislocation and conflict, while in the third and fourth, they bring about regionalism. In all four scenarios, countries negatively affected by population growth, resource scarcities and bad governance, fail to benefit from globalization, are prone to internal conflicts, and risk state failure, the effectiveness of national, regional, and international governance and at least moderate but steady economic growth are vital, and the U.S. global influence diminishes. 12

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s short term and medium term scenarios of future geopolitical realignments start from the premise that “America does not have, and will not soon face, a global peer. There is thus no realistic alternative to the prevailing hegemony and the role of U.S. power as the indispensable component of global security”. 13 Brzezinski’s optimistic scenario envisages a sort of U.S.-EU global partnership 14 in which the two entities


14 As Brzezinski puts it: “an essentially multilateralist Europe a somewhat unilateralist America make for a perfect global marriage of convenience. Acting separately, America can be preponderant but not omnipotent; Europe can be rich but impotent. Acting together, America and Europe are in effect globally omnipotent.” Ibidem, p. 96.
would act together, becoming the “core of global stability,” on the one hand, and a “genuine European-Russian bonding” facilitated by Russia’s need for help in order “to develop and colonize Siberia”, on the other. As for the Far East, “the most likely pattern will involve the interplay of China’s overt rise to regional power, Japan’s continued but ambiguous acquisition of increasingly superior military power, and America’s efforts to manage both”. In order to foster a sort of informal Chinese-Japanese-American triangle in the region, the U.S. will have to promote a stable and cooperative relationship with China and to encourage Japan to “become more politically engaged” against the background of its cautiously but steady military build-up. On the long run, if NATO would continue to expand and Russia would become one way or another “an extension of it”, the circumstances would be ripe for setting up a trans-Eurasian collective security structure that would involve Japan and China and transforming the G-8 into a G-10, comprising China and India. 

The pessimistic scenario put forward by Brzezinski would be a severe U.S.-EU rivalry stimulated by a Franco-German alliance combined with Russia’s relapse into a nationalistic dictatorship, in the western regions of Eurasia, and an exclusive Asian economic and possibly security regionalism spurred by China, followed by Japan’s rush into remilitarization, in the eastern regions of Eurasia. The resulting anti-American pan-Europeanism and pan-Asianism, especially if aggravated by U.S. unilateralism could not only push the U.S. out of Eurasia, but halt any attempts to forge a framework for global security and plunge the world of the twenty-first century into a new twentieth century regionalism. That particular scenario, envisaging an enlarged EU together with Russia and East Asia (Japan and China) becoming counterweights of the U.S., is shared also by Charles A. Kupchan, the persuasive advocate of the need of a new American grand strategy in order to smooth the transition from a unipolar towards a multipolar world. 

Other scenarios are those proposed by a June 2005 Power and Interest News Report (PINR). It envisages a period of short term stability during which each of the major regional power centres would have a stake in preserving it “either by a perceived need to retrench or by the goal of protecting processes of economic and military development.” That period would be followed on the medium and long term by the rise of the EU, China, India, Brazil and possibly Russia to world power status and the turning of “several states that are currently either regional powers or are themselves under strong influence or domination by the world’s major states” into either “second wave” powers or major hurdles to global stability and security, including Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, some Western and Central African states (Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda), Vietnam and the Philippines. There are also good prospects for China, India, Brazil and other states to establish strong links with these countries which would complicate even further the geopolitical

15 Ibidem, pp. 103, 111, 115, 120-123. 
16 Ibidem, pp. 91, 103, 126-127. 
17 Charles A. Kupchan, op. cit., pp. 29 and 63.
GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION AND THE EU-JAPAN-U.S. TRIAD

picture. “This possible development – concludes the report – demands that Washington and other power centres around the world prepare themselves not just for the more obvious geopolitical challenges stemming from rapidly emerging new powers, but also for the upcoming difficulties and uncertainties in dealing with a dozen new regional players.”

Obviously, projections longer than 20 years are venturesome because possible contingencies multiply at a geometrical progression. However, one possible useful, although schematic way to go beyond sheer guess in predicting long term plus geopolitical future (up to 50 years) and understand globalization is through the lenses of long cycles. According to the world-system theory promoted by Immanuel Wallerstein, globalization is far for being something new. In fact, it is the business as usual way of how capitalism works. For him, there is no evidence that the world is now more globalized than it was throughout la belle époque period, before the First World War. What is really new in the post-war era, argues Wallerstein, is the fact that after a period of roughly 20-25 years when the U.S. hegemony was at its peak after the Second World War (1945-1965/1970), due to the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan, by the 1970s we could speak of a triad of centres of capital accumulation, whose forging inaugurated the competition for shares in the world market and for control of the next generation of cutting-edge industries. The U.S. tried to control the political consequences of this economic power shift by setting up the Trilateral Commission and then by escalating the Cold War. Starting 1970 the world experienced one long Kondratieff B-cycle (downswing) characterized by a sharp reduction of profits from productive activities. This, in turn, led to attempts “to export the consequences of the downturn, especially the unemployment, to each other” and “a shift in emphasis from accumulating capital via productive profits to accumulating capital via financial manipulations, in which the U.S. has retained an advantage because of the role of the dollar as the reserve currency”.

For the first half of the 21st century the world-system theorist envisages a return to a Kondratieff A-cycle (upswing) during which cutting-edge industries based on informatics, biotechnology and new energy resources, largely monopolized, will toughen the competition among the triad. In order “to ward off the European threat”, the U.S. and Japan will unite their economic efforts. Other two big actors, China and Russia, provided they manage to preserve their national integrity, will negotiate their entering in the resulting dual structure of economic power: China into the U.S.-Japan regional economic complex and Russia into the western European one.

