

From *finalité politique* to *multifinalité*. Theoretical basis explaining the turn in the process of defining the future of the European Union

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Abstract: *The aim of the research is to find the theoretical basis for the turn from finalité politique towards multifinalité in the paradigm of knowing the future European Union. These theoretical bases for reimbursement will be supported by empirical evidence and practical solutions, which in this case constitute a point of reference for potential final solutions. This objective is important in that not only researchers and theorists are involved in the search for the EU's future, but also practitioners, including EU technocrats. The research found that: first of all, it is extremely important to define the essence of the (non-adjective) finalité with its internal components (transcendence, equilibrium, destiny), secondly to determine the state at the moment which will be extremely important reference point (référentiel), although contextual, initial condition of research on the finalité.*

Keywords: *finalité politique, multifinalité, référentiel, European Union*

Research assumptions

The aim of this research paper is to search for the theoretical basis for the turn from finalité politique towards multifinalité in the paradigm of defining the future of the European Union. This theoretical basis for this turn will be supported by empirical evidence and practical solutions, which in this case constitute a kind of reference point for potential future solutions. This reservation is important because not only researchers and theorists are involved in the search for the final effect of the EU, but also practitioners, including EU technocracy². Additionally, specialists, experts, analysts, etc. (epistemic communities) have often been involved in the search for solutions and the final goal, as well as in the FP debate itself³. Obviously, we must remember that virtually all attempts to determine finalité politique of the EU were only proposals⁴ and they also

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² *White Paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*, COM (2017) 2025 final. The document was published by the European Commission in the form of communication (COM).

³ These are knowledge-based communities, i.e. various types of expert teams, reports and statements of specialists and analysts who support the EU and its institutions with their knowledge.

⁴ All you have to do is compare integration concepts assuming specific transitional or final solutions, such as: *Europe a la carte, variable geometry, hard core, multi-speed Europe, flexible integration, differentiated integration, two-class Europe, enhanced cooperation, closer cooperation*, etc. B. H. Miller, *Tomorrow's Europe: A Never Closer Europe*, „Journal of European Integration”, 2017, Vol. 39, Issue 4, p. 421.

include those that have been simply unsuccessful⁵. Hence, simulating and designing the EU's future takes place simultaneously in several environments, but without a uniform scenario, and therefore rather spontaneously. Often these attempts are separated from one another, dispersed, independent and accidental, as well as utopian⁶.

The European Union is a product of the European integration process. What will be the end result of the European Union? This question is only signalled because it is not the main problem of the analysis. However, it shows a certain development pattern and context for the discussion about the EU's *finalité*. Obviously, if to some extent the presented research results are used to seek answers to this question, it will only be a side effect of the measures taken, because the way the EU will look like is vitally important not only for the EU itself and its Member States, but also for EU citizens who live in it.

This study was divided into three parts, as the analysis begins with *finalité* and its components. It is *finalité* without adjectives that sets the foundations for *finalité politique* (FP) and, consequently, also for *multifinalité* (MF).

Finalité

In order to search for the goal and final shape of the EU (*finalité*) as a product of integration processes, it is necessary to properly diagnose its current state. The dispute about the EU has been going on since its inception. Researchers, in particular lawyers and political scientists, are wondering whether it should be seen as an international regime, an international organization, an agency acting at the will of its Member States, an empire or as federation or supranational institution, gradually transforming into a

⁵ E.g. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Cf.: A. Podraza, *Unia Europejska w procesie reform traktatowych [The European Union in the treaty reform process]*, Lublin 2007. Using the constitution to build a political community (*finalité politique*) is a natural procedure recommended by many theoreticians and practitioners. E.g. P. Buras uses the terms constitutional discussion, *finalité politique*, and political union interchangeably, referring them to the concept of rebuilding the architecture of European integration so that new problems, not taken into account by the founders of the EEC, could be faced. P. Buras, *Dyskusja o finalité politique Unii Europejskiej. Przegląd stanowisk [Discussion on the finalité politique of the European Union. Position overview]*, in: *Polska – Unia Europejska. W pół drogi. Wybrane problemy [Poland - European Union. Halfway. Selected problems]*, ed. M.A. Cichocki, Warsaw 2002. p. 13. Cf. also: J. Nergelius, P. Policastro, K. Urata, *Challenges of Multi-Level Constitutionalism*, Lund, Krakow 2004.

⁶ Attempts to answer the question of what European Union we want at the point of optimal advancement of its development are extremely important, because it could contribute to the discussion new solutions that are not only most real, but also the most desirable for everyone. Moreover, this question contains a lot of specific issues that should be resolved, including the level of solidarity, the level of harmonization, etc. Let us pay attention to studies that have significantly contributed to this discussion: J. Zielonka, *Europe as an empire. The nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford University Press 2006, K. Szczęsny, *The Duchy of Europe or the "Europe System? Some Observations about the Future of the European Union*, „The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest”, Vol. 5, No. 3 (16), 2005, P. Świeboda, *W stronę europejskiego finalité politique [Towards European finalité politique]*, „Przegląd Europejski” 2000, no. 1, M. Gravier, *Empire vs. Federation: which path for Europe?*, „Journal of Political Power”, 2011, no. 7, M. Zurek (ed.), *Wizje Unii Europejskiej. Przyszłość wspólnej Europy [Visions of the European Union. Future of the united Europe]*, Szczecin 2003, Ph.C. Schmitter, *Imaging the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts*, in: G. Marks (et al.), *Governance in the European Union*, London 1996, Martin I., *What finalité politique for the European Neighbourhood Policy? On Objectives and Instruments of EU Relations with its Neighbourhood*, J. Ruskowski *Teorie europeistyczne w poszukiwaniu finalité politique Unii Europejskiej [Europeanist theories in search for finalité politique of the European Union]*, in: L. Wojnicz, D. Rdzanek, M. Potkańska (ed.), *W poszukiwaniu finalité politique Unii Europejskiej. Aspekty teoretyczne i praktyczne [In search of finalité politique of the European Union. Theoretical and practical aspects]*, Szczecin, Warsaw 2015, p. 9 and subsequent pages., P. Buras, *Dyskusja o finalité politique Unii Europejskiej. Przegląd stanowisk [Discussion on finalité politique of the European Union. Position overview]*, in: *Polska – Unia Europejska. W pół drogi. Wybrane problemy [Poland - European Union. Halfway. Selected problems]*, ed. M.A. Cichocki, Warsaw 2002.

European state?

Obviously, one can reach for the Treaty of Lisbon that dispels these doubts by stating that the EU is an international organization with legal personality⁷. Although this provision does not exhaust the issue, the Lisbon definition of the EU as a subject of international law should be the starting point for considerations. Can the EU be something more or something less than an international organization in the future? We already know that the EU of the second decade of the 21st century is more than an international organization, but still clearly something less than a sovereign state. The EU is also not a union of sovereign states. Not anymore, because the European Union Member States are not typical nation states, because it is difficult to notice potential features of nation states like an aggressive or war attitude, territorial possessiveness, chauvinism, imperialism, etc. in them. They are much more Member States than nation states⁸. One can even see the evolution of these countries from Westphalian nation states to EU member states. Member States are guided by collective logic and the logic of coordinated actions, they have denationalized power and competences constituted more vertically, and they are more altruistic, solidary, peaceful towards other actors, and loyal⁹ to one another¹⁰.

In order to consciously and correctly search and define *finalité*, it is first necessary to accurately determine the initial state, because only such a process allows (or gives hope) for the achievement of the most optimal results. The initial state is understood here as the point of the optimal shape of the EU at a given moment (the moment of its maximum development), from which we start projections regarding *finalité*. This is all the more important that the current discussion about *finalité* takes the current shape of the EU as a reference point (*référentiel*)¹¹, but the EU is still changing, so this reference point is also shifting and will change. As a result, *finalité* projections must necessarily take into account this type of dynamics and transformation. The reference point (*référentiel*) is thus becoming an extremely important, though contextual, initial condition for research on *finalité*¹². The European Union defined at a given moment should be assessed through the prism of its specific content, certain constant, invariant and characteristic components that make up the specific EU DNA code. All permanent, irreducible achievements, features, values, principles and solutions in force

⁷ J. Fiszer, *Czy Unia Europejska zagraża państwu i jego interesom narodowym? Aspekty teoretyczne i utylitarne [Does the European Union threaten the state and its national interests? Theoretical and utilitarian aspects]*, in: J. Ruzzkowski, R. Podgórzkańska, *Państwo w Unii Europejskiej [State in the European Union]*, Szczecin 2017, p. 23.

⁸ Nation states have typically Westphalian features shaped in an anarchized international environment such as: aggressive or war attitude towards other states and nations, territorial possessiveness, chauvinism, imperialism, disloyalty, egoism, national interest, etc. In addition, nation states are guided by individual logic and uncoordinated actions, and they have nationalized power and competences constituted more horizontally. Cf. on the subject. R. Bickerton, *From Nation-States to Member States: European Integration as State Transformation*, in: *The Search for Europe. Contrasting Approaches*, BBVA 2015, p. 202 and subsequent pages.

⁹ Interestingly, the principle of European loyalty, unique in international relations, appeared in art. 4 (3) of the Treaty on European Union in the post-Lisbon version and is based on loyal cooperation of the EU and the Member States, which respect one another and provide mutual assistance in carrying out tasks arising from the Treaties.

¹⁰ J. Ruzzkowski, *Państwo członkowskie Unii Europejskiej jako jednostka analityczna w studiach europejskich [A Member State of the European Union as an analytical unit in European studies]*. Instead of the Introduction in: J. Ruzzkowski, R. Podgórzkańska, *Państwo w Unii Europejskiej [State in the European Union]*, Szczecin 2017, p. 9 and subsequent pages.