Letting aside the issue of globalization being merely the working of the capitalist world-system, which is

---

a debatable point in itself, there are several weak points in Wallerstein's scenario. First, taking Wallerstein's definition of a hegemonic state, namely a state that is imposing a structure of world order upon the world-system, with the exception of few years after 1945, the U.S. hegemony never existed throughout the bipolar era. It would be much fair to say that, by and large, because the omnipresence of the two super-powers – directly or indirectly – on the global stage, the bipolar era was one of co-hegemony of the U.S. and Soviet Union. Second, the fact that the U.S. hegemony has started to falter since 1970 seems contradicted by the leading role the U.S. have played in the Gulf War as well as in the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Third, it is not clear at all that China would accept the role of a junior partner of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Russia would opt out for an energy security deal with the EU instead of a strategic one with China and India. It is much more likely that China and Russia, provided that they manage to preserve their territorial integrity (which is not entirely sure) and overcome the factors that undermine attempts to bring the two countries closer together, would try to consolidate the close ties developed in recent years, in order to promote their mutual interests in energy supplies and defence sales and to counter the perceived U.S. hegemony.

Fourth, Wallerstein's scenario of future geopolitical realignments is rooted in two nowadays debatable theoretical and epistemological frameworks: the Westphalian tradition; and the conceiving of the world as being in a linear upward curve in a past-present-future time continuum. In a time of "bifurcation" (as Ilya Prigogine has aptly called it) and "butterfly effect", when the nation-state is in decline, and we are facing an increase in the privatization of power by legal and illegal groups, it is difficult to envisage which new actors apart states may step into the global arena – criminal groups, clans, tribes, provinces, regions, organizations etc – which may lead future geopolitical realignments to look very different to the ones we were used to.

Conclusions: Regionalization by Default and Geopolitical Realignments?

At least three main conclusions could be inferred from what has been assessed. First, the globalization triggers macro-regionalization, which, in its turn, generates micro-regionalization – the EU being a good example of both. Second, in virtually all scenarios of geopolitical future the recurrent theme is regionalism, which comes in various "shapes and sizes". That is why maybe we should start to live with the

---

20 Even if one concessed that globalization is nothing new, there are at least three new developments in the way capitalism has been working in the last 100-150 years: "the integration of the world in terms of the speed of communication and the scale of trans-national exchange in cultural, economic and political matters"; the formation of "some 50-60,000 trans-national co-operations"; and "the emergence of a rather dense network of international organizations, which, to some extent, seem to control the workings of the interstate systems, as well as of the workings of capitalism". See "Debate on the Propositions", in Immanuel Wallerstein, Armand Clesse (eds), op. cit., p. 65.


22 The "butterfly effect" refers to the fact that we live in a world that is so interdependent that a small change somewhere could change the course of events completely.

23 "Debate on the Propositions", in Immanuel Wallerstein, Armand Clesse (eds), op. cit., p. 93
idea of a sort of regionalization by default. Third, how the relationship among the members of the EU-Japan-U.S. triad will look like in future will depend to a large extent on how the American power is going to prevail within the Western world and how it is going to handle the reassertion of countries belonging both to the Western and non-Western worlds. The various possible outcomes entail a plethora of varieties of geopolitical realignments. The investigation of possible institutional responses to these significant globalization challenges falls outside the scope of this study.24

Annex 1

Unipolar vs. Multipolar World

---

24 Nevertheless, one cannot help asking if Ulrich Behr wasn’t right in stating that a possible alternative to the national state and the global hegemonic state is the trans-national state. The trans-national states are not national, international or supranational states. Within trans-national states, the system of political coordination is organized along the axis globalization-localization. Therefore, trans-national states are glocal states, provinces of the global society which are struggling to earn their position on the global market.
### Annex 2

#### Outline of Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Legacies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geopolitical frameworks</th>
<th>Westphalian (State-centric)</th>
<th>Philadelphian (global republican)</th>
<th>Anti-Utopian (post post-colonial multi-cultural)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal author</td>
<td>Kissinger</td>
<td>Fukuyama</td>
<td>Huntington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key concept</td>
<td>state sovereignty</td>
<td>popular sovereignty</td>
<td>post-sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>loss of sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional unit</td>
<td>nation-state</td>
<td>liberal democracy</td>
<td>civilizational supertate &amp; fading state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral principle</td>
<td>balancing/centerwaging</td>
<td>binding/binding</td>
<td>fortifying, following outcollapsing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geoeconomic foundations</th>
<th>Westphalian (State-centric)</th>
<th>Philadelphian (global republican)</th>
<th>Anti-Utopian (post post-colonial multi-cultural)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal author</td>
<td>Gerschenkow</td>
<td>Kech</td>
<td>Landes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key concept</td>
<td>national economy</td>
<td>global market</td>
<td>economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving force</td>
<td>state-led industrialization</td>
<td>market-driven mega-competition</td>
<td>world cultures that guide the inner values and attitudes of a population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical variable</td>
<td>large input of capital and labor</td>
<td>critical input of technology</td>
<td>invention and know-how</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geocultural networks</th>
<th>Westphalian (State-centric)</th>
<th>Philadelphian (global republican)</th>
<th>Anti-Utopian (post post-colonial multi-cultural)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal author</td>
<td>Anderson</td>
<td>Barber</td>
<td>Kaplan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key media</td>
<td>state-run radio/TV</td>
<td>cable TV network</td>
<td>underground network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key purpose</td>
<td>action building</td>
<td>global penetration</td>
<td>anti-state reaction &amp; order in cultural sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key effect</td>
<td>video-legitimization</td>
<td>video-globalization</td>
<td>subversive operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>homogenization</td>
<td>legitimization of civilizational supertate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 3

The Functioning Core vs. the Non-Integrated Gap