¹¹ More about the concept *référentiel* see: P. Muller, *L'Analyse cognitive de politiques publiques: Vers une sociologie politique de l'action publique*, „Revue Française de Science Politique”, 2000, no. 50-2, s. 193 and subsequent pages.

¹² Cf.: C. Radaelli, R. Pasquier, *Conceptual Issue*, in: *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, P. Graziano, M.P. Vink (ed.), Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York 2007, p. 37.

in the EU (the origin and founding values of the European Communities, existential goals, motives and values of the EU¹³) constitute its DNA. The EU's DNA includes the ability to alleviate conflicts in international relations by creating and complying with regulations including the use of its strength (currently primarily economic). This code, resulting from the analysis of systemic invariables in the integration process, should be the starting point for any discussion on the future EU. In the research process is not enough to just track system shifts from one system state to another (starting state > final state), but the logic of these shifts and their direction must be learnt.

So not what changes in the EU, what is rejected, transient, passing, constitutes the EU DNA code, but the sum of its permanent features. The EU's DNA is the nature of the EU. If what changes becomes what is permanent, it is included in the EU's DNA. Thus, the UE's DNA code may be expanded. The sum of permanent EU (immutable) features ordered according to a particular idea can give a package effect in the form of *finalité*.

Ideational elements, social and identity aspects of the future shape of the EU are very important in the search for the EU's *finalité*. In addition, informal standards and all intuitive means and methods of defining *finalité* cannot be underestimated.

The EU is still an unfinished, ongoing, evolving, transformative, flexible project, that is constantly adapting to changing realities. In classic functionalism, the term *transcendence* is used, which refers to this type of transformation towards a qualitatively different final shape. *Transcendence* can be a new dynamic of growth driven by positive solutions and borrowings, while also eliminating negative experiences of the EU (e.g. resulting from integration crises). This learning process is also part of *transcendence*.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy uses a term "finalistic action" or "finalistic behaviour", which has the nature of final clarification and a kind of "closing" of a task (or process), emphasizing that the final state in input-output systems is equilibrium. Each system encodes past events to later process them for future communication and finally reach equilibrium that in some way shows and seals the final state¹⁴. This means that the current system activities depend on the system concepts of the final state. Therefore, equilibrium is an important element stabilizing and perhaps even petrifying the final state (shape) of the system.

The EU's *finalité* (without adjectives) is also a form of destiny of the EU appearing as a result of the process of building it. *Finalité* is a new European Union we yet do not know.

Therefore, the EU's *finalité* contains features that characterize it in terms of definitions. Undoubtedly, they include: *transcendence*, *equilibrium* and *destiny*.

On the other hand, the search for *finalité politique* (FP), which is the final political goal which the European Union should reach and which should be achieved, is a limitation restricting the development process of this organization to one political shape. The strategic assumptions of EU development are therefore burdened with one or another fragmentation (*finalité politique*, *finalité économique*, etc.), which overlaps with the typical weaknesses of these assumptions related to their non-definition, lack of certainty, lack of agreement among Member States and lack of durability.

¹³ Its integrative power should be recognized as one of the central features of the EU's nature. Also, the lack of the superior model of *governance* is a fundamental feature of the EU political system (understood as *polity*).

¹⁴ L. von Bertalanffy, *General system theory: foundations, development, applications*, New York 1969, p. 131.

Finalité politique

The European Union is a modern structure, and modernity is future-oriented¹⁵. Imagination is extremely important in the projection process of the future. Hence, all the discussions about the future of the EU, and even more so about specific political forms or organizational states, require political imagination from practitioners (politicians, technocrats), which additionally – what is extremely difficult – is to be shared by all involved actors (*shared imagination*), and requires theoretical reflection with predictive evidence from researchers (research imagination). These three imaginations must be correlated, balanced and compatible, then there is a chance that the final result will be the most optimal one (or close to optimal).

The very research process aimed at searching for *finalité politique* is almost inherently connected with logic of consequences¹⁶, which has a rationalist provenance¹⁷, and more precisely it is associated with rational-choice institutionalism (RCI)¹⁸. The search for FP is to follow the logic of consequences of the European integration process, or rather the consequences that will be the final effect of the integration process within the European Union. *Finalité politique* should therefore be a rational choice with a fundamental consideration of the consequences of this choice (decision). According to the institutionalism of the rational choice, defining *finalité politique* in the EU is a rational and informed choice, and the choice in political institutions is arranged in such a way as to ensure recipients about three important issues. Firstly, that the choice was made reasonably, that it is an expression of planning, reflection, analysis and systematic use of information. Secondly, that it takes into account matters relevant to the people concerned and that the relevant interests have been heard in this process. The decisions themselves and the intentions they express are of great importance, regardless of their implementation. Moreover, they were identified as the main product of the organization. Thirdly, that its leaders exercise control over the political system in an appropriate manner¹⁹.

When based on the meta-theoretical findings made by institutionalism of rational choice, the search and declaration of *finalité politique* should be a rational process, preceded by planning, with the systematic use of information. In the process of searching for future FP, the European Union noticeably bases on information (knowledge) supported by the authority of experts, specialists and analysts (e.g. reflection groups, expert reports and analyses, committees of sages, etc.). The search for FP must therefore be based on a rational learning process, on expert knowledge (*epistemic communities*), because these elements increase the likelihood of a right and thought-through choice, reduce the risk of inapt or accidental consequences. The school of rational choice (RCI) is also a school of rational learning²⁰.

¹⁵ Unlike past-oriented anti-modernism.

¹⁶ A synonymous term also appears in literature: *logic of consequentialism*. Cf. A. Niemann, *Explaining Decisions in the European Union*, Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 24.

¹⁷ The logic of consequences was already well known to functionalists and neo-functionalists, as well as the more constructive logic of appropriateness. However, in the ontological assessment, both logics are activated in noticeably different conditions and in different environments. A. Niemann..., *op. cit.*, pp. 24–25.

¹⁸ More on the subject of institutionalism of rational choice: *Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, ed. J. Mahoney, S. Thelen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010; *Explaining Social Institution*, ed. J. Knight, J. Sened, University of Michigan Press, Michigan 1995.

¹⁹ J. G. March, J.P. Olsen, *Instytucje. Organizacyjne podstawy polityki [Institutions. Organizational bases of politics]*, Warsaw 2005, p. 66.

²⁰ These RCI parameters evidently bring it closer to constructivism, that is, in fact, to sociological institutionalism.

Finalité politique is a rational, ultimate, and therefore final political goal (or goals) to be achieved or should be achieved by the European Union (e.g. it can be the EU organizational shape, its legal and constitutional form, territorial size, etc.). In itself, FP can be a multi-faceted objective: political, economic, legal, systemic, geographical, social, etc. FP is also the final political (systemic) shape of the European Union. If we recognize that the European Union is a *sui generis* political system, then *finalité politique* will be situated in the output phase, i.e. in the result phase generating a specific result²¹.

Thus, FP should be: planned, informatively justified, participatory (non-elitist), optional (not given). The FP form may therefore be revealed as: a project (of the final EU system), a goal (to be achieved) or a shape (which the future EU is to take)²².

Finalité politique (FP) can be basically divided into general, subjective and sectoral. General FP refers to the future of European integration as a phenomenon and process²³, subjective FP refers to the final shape of the EU as a whole, while sectoral FP can refer to the future of specific sectoral policies in the EU. There have been attempts to search for the final goal to be achieved, e.g. the Eurozone or the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In 2011, a special term for this task was introduced: *finalité politique for the European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP)²⁴.

Another division of *finalité politique* refers to predictive theoretical indications that result from the findings of individual Europeanist (or politological) theories. As a result, we can talk about: neo-functional *finalité politique*, intergovernmental FP, realistic FP, etc.

We can also be tempted to divide FP due to the gradual achievement of the final shape of the European Union. Hence, we distinguish e.g. territorial *finalité* (the EU cannot expand endlessly, so one day it will reach the maximum or - as we prefer - the final territorial shape), or identity *finalité* (it will be achieved with the formation of a European or EU identity)²⁵.

Great Europeanist theories are somewhat lost and often not convincing when defining *finalité politique* (FP). Obviously, using the main Europeanist paradigms in their current shape and their entire set of theses and explanatory arguments, one can be tempted to make such an attempt.

It is difficult to achieve a goal if it is not clearly and officially defined. This is the situation regarding *finalité politique* of the European Union practically from the very beginning of European integration, i.e. from the early Community period²⁶.

²¹ J. Ruzzkowski, *Teorie europeistyczne w poszukiwaniu finalité politique...*, op. cit. [*Europeanist theories in search of finalité politique*], p. 9 and subsequent pages.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ There are also more symbolic questions in literature about the future of all Europe (*finalité Europe*).

²⁴ Cf. I. Martin, *What finalité politique for the European Neighbourhood Policy? On Objectives and Instruments of EU Relations with its Neighbourhood*, www.academia.edu/2221447/2011.

²⁵ The European identity is based on the so-called second choice (this is the second-choice identity). The first choice is a national declaration, e.g. I am Polish, the second choice is a European declaration, I am European, EU citizen. The European identity is therefore a background identity towards the national identity, but in some cases it may, however, be the first choice (e.g. technocrats in the EU, cosmopolitans, etc.).

²⁶ There are various reasons for this (lack of consensus among Member States, high EU volatility and dynamics, fear of internal conflicts, etc.). However, the reasons for the lack of an official declaration on FP are not the subject of this study.

This situation implies a tendency to accept experimental solutions²⁷ leading to particularism and eclecticism in the field of final effects and to their dispersion, and it also implies the use of such research instruments that will be suitable for undertaking the analysis of this type of solutions, with their simultaneous high variability and fluidity. In addition, talking about *finalité politique* is difficult because political cooperation within the EU is practically only becoming closer and crystallizing²⁸, as opposed to economic cooperation. So maybe it would be much easier to formulate *finalité économique*? In Bella Ballassa's economic theory of integration, the last stage of integration is the economic and political union²⁹, i.e. a mix of economic cooperation and political cooperation. Thus, even advanced economic integration in the EU, according to economists themselves, will achieve its highest level of development together with full political integration³⁰.

S. Dulien and J. I. Torreblanca believe that there are two opposing visions of the EU's *finalité politique*: "minimalist intergovernmental" and "maximalist federal". The followers of the first vision believe that the highest guardians of legitimacy and democracy are the Member States and that the transfer of sovereignty implied by the political union requires simultaneous strengthening of the presence and role of EU Member States in the decision-making process. In turn, supporters of the maximalist-federal concept want to strengthen the political capacity and democratic legitimacy of existing European institutions, in particular the European Parliament and the European Commission³¹. It seems, however, that the range of possible solutions outlined in such a manner is too narrow, because even if we assume that the minimalist version of the European Union is intergovernmental integration, the maximalist solution does not really close at federation crowned with the political union, but either at *consortio*, or even a supranational superstate³². It can be noticed that in some areas (e.g. trade policy, monetary policy, competition policy) the European Union already has certain parameters of a political union. In turn, certain elements of federal solutions can be seen in the European Parliament, the European Commission or the primacy of EU law over national law. Finally, we find intergovernmental solutions in the system of councils (European Council and Council of the European Union).

It is worth considering whether theoretical paradigms suggest other solutions to the dilemma resulting from the final result of the EU. Some theories skip FP or

²⁷ The fourth scenario for the development of the future European Union contained in the White Paper on the future of Europe, which was adopted by the European Union on 1 March 2017, calls for more space for experimentation".

²⁸ J. Aveline, *Branding Europe? Branding, design and post-national loyalties*, "Place Branding", 2006, vol. 2-4, pp. 334-335. See also: A. Wierzchowska, *Wpływ modernizacji i kryzysu na dynamikę zmiany w Unii Europejskiej [Impact of modernization and crisis on the dynamics of change in the European Union]*, Warsaw 2016, pp. 428-439.

²⁹ See: B. Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, London 1962.

³⁰ Such a union would accumulate harmonization of economic policies and full political unification together with supranational institutions. Cf. B. Ballassa, *The Theory of Economic... op. cit.*

³¹ Cf.: S. Dulien, J. I. Torreblanca, *Czym jest unia polityczna? [What is a political union?]*, "Policy Brief", European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR/70, p. 5. The EU will be more ethnically and religiously diverse in the future and therefore needs to derive its legitimacy from its citizens. Only then can we recognize what binds us together and what the sense of community is supported by shared values of democracy, such as: freedom and equality and avoiding nationalist attitudes for which there is no place in 21st century Europe. Calleja Ragonesi, *Reconnecting Europe with its citizens*, europesworld, 21.12.2015.europesworld.org.

³² When stable (similar, related) rules of action are created, not in a given segment (field), but between them and above them, a suprasystem may be formed, which will be located above subsystems. Cf. relations between suprasystems and subsystems in J. Grier Miller in *Living Systems*, New York 1978.

underestimate this problem by stressing other elements of integration processes. For example, functionalism is a theory indicating a path for the implementation of integration, and also a method of integration, but it does not indicate its final goal³³. The essence of functionalism is the establishment of a functional institution or organization that will be able to take power (competence) from nation states and use it for their good and benefit. The final product of functionalism is therefore the arrangement of such institutions (creating, for example, an international community coordinating their activities) of a more functional and technical nature, and less political. The resulting international community would therefore be a pluralistic body, as on one hand it would bring together many institutions and on the other many Member States.

While, neo-functionalism, and most of all neo-neofunctionalism³⁴ attempted to define FP through the prism of *consortio*. According to Ph. C. Schmitter, the final result of integration is not necessarily federation, but multidimensional collegial governance, which is conventionally referred to as *consortio* (the author also uses the term *condominio*). *Consortio* as a supranational multi-layer and multi-level collective governance system with self-propelling and self-reproducing capabilities, based on non-state technocratic actors³⁵, is much more real than federation, but it is also much more beneficial for integration processes. Supranational governance³⁶ is a constitutive element of *consortio*, hence we can talk about a partial (fragmentary) view of *Multi-level Governance* (MLG). In *supranational governance* within *consortio* Member States do not have full control over supranational institutions, and the latter, as entities of such governance, show considerable independence, which translates into institutional and political results. *Consortio* is a type of *finalité politique* also in *Multi-level Governance* (MLG) and derivative approaches (or associated with MLG), such as: theory of polycentric governance system³⁷.

Despite the above-mentioned arrangements, the final product of integration between nation states is not of primary importance for neo-functionalists. The process of political integration in itself, its dynamics and its changes are more important. An element of this process is therefore the formation of a political community in which supranational structures will play a key role as potential “integration agencies”³⁸.

The theory of intergovernmentalism is similarly ascetic in terms of FP, although it strongly emphasizes the nationally motivated self-interest of a Member

³³ All the more that functionalism means a non-political phase of the development of European integration and is based on functional logic opposed to national interest.

³⁴ Neo-neofunctionalism is a theory dealing primarily with the “product” of integration (final result), which is another factor that differentiates it from neofunctionalism, which is much more focused on the “process” of integration.

³⁵ Ph. C. Schmitter, *Neo-neofunctionalism*, in: A. Wiener, T. Diez, *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York 2005, p. 69.

³⁶ The term “supranational governance” has strong neo-functional roots. Neofunctionalism exposes the concept of “supranationality” with an appropriate level of institutionalization. The joint supranational power has its own competences, which it acquires or is voluntarily entrusted (delegated) with them by nation states, or as a result of extending (maximizing) its powers (*spill-over*) outside the delegation process. J. Ruzkowski, *Ponadnarodowość w systemie politycznym Unii Europejskiej [Supranationality in the political system of the European Union]*, Warsaw 2010, p. 278.

³⁷ Similarly in the extending variety MLG proposed by David Levi-Faur as *Multi-Level System of regulatory governance*. This system was to be created in the EU thanks to two components: regulation and Europeanization. D. Levi-Faur, *Regulatory Governance*, in: *Europeanization. New Research Agendas*, Ed. P. Graziano, M.P. Vink, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

³⁸ Cf. also: T. Gehring, *Integrating integration theory. Neofunctionalism and international regimes*, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 95/39, pp. 3-6.

State. However, its continuation, which is liberal intergovernmentalism, outside the confederation system of the EU, in practice promotes a kind of joint venture between Member States and EU institutions. It seems that FP in liberal intergovernmental theory is a bit bolder, as it designs the European Union as a power, also a normative soft power, even with elements of a hard power (with its economic, political and even military power).

Federalism is often associated with a slightly utopian idea of federation, e.g. in the form of the United States of Europe³⁹, or an attempt to mix federalist and liberal-intergovernmental *finalité* providing for federation within the confederation⁴⁰.

The final state of the EU in this regard is *federatio*, which offers a form of a political and economic union with the features of a supranational state with the division of functions, competences and responsibilities between the federal level (centre of power with coordination functions) and the subfederal level with a specific resource of its autonomy. Different levels and centres of power would be balanced precisely by (and thanks to) *federatio* that would allow for the achievement of common goals. In this approach, *federatio* is specifically state-centric, although in the case of the federal European Union it will be a form of federation of states. *Federatio* is therefore to be an institutional and subjective form of *finalité politique* of the EU.

Two parallel proposals can be distinguished in federal *finalité politique*: 1. a political union, 2. a banking union (a type of fiscal federalism).

The first type is the choice between limited economic federation, which is primarily to stabilize euro, and complete federation that would take over the traditional tasks of nation states - taxation, social security and redistribution. The second type oscillates between rule-driven federation with a small margin of political innovation and flexibility, and federation that allows for a wide range of decision-making freedom and choice of political instruments⁴¹. The second proposal, i.e. the banking union (or fiscal federalism), can be the basis for broader federation, or even a full banking, fiscal, and economic union⁴².

A new proposal expanding and multiplying classic *finalité politique* can be *multifinalité* (MF), that is, the theoretical-syncretic synthesis of solutions and proposals designing the future of the European Union, on the basis of which one could attempt to define its future shape.

Theoretical and practical reasons for turning towards multifinalité

How can we define *multifinalité* (MF)? The easiest way would be to state that *multifinalité* is a multiple final shape and a diversified effect of the development of the European Union. So, this is a syncretic final state that can only be understood from a process-oriented and transcend-oriented perspective as well as from the perspective of their dynamics. This is important because in the case of European integration we

³⁹ D. Sidjanski, *The Federal Future of Europe. From the European Community to the European Union*, Ann Arbor 2000. A. Auer, *The Constitutional Scheme of Federalism*, „Journal of European Public Policy”, 2005, Vol. 12, Issue 3, p. 421. Even the Maastricht Treaty there is a „federal appointment of the EU”.

⁴⁰ The pro-integration federal development of Community law was a response and reaction to the disintegrative confederate political development. J. J. Weiler, *Transformation of Europe*, „Yale Law Journal”, 1991, No. 100 (8), p. 2424 and subsequent pages.

⁴¹ S. Dulien, J.I. Torreblanca, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 3.

deal mainly with expansive logic (with the spill-over effect)⁴³. The key word here is “multiple”, which means a varied, polycentric effect, also accumulating many parallel end solutions. For instance, if the future European Union consists of a political union, an economic union, and a social union. This is the multiple final shape of the EU. A union based ultimately on differential multi-speed integration can be an example of *multifinalité*. If the future EU has a strong centre focused on the Eurozone, with a separate budget, executive authority and parliamentary assembly, and weak periphery situated outside of it, this is also an example of the EU’s multiple final shape. *Multifinalité* can therefore be the result of differentiated integration.

Therefore, the sources of *multifinalité*, or determinants, which can cause MF include: differentiated integration, multi-speed integration, polycentricity, as well as separationism.

The theoretical syncretism of *multifinalité* is derived from several polycentric theories, which emphasize the possibility of the EU’s multiple and varied final shape. These theories include: federalism, multi-level governance (and the theory of polycentric governance system as a variation of it) and neo-neofunctionalism.

Specific elements of *multifinalité* can be seen in *federatio*, which offers a form of political union and an economic union, including a banking and fiscal union. Federal theory has some explanatory potential in the field of *multifinalité*.

Written almost into the essence of multi-level governance, polycentricity can also be an important clue for researchers attempting to search for *multifinalité*, which is confirmed by the theory of polycentric governance system originating from MLG.

Neo-neofunctionalist *consortio* is directly related to supranational and collective multi-layer and multi-level governance, which can be a source of *multifinalité*.

If the EU is also an international regime, federation, organization, etc., then “it is all at once; [a] its various forms occur in different activities, in different institutions and at different times. In the European Union there is a full spectrum of forms of activity, from pure intergovernmental policy, the system of balance of power and the model of international organization (e.g. in defence matters), to the model of supranationality close to the state form (e.g. in the scope of the common market)”⁴⁴.

There are several identifiable *multifinalité* varieties: sectoral, separational, and globalizational.


We must remember that *finalité politique* is a formula that narrows the future shape of the EU to its political face. And the future EU is also its economic, social, cultural, identity-related shape, etc. This is the original turning point in the direction of *multifinalité*. If the EU is the sum of various final states (*finalité politique*, *finalité économique*, etc.)⁴⁵, then we can talk about sectoral *multifinalité* (see Chart 1). For this reason, the search for *finalité politique* of the EU is only a search for its fragmentary rather than overall shape.

⁴³ Of course, we can also point to the sequential defensive logic of European integration (e.g. Brexit).

⁴⁴ J. Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja [Theories of international relations. Criticism and systematization]*, Warsaw 2007, pp. 354-355.

⁴⁵ Final states are not scenarios because they do not have potentialities.

Chart 1. Sectoral *Multifinalité*



Source: the author's own elaboration.

Scenario 5 contained in the White Paper on the future of Europe adopted by the European Commission in 2017. Reflections and scenarios for the EU-27 by 2025 are close to sectoral *multifinalité*, which provides for progress in all areas of integration within the EU (economic and monetary union, political union (foreign and defence))⁴⁶.

In practice, federalism can lead the European Union to a political union, i.e. to the implementation of the most difficult integration work that could crown all efforts made so far, but also can lead to a social union while maintaining a highly integrated economic union. This should be all the more appreciated because a political union (political integration⁴⁷) is the most difficult element of integration processes. In practice, the above sectoral examples of *finalité* lead to many “unions in the union”, which means that we are dealing with *multifinalité*.


In practice, turning from *finalité politique* towards *multifinalité* in the paradigm of debating the future European Union (*finalité turn*) has been progressively implemented since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Plans for building a strong centre, which would be a Eurozone with a separate budget and own government, are becoming clearer. In May 2010, the first Euro Summit took place. Franck Biancheri was a supporter of such summits that would represent a specific “*raison d'état*” of the Eurozone. Such summits have already become part of the EU's political system. In August 2017, there was a proposal to establish a new position of the minister of finance for the Eurozone. If we add to this real plans for the establishment of a Eurozone parliament (Wolfgang Schäuble is a supporter and propagator of such a solution) and the announcement of the use of referendum in the Eurozone (trans-euroland referendum), which would be a form of dialogue with the citizens of this zone, and which would support the process of introducing further changes covering the Eurozone, we will notice that more democratic - based on direct democracy mechanisms - basis for the functioning of this zone will be created. As a result, we can deal first with a process of clear democratization of the Eurozone, but then also autonomisation of this Eurozone

⁴⁶ White Paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU-27 by 2025, COM (2017) 2025 final. More similar task point out Ursula von der Leyen: European Union have to strive for more at home in order to lead in the world. U. von der Leyen, *A Union that strives for more. My agenda for Europe, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024*, Brussels 2019, p. 5.

⁴⁷ Close political integration in the EU and a political union as a final solution has been discussed among others by Paweł Świeboda in his article entitled *W stronę europejskiego finalite politique [Towards European finalité politique]*, “Przegląd Europejski”, 2000, no. 1.

within the EU. However, as a result a „Eurounion” may be built in the European Union. It is also a signal towards differentiated integration or multi-speed integration. An extreme element of *multifinalité* would be the detachment of the Eurozone (the future „Eurounion”) from the European Union. Thus, one of the extreme, though possible forms of *multifinalité*, may be its separational variety (see Chart 2).

Chart 2 Separational *Multifinalité*



Source: the author's own elaboration.

Currently, the Eurozone is in the stage of specialized governance, which is dedicated only to this area (*Eurozone Governance*), and which can be used to create the Eurounion. In the future, the Eurounion may be the most modern supranational institutional system in the world.

In separational *multifinalité* elements of sectoral *multifinalité* may occur. It is enough to note that a financial union (which should include a banking union and a capital markets union), a fiscal union and a political union⁴⁸ will be built in the Eurounion to state that these are parameters of sectoral *multifinalité*.

If one of the interpretations of European integration situates the European Union as a regional response to globalization⁴⁹, we can assume that the EU is already one of the global centres along with other centres such as the USA, ASEAN, China, etc. It is a kind of globalizational *multifinalité* based on multicentricity, in which the EU is only one of the elements. For the EU, this type of *multifinalité* has even a *meta* dimension. In globalizational *multifinalité*, the EU is a global economic actor, but not a political or military one. However, it has a chance to be a global strategic actor. On June 28, 2016, the European Council adopted the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, which is a kind of breakthrough, as in the current evolution process of the EU some aversion to the military component and to risk could be seen. Is it possible to be one of the global centres without imperial capabilities? This dilemma was temporarily solved by J. M. Barroso, who describes the

⁴⁸ C. Mik, *Opinia na temat komunikatu Komisji Europejskiej zatytułowanego Biała Księga w sprawie przyszłości Europy. Refleksje i scenariusze dla UE-27 do 2025 [Opinion on the European Commission Communication entitled White Paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU-27 by 2025]* [COM (2017) 2025 final], „Zeszyty Prawnicze”, Bureau of Sejm Analysis, Year XIX, no. 2(54), 2017, p. 80.

⁴⁹ K. Szczerski, *The Duchy of Europe...* op. cit., p. 54. Cf. also: R. Stichweh, *Globalisierung der Wissenschaft und die Region Europa*. In *Globalisierung. Ökonomische und soziale Herausforderungen am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*. Hrsg. Gert Schmidt und R. Trinczek, „Sozialen Welt”. Sonderband 13. 1999.

EU as the “first non-imperial empire”⁵⁰.

However, some examples of the EU’s strategic action could still be spotted earlier. It is enough to mention sanctions imposed on Russia, extended to the East after the Cold War, strategies dedicated to Russia, Africa, the Baltic Sea Region, etc. But a global strategic actor must have its eyes turned to the horizon (*finalité politique*). On the other hand, international crises have highlighted the lack of geopolitical reflection, for which the EU is currently paying a certain price. Therefore, a strengthened strategic action of the European Union is needed, which can be considered as an example of excessive speed by some Member States, so it should not be ruled out that in this type of EU activity a coalition of the willing and capable of such action will be formed. The strategic union will be an important part of globalizational *multifinalité*, i.e. *meta-multifinalité*.

Conclusions

It should be remembered that the search for *finalité politique* in theoretical approaches is a slightly different procedure than its identification in the political practice of the European Union. It is almost obvious that any decision on *finalité politique* of the European Union cannot be spontaneous and ill-considered, as it would have the opposite effect. Europeanist theories allow for a thoughtful and balanced design of the final shape of the EU, they suggest and propose certain formulas. It can be said without exaggeration that using these clues can help practitioners find real solutions.

The aim of the research was to search for the theoretical basis for turning from *finalité politique* towards *multifinalité* in the paradigm of learning about the future European Union. During the research it turned out that: firstly, it is extremely important to determine the essence of *finalité* (without adjectives) with its internal components (*transcendence, equilibrium, destiny*), and secondly to determine the initial state at a given moment (the moment of its maximum development), which will be the reference point (*référentiel*), and at the same time an extremely important, though contextual, initial condition for research on *finalité*. Because the precise determination of the reference point depends next research stage. Only after these efforts it was possible to take another step towards *finalité politique* as a fragmentary element of the final shape of the EU, and finally towards *multifinalité* as a multiple and diverse shape of the final EU.

The theoretical turn towards *multifinalité* is associated with the emergence of polycentric theories (Multi-level Governance and the theory of polycentric governance system), but is also associated with the final *federatio* in federal theory and *consortio* in neo-neofunctionalism.

On the other hand, the practical turn towards *multifinalité* took place with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and above all, it was associated with later tendencies to strengthen the Eurozone, and to treat it as the core of the EU. This initiated activities aimed at equipping this zone with its own institutions, being the institutional

⁵⁰ See: R. Bickerton, *From Nation-States to Member States: European Integration as State Transformation*, in: *The Search for Europe. Contrasting Approaches*, BBVA 2015. J. Fiszler notes that an empire will be a more useful formula for the European Union, defined by the asymmetry relations between the center and the periphery, variable spatial structure, determined by territorial expansion and the logic of two-level identity - national identity and the so-called civilization mission. J. Fiszler *Czy Unia Europejska zagraża państwu... [Is the European Union threatening the state?]*, p. 28. Cf.: E. O. Eriksen, *European Transformation. Pragmatic Approach*, "ARENA Working Paper", 2010, No. 7, M. Gravier, *Empire vs. Federation: which path for Europe?*, "Journal of Political Power", 2011, no. 7.

backbone Eurozone governance.

Multifinalité is just another possible projection of the final shape of the EU, which is not only an alternative to *finalité politique*, but can also contain FP as an element of the multiple effect.

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